

Bibliotekarstudentens nettleksikon om litteratur og medier

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Ideologi

En overordnet filosofisk, religiøs og/eller politisk livsanskuelse, med et sett av verdier, holdninger og idealer, et forsvar for hva som er sant og rettferdig. Et sett av meninger, antakelser, trosforestillinger og holdninger. Et verdisystem. “[T]he term is used to designate some kind of especially coherent and rigidly held system of political ideas.” (Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 306)

I vid forstand er ideologier alle politiske, religiøse, estetiske og andre bevissthetsformer som fungerer som uttrykk for og legitimering av samfunnsforhold og interesser (Arnold og Sinemus 1983 s. 474-475).

“Mike Cormack in his book *Ideology* (1992) begins by quoting four competing accounts of the term [...] Terry Eagleton in *Ideology: An Introduction* (1991) lists as many as sixteen definitions currently in circulation” (Taylor og Willis 1999 s. 57).

“Ideology is a system of concepts and views which serves to make sense of the world while obscuring the *social interests* that are expressed therein, and by its completeness and relative internal consistency tends to form a *closed* system and maintain itself in the face of contradictory or inconsistent experience.” (Terry Eagleton sitert fra <https://www.thoughtco.com/ideology-definition-3026356>; lesedato 19.03.18)

En ideologi er bl.a. et system av verdier. Disse verdiene gir den selvforståelsen som samfunnet skaper som modell for det enkelte samfunnsmedlem. En “politically innocuous meaning of ideology comes close to the notion of “world view”, in the sense of a relatively well-systematised set of categories which provide a “frame” for the belief, perception and conduct of a body of individuals” (Terry Eagleton gjengitt sitert fra Westwell 2006 s. 6).

Ideologi er “falsk totalitet” fordi den “ikke har satt sine egne grenser og ikke er bevisst sin egen begrensning [...] Den eksisterer fordi det finnes ting som det ikke er lov å tale om.” (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 235). En ideologis svakhet ligger ikke i dens svar, for den lykkes alltid med svarene i å etablere forståelige sammenhenger, dens svakhet er snarere de spørsmålene som forblir uten svar (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 235). “Ideologi er

vedvarende *realitetstap*.” (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 234) Ideologier får folk til å akseptere noe ukritisk, uten bevis eller sikker kunnskap, og uten selvstendig vurdering.

“[I]deologies do not operate through single ideas; they operate in discursive chains, in clusters, in semantic fields, in discursive formations” (Stuart Hall sitert fra Brunsdon og Spigel 2008 s. 266). I en ideologi tolkes alltid hendelser innenfor ideologiens eget tanke-system (Mucchielli 1986 s. 24). Noen verk og sjangrer “celestialize hierarchy” (Hugh Duncan sitert fra Sayre 2011 s. 126), dvs. forsvarer de herskendes ideologi og deres undertrykkelsesmekanismer. Ideologier røper seg gjennom sine motsetninger (Dirkx 2000 s. 82).

“Ideology is less tenacious as a “set of ideas” than as a system of representations, perceptions, and images that precisely encourages men and women to “see” their specific place in a historically peculiar social formation as inevitable, natural, a necessary function of the “real” itself.” (Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 310)

“Ideology is a social process that works on and through every social subject, that, like any other social process, everyone is “in,” whether or not they “know” or understand it. It has the function of producing an obvious “reality” that social subjects can assume and accept, precisely as if it had not been socially produced and did not need to be “known” at all.” (Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 311)

“[C]ultural processes are by definition also ideological in so far as the way in which the world is made to mean in a society tends to coincide with the interests of the dominant or powerful classes and groups in that society. [...] the media function ideologically; how, that is, in processes of institutionalized cultural production particular meanings are encoded into the structure of texts, ‘preferred meanings’ which tend to support existing economic, political and social power relations.” (Ang 1996 s. 138)

John Thompsons skriver i boka *Studies in the Theories of Ideology* (1984) at ideology er “linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power – to maintain domination. . . by disguising, legitimating, or distorting those relations” (sitert fra <http://www.jpccs.in/>; lesedato 03.06.15) “In *Studies in the Theories of Ideology*, John Thompson examines many recent theories of ideology and finds that many of them sever the link between ideology and domination, and therefore rob ideology of the critical edge that it had in Marx and other neo-Marxists. I would therefore agree with Thompson on the need to link the concept of ideology with theories of hegemony and domination, and thus to delimit its application to ideas and positions which serve functions of legitimation, mystification, and class domination that assure the domination of the ruling class over other classes and groups within society, rather than equating all ideas or political positions with ideology” (Kellner 1991).

Ideologi “designates the indispensable practice – including the “systems of representation” that are its products and supports – through which individuals of different class, race, and sex are worked into a particular “lived relation” to a sociohistorical project. Ideological analysis studies the ways in which those “lived relations” and systems of representation are constituted, transformed, and affiliated with various specific political programs. More committed forms of ideological analysis also attempt to change the association of influential ideological ensembles and particular political programs. For there can be no successful political program that is not driven by powerful and comprehensive forms of ideological address. Thus, literary and cultural texts of all kinds constitute a society’s ideological practice, and literary and cultural criticism constitutes an activity that, in its own rather meager way, either submits to, or self-consciously attempts to transform, the political effects of that indispensable social practice.” (James H. Kavanagh i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 319-320)

Den britiske kulturkritikeren Raymond Williams vektla “that there are also ‘residual’, ‘emergent’, ‘oppositional’ or ‘alternative’ ideologies. Residual ideologies are those which, although formed in the past, are still active. Emergent ideologies are those of new groups, existing outside of the dominant groups. Oppositional ideologies actively mount a challenge to the dominant ideology, while alternative ideologies may happily coexist with it. Art, and artistic production, may represent any one of these kinds of ideology.” (gjengitt fra Barnard 1988 s. 48)

Ideologiske inkonsistenser blir bare synlige når det har oppstått en motsetning innad i ideologien. Men en ideologi er til for å gi svar i motsetningsfulle situasjoner; det er dens oppgave å viske ut motsetninger (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 234). Kun den som kan distansere seg helt fra en ideologi, kan vite hva en ideologi sier og representerer (Pierre Macherey i Brackert og Lämmert 1977 s. 235).

Både sakprosa og skjønnlitteratur har et ideologisk nivå som kan beskrives eller avsløres i en litterær analyse. Knut Hamsuns ideologiske tilbøyeligheter beveget seg politisk fra anarkistiske tendenser via konservatisme til reaksjonære holdninger som minner om fascisme. En slik utvikling kan etterspores i tekstene hans. Han har også tydelige rasistiske innslag i sin skjønnlitteratur og sakprosa (afroamerikanerne i USA er “Væsner med Tarmer i Hovedet”; “Hans ansigt er ubehagelig, jødisk”). Det ideologiske i et verk kan også inngå i analyser av tegneserier, film, dataspill og andre medier.

“Anglo-European colonialist ideology [...] permitted a small group of small nations – England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands – to dominate most of the globe from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century and which permitted white Americans, in turn, to dominate the Native American lands we now call the United States of America and to hold African captives as slaves. An ideology this successful dies hard. [...] one reason colonialist ideology is so

successful is that it is supported by a complex psychology that strongly influences the way we perceive ourselves and others.” (Tyson 2006)

En litterær tekst kan fungere som en imaginær løsning på ideologiske konflikter, ved å konstruere konflikter i teksten som lar seg løse i teksten (Sayre 2011 s. 148). En litterær tekst kan ifølge amerikaneren Stephen Zelnick også fungere som en “permissive narrative” som bygger opp en komplisert konflikt som begrunner hvorfor en ideologisk konflikt må fortsette i virkelighetens verden (Sayre 2011 s. 148).

En roman, en film eller et dataspill kan presentere f.eks. “capitalist values and beliefs as always correct, timeless and therefore ahistorical. This view of any value system is highly ideological and open to challenge. However, the familiarity of the generic codes and conventions does not invite the audience to challenge its value system.” (Taylor og Willis 1999 s. 64)

“[I]deological analysis attempts to understand how dominant social groups are able to reproduce their social and economic power” (Taylor og Willis 1999 s. 57).

Nederlenderen Teun A. van Dijk kaller fire posisjoner for “den ideologiske firkanten” (“The ideological square”), posisjoner som “provides the features for positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. This ideological square emphasises the positive ‘Us’ and de-emphasises the positive ‘Them’; similarly, it emphasises the negative ‘Them’ and de-emphasises the negatives ‘Us’.” (<https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/corpus/conference-archives/2017/general/paper212.pdf>; lesedato 20.11.19)

Ideologi er dynamisk produksjon og manipulasjon av midler som brukes til å oppnå bestemte mål (Hamon 1984 s. 10). “Politiske ideologier er gigantiske forenklingsapparater. De reduserer virkeligheten til enkle, gripbare marsjordre. Nettopp fordi virkeligheten forenkles så ekstremt, blir det enklere å gripe inn i historiens strøm.” (professor i statsvitenskap Bernt Hagtvet i *Dagbladet* 30. juli 2011 s. 72)

Når det legges sterke føringer fra politiske partier og myndigheter på hvordan litteratur skal skrives, har resultatet blitt kalt “planleggingslitteratur” og “politikk-kunst” (Joch, Mix m.fl. 2009 s. 130 og 133).

Karl Marx oppfattet ideologier som kollektive illusjoner eller løgner, falsk bevissthet som tilslører sanne sammenhenger. Ideologier rettferdiggjør rådende, urettferdige samfunnsforhold og ulike former for undertrykkelse. “De herskende tanker er de herskendes tanker”, hevdet han. Ideologier framstiller noe som selvfølgelig, naturlig og/eller nødvendig, nesten alltid på en slik måte at det tjener maktøverne og de dominerende sosiale klassene. De dominerende ideene i enhver historisk periode er ideene til den ledende klassen, dvs. de som har den sterkeste økonomiske og politiske makten i samfunnet (dominant-ideologi-tesen). Gjennom

prinsipper, lover, institusjoner m.m. blir ideologiene preget inn i samfunnets medlemmer slik at de mer eller mindre godtar de rollene som den rådende ideologien gir dem.

Marx' dominant-ideologi-tese lar ideer omfatte både intellektuelle ideer, verdier og (moralske, politiske, sosiale) normer. Den dominerende ideologien i en periode framstilles av maktøverne som noe nødvendig og uunngåelig, en selvfølgelighet som det er meningsløst å opponere mot. "*The Dominant Ideology Thesis* suggests that there is in most societies a set of beliefs which dominates all others and which, through its incorporation in the consciousness of subordinate classes, tends to inhibit the development of radical political dissent. [...] the dominant ideology has the function of maintaining the dominant class's control over property in feudalism and early capitalism. In late capitalism, however, the changing nature of the dominant class in terms of a partial divorce between ownership and control means that the dominant ideology ceases to be crucial for the coherence of the dominant class." (Son-Ung Kim m.fl. i http://www.sociologyindex.com/dominant_ideology_thesis.htm; lesedato 23.06.15)

Den franske sosiologen Pierre Bourdieu kaller ideologi for "symbolsk makt". Både det vitenskapelige, estetiske, moralske og religiøse fyller ideologiske funksjoner (Peytard 1995 s. 32). Begrepet inkluderer både epistemologiske, sosiologiske, politiske og psykologiske faktorer. Ideologi avgrensner hva som lar seg tenke, føle, uttrykke og forstå, og skaper soner der alt er uforståelig eller usynlig (Sayre 2011 s. 135).

"Ideology cannot exist without the psychology appropriate to it, without the psychology that sustains it. Thus, such ideologies as classism, sexism, heterosexism, and racism are not merely belief systems. They are also ways of relating to oneself and others and, as such, involve complex psychological modes of being. Perhaps nowhere is the intimate connection between ideology and psychology demonstrated more clearly than in postcolonial criticism. For one of postcolonial theory's most definitive goals is to combat colonialist ideology by understanding the ways in which it operates to form the identity – the psychology – of both the colonizer and the colonized. And as a pervasive force in Western civilization, colonialist ideology can be found operating, sometimes invisibly but almost always effectively, even in those cultural practices and productions in which we would not expect to find it" (Tyson 2006).

Den franske filosofen Louis Althusser hevdet at alle mennesker befinner seg fullstendig innenfor en ideologi. Oppdragelse, familie, utdanning, mediene, religiøse organisasjoner i en stat styrer hva og hvordan vi tenker og handler. Althusser oppfatter ideologi som en ubevisst dimensjon i mennesket som åndsvesen. I en viss forstand er ideologi derfor et historieløst fenomen, i motsetning til de politiske ideologiene som f.eks. marxismen og nazismen (Aron og Viala 2006 s. 34). Det generelle fenomenet ideologi gir en viss autonomi til måten

mennesket oppfatter sin situasjon i verden på. Marxisten Althusser oppfatter ideologi som en representasjon av individers imaginære relasjon til sine reelle livsbetingelser (gjengitt etter Sarfati 2001 s. 97). Denne relasjonen gir seg utslag i tenkemåter og i konkrete handlinger.

Ideologi er ifølge Althusser den (overdeterminerte) enheten av det reelle og det imaginære, og uttrykk for vilje, håp og lengsel snarere enn beskrivelse av virkelighet (gjengitt fra Clarke, Cohen et al. 1981 s. 96). Det ideologiske har samme forklaringskraft for Althusser som det underbevisste har innen psykoanalysen (Dirkx 2000 s. 82).

Den ideologien som en selv har, er mer eller mindre “usynlig” for en selv. “Religious beliefs, political opinions, conceptions of race and sex or social class, even our most deeply seated notions of life – all these constitute our ideological frame of reference. Although we may live as if our beliefs were the only true and real explanations of how the world is, we need only compare our own ideology with that of another group or culture or era to see how historically and socially shaped many of those views are.” (Bordwell og Thompson 2007 s. 63). “[I]deology is most effective when it erases itself” (Deacon et al. 1999 s. 154), dvs. fungerer på en allestedsnærværende, men usynlig måte.

Ideologier skaper ifølge Marx og Althusser en imaginær, illusorisk koherens som gjør at mennesker kan neglisjere den sosiale urettferdigheten i samfunnet (Dirkx 2000 s. 82). En ideologi er ambivalent, den forsoner menneskene, men omfatter også den utilfredsheten som må forsones (Hager 1992 s. 146). Det kan skilles mellom regressiv ideologier som ser tilbake mot et ønsket samfunn som en gang eksisterte (eller som folk tror at eksisterte), nåtidslegitimerende ideologier som vil bevare status quo, og progressive ideologier som vil forandre kraftig eller fjerne den nåværende tilstanden og bygge noe annerledes/bedre.

Det er totalitære ideologier som f.eks. kommunismen og nazismen som skaper mest fanatisme. Totalitære ideologier fungerer som “erstatningsreligioner”. Mens ekte religioner bevarer en ærefrykt for det uforklarlige, for noe ukjent som mennesket er en del av, skrumper verden for ideologene ofte inn til noe som skal “forklares og kureres fra ett punkt” (Safranski 1999 s. 326)

“Marx took over the term “ideology” from the French Revolution of 1789. It was actually coined in the 1790s by Antoine Destutt de Tracy and originally meant a “science of ideas” capable of conceiving a set of progressive positions that could guide society in an enlightened direction. (Evidently Napoleon later invented the term “ideologue” at a particularly conservative bend in his own winding career, when he wanted to attack “dogmatic” revolutionists like Destutt de Tracy.) At first, Marx retained this original usage in some of his early essays, even though he would ultimately define ideology in at least four different ways throughout his career. Later, Lenin would also utilize a variation of this first conception in *What Is To Be*

Done? (1905), when he called socialism “the ideology of struggle of the proletarian class” and claimed that in the class struggle “socialism” is necessarily “introduced by the ideologues” (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 85-91). Revealingly enough, the other three concepts of ideology used by Marx at various moments are not always easy to interrelate with this first and quite straightforward definition of it as a programmatic set of consciously held ideas about society.” (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 277-278)

“In *The German Ideology* (1846), Marx and Engels referred to ideology in a much more negative vein as a set of illusory beliefs that keep people from rationally understanding their real conditions of material existence. This very influential second definition went as follows: “[I]n all ideology people and their circumstances appear upside down as in a *camera obscura*. ... In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth; here we ascend from earth to heaven. ... We set out from real, active people, and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process.” (Marx and Engels, 1975, 5, p. 36) This second definition of ideology was also the one that on 14 July 1893 led Engels, in a letter to Franz Mehring (over a decade after Marx’s death) to describe ideology for the first time as “false consciousness” (Marx and Engels, 1953, p. 541). Although Marx never actually used this phrase, it was definitely consistent with his contention that ideology often entails an illusory misunderstanding of how society unfolds. This “negative” understanding of ideology as an illusionary sense of material conditions was subsequently the starting point for Althusser’s ingenious structural redefinition of ideology as mere “false *unconsciousness*.” Or, as Althusser put it, ideology constitutes “the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1978, p. 162). For all the cogency of this antihistoricist interpretation of ideology by Althusser (who baldly remarked in the same essay that “Ideology has no history”), it presupposes a congruence between ideology and falsehood that is illuminating at certain moments and dead wrong at others.” (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 278)

“The third concept of ideology used by Marx entailed a broadening of his understanding of this phenomenon, but this alternative vantage point did not simply invalidate all that was of merit in the two earlier definitions. Instead of being programmatic beliefs about social change or mystified views about social conditions, the third definition was in a certain sense a combination of both. Here ideology was construed to be a legitimate expression of the actual interests of a particular class, part fictive and part factual in nature, in relation to a given system. Anchored realistically in certain social formations and yet banking on the as-yet-unrealized (hence “unreal”) potential of these formations, ideology so defined is not so much right or wrong as it is more or less limited. According to this definition, the superiority of working-class ideology is that it takes into account the interests of all humanity (and is thus a “classless”, as well as radically egalitarian, ideology).

All other class-based ideologies are only beneficial to one social class or group, to one degree or another. They thus represent less the interests of humanity, than those of an elite or provincial group within it. This third definition of ideology features a subtle ratio of truth value to outright illusion that revolves around the gap between empirical observation and an abstract worldview – with the latter generally edging out the former for acceptance. Thus, ideology involves both a cognitive and noncognitive grasp of reality that is true on one level and false on another. This third and more complicated concept of ideology in Marx’s later work is one that yielded some especially remarkable advances in the 1920s and 1930s, from Gramsci and Mariátegui through Benjamin and Adorno. It was with this group and the origin of “critical theory” that the noteworthy shift was made from seeing ideology just as a system of progressive ideas or negative illusions to grasping it as a set of *lived* social practices marked by varying degrees of self-realization. This conception also triggered the concept of “behavioral” ideology that emerged with Voloshinov in the 1920s and flourished after the 1960s in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. For Bourdieu, the sociologist, ideology involves habitual acts within society that are based on class-structuring disposition. These ideological habits are bound together by an internalized “cultural unconsciousness” with *actual* relations to both real and imagined conditions of existence (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192).” (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 278-279)

“The fourth and final definition of ideology used by Marx appeared most arrestingly in an extremely complicated passage from his later writings, that is, the first part of volume one of *Kapital* (1867). In this magisterial discussion of the secrets of *commodity fetishism*, Marx deployed ‘ideology’ to mean a field of duplicitous and disfiguring relationships that are not so much wrong as they are misleading and socially constraining. As a result of this dislocated link to material conditions, “the mind reflects an inversion in reality itself” that results from the tenacious but never absolute hold of commodity fetishism. That is, we both see and misperceive the nature of our relations to the world through the veil of fetishized commodities in a constellated system that revolves around them. The metaphor of the *camera obscura* that Marx uses without much success in his early writings on ideology, as others have noted (Mitchell, 1986, pp. 168ff), suddenly gained unprecedented trenchancy in this fourth definition of ideology. Here we can paraphrase Terry Eagleton again: in *The German Ideology* Marx defined it as a matter of not seeing things as they really are, and in *Kapital* he discussed ideology more expansively as a form of structurally constrained thought that is less downright false than it is markedly reductive and generally disempowering (thus being tied to one’s class interests rather than to those of humanity in a more all-encompassing manner). Ideology here is *both true and false*, while being contingent upon a deceptive combination of the two that *naturalizes* the historically constructed in such a way as to make it look “inevitable” (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 85-91).” (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 279-280)

“This highly nuanced fourth definition of ideology spawned a series of brilliant engagements with the problem of ideology, starting with two legendary books from 1922-3: *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (History and Class Consciousness)* by Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács and *Marxismus und Philosophie* by German thinker Karl Korsch. Each of these studies in turn had a profound impact first on the 1930s – when “critical theory” was originated by the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, T. W. Adorno, and Walter Benjamin) – and then on the 1960s – through Guy Debord’s critique of the “society of the spectacle” and Henri Lefebvre’s crucial work on the logic of quotidian life in the postwar West. In his book, the young Lukács virtually invented the concept of reification as we now understand it. Enormously controversial in its own day and still much debated in our own, this landmark critique both inspired the creation of the Frankfurt School in 1923 and was promptly denounced by the Bolshevik leaders of the Comintern in 1924. Whether intentionally or not, Lukács revalorized subjectivity and critical self-reflexivity in a way that became a stark rebuke to the economism of Soviet-style “dialectical materialism.” As Lukács explained reification, it dramatically extended Marx’s notion of alienation (or the estrangement from oneself, from others, from one’s own work, and from the labor process per se). For Lukács this meant that reification entailed the fragmentation and dislocation of modern social experience in a way that causes people to forget that the course of society always presupposes a collective process, an overarching structural logic. The experience of modernity thus encourages people to see things as if they were mere isolated objects, or as if they were utterly autonomous agents. Consequently, the present is *not identical-with-itself* (to recall Adorno’s extension of this position) once the potential of the present to be transformed is suppressed by the status quo (Lukács, 1923).” (David Craven i Smith og Wilde 2002 s. 280)

“In the United States today, the dominant ideology is one that, in keeping with Marx’s theory, supports capitalism and a society organized around it. The central tenet of this ideology is that U.S. society is one in which people are free and equal, and thus, can do and achieve anything they want in life. At the same time, in the U.S., we value work and believe that there is honor in hard work, no matter what the job. These ideas are part of an ideology that supports capitalism because they help us make sense of why some people achieve so much in terms of success and wealth and why others, not so much. [...] Marx would argue that these ideas, values, and assumptions work to justify the reality in which very few people have positions of power and authority within corporations, firms, and financial institutions, and why the majority are simply workers within this system. Laws, legislation, and public policies are crafted expressing and supporting this ideology, which means that it plays a significant role in shaping how society operates and what lives are like within it. And while these ideas may be part of the dominant ideology in today’s America, there are in fact ideologies that challenge them and the status quo they support. The 2016 presidential campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders spotlighted one of these alternate ideologies – one that instead assumes that the capitalist system is fundamentally unequal and that those who have

amassed the most success and wealth are not necessarily deserving of it. Rather, this ideology asserts that the system is controlled by them, rigged in their favor, and designed to impoverish the majority for the benefit of the privileged minority. Sanders and his supporters, thus advocate laws, legislature, and public policies that are designed to redistribute society's wealth in the name of equality and justice.” (Nicki Lisa Cole i <https://www.thoughtco.com/ideology-definition-3026356>; lesedato 19.03.18)

Det som i andre samfunn blir (eller ble) oppfattet som sant og rettferdig, kan i ens eget samfunn bli oppfattet som usant og urettferdig. Innen et samfunn kan noen sannheter bli oppfattet som kun én gruppes meninger og tro (f.eks. den kristne religion), ikke en overordnet sannhet med konsensus i hele samfunnet. “[W]hat feminists know about sexual harassment are beliefs that are based also on principles of feminist ideology, such as equality, autonomy and so on. Others (especially anti-feminists) may deem such knowledge as mere opinions or exaggerated beliefs.” (Dijk 1995) En ideologi skjuler sannheten samtidig som sannheten omformes styrt av bestemte interesser, formål og ønsker, hevder en fransk essayist (Lévy 1977 s. 167).

“En vanlig oppfatning om ideologi er at det er fasttømrede prinsipper som skal forklare alt. Men det virker mer som om ideologi arter seg som et filter mellom inntrykkene, verdens sprikende fakta, og de årsaksforklaringene vi velger å trekke mellom alle inntrykkene.” (Sigve Indregard i *Morgenbladet* 14.–20. august 2015 s. 4)

“Ideology, after all, is nothing more than “the fiction one would prefer to believe,” the system of representations that the dominating class uses to justify its power and which the dominated need, or think they need, to rationalize their powerlessness.” (Stam 1992 s. 77)

“[S]ystemet råder også over mekanismer, der hurtigt, effektivt og ubemærket kan afmontere oprøret ved at suge dets overflade af ungdom, nyhed og sanselig intensitet op i flader af medie billeder og forbrugsvarer.” (Michael Buchwald i Skyum-Nielsen 1982 s. 173)

“The social inspiration for a theory of ideological structure [...] must be sought in the basic properties of (social) groupness, of which the following ones have particular relevance:

1. Membership devices (gender, ethnicity, appearance, origin, etc.): Who are we?
2. Actions: What do we do?
3. Aims: Why do we do this?
4. Norms and Values: What is good or bad?
5. Position: What is our position in society, and how do we relate to other groups?
6. Resources: What is ours? What do we want to have/keep at all costs?”

(Pullum 2004)

En ideologi kan romme mange tendenser og -ismer i ulike blandinger. Janzen Kooistra skriver at den britiske middelklassen i victoriatiden hadde en ideologi som inkluderte “capitalism, paternalism, racism, imperialism, sexism and the like” (1995 s. 57). Det går an å studere ideologien i en tekst, teksten i ideologien, ideologien som tekst, flere ideologier som brytes i samme tekst, m.m. (Hamon 1984 s. 5).

“[B]oth racism and antiracism are ideologies, and so are sexism and feminism. Ideologies may thus serve to establish or maintain social dominance, as well as to organize dissidence and opposition.” (Pullum 2004) Noen ideologier har pådratt seg et svært tydelig sosialt og etisk stigma. Den franske forfatteren Maurice Barrès var både nasjonalist og antisemitt. Han levde fra 1862 til 1923. “I tilfellet Barrès [var det] frem til ganske nylig [...] vanskelig å oppdrive bøkene hans og ganske suspekt å sitere selv apolitiske tekster fra hans hånd. Undertegnede har selv skamfullt unngått blick fra undrende bokhandlere ved kjøp av gamle utgaver av noen av disse verkene i Latinerkvarteret i Paris.” (Øystein Tvede i *Morgenbladet* 25. september–1. oktober 2009 s. 20)

“A striking illustration of [...] selective reading is the working-class response – or rather, nonresponse – to imperialist propaganda. Patrick Dunae and others have argued that a whole generation of boys were converted to imperialism by the novels of [den engelske forfatteren] G. A. Henty and similar forms of indoctrination. “At school, in church groups, in recreational associations – at almost every turn boys were exposed to the imperial idea”: that undeniable fact leads Dunae to the conclusion that “in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century most British youths were acutely aware of their imperial heritage. They could scarcely have been otherwise.” They certainly could have been otherwise. The majority of those youths were working-class, and they seem to have been acutely unaware of their empire. Although John MacKenzie has shown that imperialist propaganda saturated textbooks, popular literature, and later the cinema, he fails to prove that this message got through to its intended audience. The memoirs of Robert Roberts, Willie Gallacher, and Harry Pollitt all document workers’ indifference to the empire, except for brief and exceptional outbursts of jingoism during the First World War. [...] Apparently they did not even notice the ideological freight carried by these tales, which were read purely as adventure stories, in which India or Africa was simply an exotic backdrop, not a territory the reader wanted to spend his life policing. [...] John M. MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester, 1984)” (Jonathan Rose i artikkelen “Rereading the English Common Reader”; her sitert fra <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2709910.pdf>; lesedato 26.01.17).

“Bourgeois ideology, for Brecht, masks the people’s loss of real power by fostering certain illusions – the illusion of individual autonomy, of a free contractual relationship between labor and capital, producers and consumers, and so forth. This

ideology it not a Machiavellian imposition by a dominating class, but rather a phenomenon generated by the social structure itself. It becomes our “lived world,” in Althusserian terms, a kind of normal pathology, the moorings of the dominant system within the psychic and intellectual structures of *all* classes. It is precisely the normality of ideology that necessitates an art which makes things strange. Brecht believed that bourgeois normality numbs human perception and masks the contradictions between professed values and social realities; therefore he called for an art that would free socially conditioned phenomena from the “stamp of familiarity” and reveal them as striking, as calling for explanation, as other than “natural.” ” (Stam 1992 s. 211) “Without resorting to coercion or violence, hegemony makes people accept a certain ideological position through a discourse, as if it were something natural.” (Kim 1996 s. 223)

Ifølge Althusser uttrykker forfattere ideologi i sine verk uten å være seg det bevisst, og det er mulig å rekonstruere hva ideologien består i gjennom tolkning av verket, gjennom å forstå “symptomene” i teksten, dens ideologiske spenninger og konflikter (Aron og Viala 2006 s. 34-35). I verket *Forsvar for en teori om den litterære produksjon* (1966) prøver franskmannen Pierre Macherey å vise hvordan forfatterne Honoré de Balzac og Jules Verne skaper romaner med ideologiske implikasjoner som de selv ikke er seg bevisst (Aron og Viala 2006 s. 35).

“In the USA, for example, unemployment, poverty, and hard times are experienced perhaps more than anywhere else as personal failures; ideologies of individualism inevitably result in self-blame. When self-blame creates threats to the personality, the result is scapegoating, revivals of virulent racism, national chauvinism, and so on. This is inevitable in a society in which psychology treats the individual person as such (a psychology which reifies possessive, isolated, privatized individuals), rather than in terms of the totality of relationships which constitute the individual’s social life. [...] This line of reasoning may illuminate why public opinion polls in the USA almost invariably conclude that the “public” has never lost faith in the economic and political systems. Rather, little faith is granted particular political leaders’ desire or capacity to perform their high functions well (except when they are serving their own self-interests). What is perceived, therefore, is a crisis of social integration at the highest levels of power. System problems are thus personalized and leaders scapegoated.” (O’Connor 1987 s. 153)

Et eksempel på hvordan populærkultur fungerer ideologisk er hvordan konflikter vises i mange tegneserier i comics-tradisjonen. Konfliktene vises som uttrykk for individuelle motsetninger og “tilfeldigheter”, ikke overgripende maktkonflikter (Greiner 1974 s. 48). Dessuten blir samfunnet framstilt som et stivt hierarki der det er “flaks” eller “uflaks” som avgjør om du er oppe eller nede i hierarkiet. Enkeltmennesket oppfatter sitt liv som “skjebne”, fordi muligheten for omfattende solidarisering ikke blir vist. Privatinteresser og individets behov framstilles som langt mer fundamentale og viktige enn fellesskapets interesser (s. 48). Ariel

Dorfman og Armand Mattelart ga i 1971 ut boka *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*.

Øyvind Holen, forfatter av boka *Donald-landet: Hvordan en and i matrosdress formet det moderne Norge* (2012) uttalte i et intervju: “Det er aldri systemet sin feil at det går galt for Donald, det er hans eget overmot eller hans udugelighet. Det er den amerikanske drømmen. Mulighetene er der, og Donald kløner det til for seg selv.” (*Morgenbladet* 9.–15. november 2012 s. 20)

Anders Heger publiserte i 2012 en bok om Thorbjørn Egner med tittelen *Egner: En norsk dannelseshistorie*. I et intervju sa Heger: “Egner er en type forfatter, på samme måte som Bjørnson, der du kan avlese samtidens ideologi og ideologiskifter veldig tydelig i arbeidet hans. - Er det så mange ideologiskifter hos Egner? Jeg trodde det var samme stabile verdensbilde hele veien. - Nei, faktisk ikke. Ta for eksempel forholdet mellom utenforskap og fellesskap, et tema han tar opp i alle hovedverkene sine. Hvordan skal vi behandle dem som ikke passer inn? I *Karius og Baktus*, som ble til midt under krigen, er svaret enkelt: Vi skyller dem ut. Inntrengerne kastes på dør. I *Hakkebakkeskogen* tvinges derimot outsiderne inn i en streng sosial konsensus, noe som egentlig er ganske dramatisk når vi snakker om rovdyr som må bli vegetarianere. - Og i *Kardemomme by*? - Personlig regner jeg det som hans litterære mesterstykke. Der er ikke løsningen at de kriminelle innvandrerne Kasper, Jesper og Jonathan tvinges til å endre sin natur. Gjennom kjærlig omgang og mildt sosialt press får storsamfunnet i stedet frem den de egentlig er – deres opprinnelige natur får nytt utløp som sirkusdirektør, brannmann og bakerassistent. - Hvilke mentalitetsskifter i det norske samfunnet speiles her? - Du kan si at verdensbildet i *Kardemomme by* er naivt. Men historien foregriper likevel ganske nøyaktig den kriminalreform Norge fikk et tiår senere, der lovbrøtere gjennom behandling og inkludering skulle rehabiliteres tilbake til de gode menneskene de opprinnelig ble født som. I Egners fjerde storverk, *Musikantene kommer til byen*, som er skrevet i 1967, er moralen ikke at samfunnet skal tvinge de bohemaktige musikantene inn i fellesskapet, men tvert imot at *dropoutsene* skal lære storsamfunnet en lekse om musikalitet og livsglede. Med andre ord: Hippiene hadde rett, opprørerne har noe å lære fellesskapet. [...] *Hakkebakkeskogen* og *Kardemomme by* sier noe om hele den nordiske modellen, som vokste frem samtidig som de ble skrevet. De formulerer en identitet for det norske samfunnet.” (*Morgenbladet* 2.–8. november 2012 s. 44)

“In July 1989 I witnessed a public controversy [in India] over the depiction of two mythological heroines on television, Sita of the *Ramayana* and Draupadi of the *Mahabharata*. Everyone, from vegetable vendors and cab drivers to upper-class intellectuals who usually dismissed television serials, was discussing it. A leading newsmagazine ran a poll to ask which of the two better represented “the modern Indian Woman.” Many comparisons and contrasts were drawn between Sita, who symbolizes devotion and patience, and Draupadi, noted for her intelligence and fiery strength. Historically, both Sita and Draupadi have served as symbols for

Indian Womanhood (ideal types of the *bhartiya naari*). For instance, nationalist ideologues have appropriated both Draupadi's rage and Sita's resilience to encourage orthodox Hindu women to join anticolonial movements (Mankekar 1990)." (Purnima Mankekar i Brunson og Spigel 2008 s. 257)

Indiske tv-seere "are reconstituted as subjects not just by the form and content of serials but the manner in which these texts resonate with the viewers' experiences of dominant social discourses. Viewers' deep emotional engagement with television, the *bhaav* that a text arouses in them, spurs them to introspection about themselves and their lives. [...] Morley has described "the average sitting room" as a "site of some very important political conflicts – it is, among other things, one of the principal sites of the politics of gender and age. ... The sitting room is exactly where we need to start from if we finally want to understand the constitutive dynamics of abstractions such as "the community" or "the nation." (Morley 1991: 12)" (Purnima Mankekar i Brunson og Spigel 2008 s. 265).

"Gerbner and Gross (1976) argue that television is the central cultural arm of American society serving to socialize people into standardized roles and behaviors. Television accomplishes this through a presentation of basic assumption about the way life is and what values are important. They suggest that television cultivates people's beliefs, about how the world works more through the sum total of interactions, behaviors and values present in television content." (Aaliya Ahmed i http://www.ijsrp.org/research_paper_jun2012/ijsrp-June-2012-47.pdf; lesedato 27.09.18)

Den amerikanske regissøren Steven Spielbergs film *Jaws* (1975) "received attention from academic critics. Stephen Heath relates the film's ideological meanings to the then-recent Watergate scandal. He argues that Brody represents the "white male middle class – [there is] not a single black and, very quickly, not a single woman in the film", who restores public order "with an ordinary-guy kind of heroism born of fear-and-decency"." (<http://www.gradesaver.com/jaws/wikipedia/inspirations-and-themes/>; lesedato 14.11.13)

Roger Fowler hevder i boka *Literature as social discourse: The practice of linguistic criticism* (1981) at fordi en av språkets funksjoner er å produsere ideologi, er også det litterære språket fullt av ideologi (Sayre 2011 s. 205).

Språkbruksnormer er ideologiske. Gjennom bruken av språket viderebringer vi en rekke begreper og tolkninger som ligger innvevd i språket, og som gjør oss blinde for andre betydninger og tolkninger enn de som allerede er godtatt (Lundquist 1983 s. 139). Geoffrey K. Pullum har satt opp en liste over prinsipper som "garanterer" at Standard English som språklig norm er best for engelskmenn. Lista kan altså brukes som "basis for justifying prescriptive claims":

“- *Nostalgia*. Justificatory basis: The past glory of some vanished golden age, an imagined linguistic utopia in which people spoke correctly. To avoid: Change – decay and deterioration, either linguistic or social.

- *Classicism*. Justificatory basis: The standing of other higher-prestige languages such as Latin. To avoid: Adoption of an inferior form of human language.
- *Authoritarianism*. Justificatory basis: Subordination to the established authority of high-prestige masters of the language. To avoid: Social disgrace from using low-grade English.
- *Aestheticism*. Justificatory basis: Beauty and aesthetic responses. To avoid: Ugliness and awkwardness.
- *Coherentism*. Justificatory basis: Consistency and order of patterning. To avoid: Chaos, randomness, disorder.
- *Logicism*. Justificatory basis: Logic in the strict sense. To avoid: Irrationality.
- *Commonsensism*. Justificatory basis: Common sense. To avoid: Silliness.
- *Functionalism*. Justificatory basis: Efficiency of the communicative function. To avoid: Ambiguity, misunderstanding, redundancy, etc.
- *Asceticism*. Justificatory basis: Discipline and self-control. To avoid: Laziness and sloppiness.”

(Pullum 2004)

En spissborger er en egoistisk og trangsynt person, preget av konformitet og selvgod uforanderlighet. Spissborgeren er grunnleggende fornøyd med sin sosiale og økonomiske situasjon, og ønsker derfor at livet skal vare i det uendelige akkurat slik det er nå, men kan likevel drømme om det store loddet. Den danske filosofen Søren Kierkegaard skrev analytisk-polemisk om spissborgerens tilværelse. Den østerriksk-ungarske forfatteren Ödön von Horváth ga i 1930 ut romanen *Den evige spissborger*. Tyskeren Hermann Glaser har lagd uttrykket “spissborger-ideologi” og beskriver hva den går ut på i boka *Spissborger-ideologi: Om ødeleggelsen av den tyske ånd i det 19. og 20. århundre og nasjonalsosialismens oppkomst* (1964; ny versjon 1985).

Ord som “kapitalisme” og “kommunisme” får helt forskjellige konnotasjoner avhengig av den ideologiske konteksten ordene brukes i (Lundquist 1983 s. 141).

Den franske forfatteren Albert Camus hadde ikke tro på noen politisk eller revolusjonær bevegelse som var villig til å drepe barn for å nå sine mål (Dubois 1995 s. 40). Han skrev om marxismen: “Med et fortvilet ønske om umiddelbar rettferdighet har de marxistene som kaller seg ortodokse, valgt å dominere verden i den framtidige rettferdighets navn. På en måte befinner de seg, uansett om det kan synes motsatt, ikke lenger på denne jord. De befinner seg i logikken. [...] Jeg har kommet til den konklusjon at marxismens virkelighetsbegrep ikke bare er falskt, men at det blir drepende.” (sitert fra Dubois 1995 s. 131 og 133)

James H. Kavanagh gir eksempler på “the relation between ideological and political struggle, of how the power to define what is “obvious” helps to determine who

rules, and of the relative strength of insurgent versus dominant ideological frameworks we can offer the widely publicized tussle during the 1984 presidential campaign over the “meaning” of Bruce Springsteen. This began with a column by George Will, America’s favorite reactionary nerd, lauding Springsteen as a shining example of the American dream – of how hard work, ambition, and the unfettered ability to accumulate wealth can give hope, if not ensure success, to working-class Americans. This version of Springsteen was then worked into a Reagan speech in Springsteen’s home state of New Jersey, attempting to appropriate Springsteen, the cultural icon, as a Reaganite kind of guy. The national media soon followed, with full segments on the network nightly news, interviewing fans at Springsteen concerts, who proclaimed that, indeed, Springsteen appeared to them as another proof of the obvious American social fact that if he could make it, anybody can. All of the hoopla eventually prompted Springsteen himself to remind his concert audiences that the words of his songs (like “My Hometown”) hardly proclaim the durability of the American dream; to donate concert proceeds to union welfare funds; and to speak to workers rallying against plant closures, telling them: “What goes unmeasured is the price that unemployment inflicts on people’s families, on their marriages on the single mothers out there trying to raise their kids on their own.” At stake here was how the vast appeal of an attractive cultural icon, and the wildly popular and pleasing cultural texts (rock songs) he produced, could be appropriated to support specific political and socioeconomic programs. Do Bruce Springsteen and his work obviously reaffirm or obviously challenge the American Dream according to Reagan and Will? Do he and his songs show an America that is a land of opportunity for everyone, or a land of broken hopes for too many? In this case, the repeated, if somewhat less-publicized, direct interventions of the “author” led right-wing propagandists to back off somewhat on their attempts to appropriate his work, and the result can be described as a kind of stand-off. [...] to say this is not to issue some kind of ultraleftist criticism of Bruce Springsteen, who has been forthrightly and refreshingly progressive, but to recognize a sociocultural fact – namely, that he and his work are enmeshed in ideological apparatuses and ideological struggles that determine its “meaning” in ways he can (and does) affect but cannot entirely control.” (Kavanagh i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 318-319)

Den engelske regissøren Sophie Fiennes’ film *A Pervert’s Guide to Ideology* (2012) er lagd i samarbeid med en kjent slovensk filosof. “Filosofen Slavoj Žižek og filmskaper Sophie Fiennes bruker sin tolkning av berømte filmscener for å presentere en fengslende filmatisk reise inn i kjernen av ideologi, drømmene som former vår kollektive tro og praksis. Den filosofiske provokatøren Slavoj Žižek er stjernen i filmen. Han undersøker filmklipp fra mer enn 20 filmer som hjelper ham å klikke seg gjennom kapitalismen, fascisme, forbruk, stalinisme, religion og mer. Tankevekkende og garantert stor underholdning.” (tidsskriftet *Cinamateket* nr. 5 i 2014 s. 36)

“Nasjonalisme er den mest mobiliserende ideologien verden har sett. Dens mangfold er dens styrke, og årsaken til dens holdbarhet og tøyelighet. I mange land fungerer nasjonalisme som et substitutt for religiøst fellesskap og som rammeverk for velferdsstaten. Siden nasjonalismen formes av lokale forhold, har den avfødt et mangfold av sosiale og politiske systemer. Disse farges gjerne av tilstøtende ideologier. Sosialdemokrater, hinduer og konservative – alle kan de være nasjonalister. Tankestrømmen er derfor vanskelig å avgrense. [...] Uten å være universalistisk har nasjonalismen blitt universell. Det internasjonale system utgjøres av nasjonalstater.” (Asle Toje i *Morgenbladet* 13.–19. april 2018 s. 31)

Rambo og andre filmer

I Michael Ryan og Douglas Kellners bok *Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film* (1988) forsøker to filmeksperter å vise hvordan den liberalismen som ligger til grunn for svært mange Hollywood-filmer på 1970-tallet, på 1980-tallet ble erstattet av en annen ideologi. Hollywood-filmene på 80-tallet rommet ofte en politisk konservatisme som støttet Ronald Reagans politikk, blant annet gjennom å diskreditere fellesskapsløsninger og favorisere individuell heroisme (Mai og Winter 2006 s. 10). Reagan selv var en stor fan av Sylvester Stallone m.fl.s *Rambo*-filmer. Her vinner den ekstreme individualisten.

“To carry out an ideology critique of *Rambo*, for instance, it wouldn't be enough simply to attack its militarist or imperialist ideology, and the ways that the militarism and imperialism of the film serves capitalist interests by legitimating intervention in such places as Southeast Asia, Central America or wherever. One would also have to criticize its sexism and racism to carry out a full ideology critique, showing how representations of women, men, the Vietnamese, the Russians, and so on are a fundamental part of the ideological text of *Rambo*. This requires analyzing how the dimensions of class, gender, race, and imperialist ideology intersect in the film, reproducing rightist ideologies of the period. [...] *Rambo* (1985) is but one of a whole series of return-to-Vietnam films that began with the surprising success of *Uncommon Valor* in 1983 and continued with the three Chuck Norris *Missing in Action* films of 1984-1986. All follow the same formula of representing the return to Vietnam of a team of former vets, or a superhuman, superhero vet like Rambo, to rescue a group of American soldiers “missing in action” who are still imprisoned by the Vietnamese and their evil Soviet allies. The film *Rambo* synthesizes this “return to Vietnam” cycle with another cycle that shows returning vets transforming themselves from wounded and confused misfits to super warriors (i.e. *Rolling Thunder*, *Firefox*, *First Blood*). All of these post post-Vietnam syndrome films show the U.S. and the American warrior hero victorious this time and thus exhibit a symptom of inability to accept defeat. They also provide symbolic compensation for loss, shame, and guilt by depicting the U.S. as “good” and this time victorious, while its communist enemies are represented as the incarnation of “evil” who this time receive a well-deserved defeat. Cumulatively, the return-to-Vietnam films therefore exhibit a defensive and

compensatory response to military defeat in Vietnam and, I would argue, an inability to learn the lessons of the limitations of U.S. power and the complex mixture of good and evil involved in almost all historical undertakings.” (Kellner 1991)

“On the other hand, *Rambo* and the other Stallone-Norris meathead films can be read as symptoms of the victimization of the working class. Both the Stallone and Norris figures are resentful, remarkably inarticulate, brutal, and thus indicative of the way many American working class youth are educationally deprived and offered the military as the only way of affirming themselves. Rambo’s neurotic resentment is less his own fault than that of those who run the social system in such a way that it denies his class access to the institutions of articulate thought and mental health. Denied self-esteem through creative work they seek surrogate worth in metaphoric substitutes like sports (*Rocky*) and war (*Rambo*). It is symptomatic that Stallone plays both *Rocky* and *Rambo* during a time when economic recession was driving the *Rockys* of the world to join the military where they became *Rambos* for Reagan’s interventionist foreign policies. The *Rocky-Rambo* syndrome, however, puts on display the raw masculism which is at the bottom of conservative socialization and ideology. The only way that the *Rockys* and *Rambos* of the world can gain recognition and self-affirmation is through violent and aggressive self-display. And Rambo’s pathetic demand for love at the end of the film is an indication that the society is not providing adequate structures of mutual and communal support to provide healthy structures of interpersonal relationships and ego ideals for men in the culture. Unfortunately, the Stallone films intensify this pathology precisely in their celebration of violent masculism and militarist self-assertion.” (Kellner 1991)

Rambo-filmene ga det amerikanske publikummet “en symbolsk kompensasjon for nederlaget i Vietnam” (Dörner og Vogt 2013 s. 191). Og Reagans hardhendte utenrikspolitiske stil fikk “gjennom fortellingen og bildene fra Rambo-filmene en virkningsfull visuell legitimasjon” (Dörner og Vogt 2013 s. 191).

Russel Berman skriver i artikkelen “*Rambo: From Counter-Culture to Contra*” (1985) om noen av Reagan-periodens filmer: “In an era where bad film stars become reactionary politicians, political films which are equally bad may be something we will just have to live with. So after the Nicaraguan occupation of Smallville in *Red Dawn*, Ricky goes to Vietnam in *Rambo*. This box office hit of the summer appears to confirm all the claims of leftist criticism regarding the ideology of Reaganism. Above all, it represents the revisionist history of the Vietnam War, won on the battlefield but lost by politicians who capitulated to the totalitarian pawns of Moscow, who in turn continue to imprison and torture unnumbered POWs” (<http://philpapers.org/rec/BERRFC>; lesedato 05.06.15).

“What is perhaps most curious, however, is how *Rambo* appropriates countercultural motifs for the right. *Rambo* has long hair, a head-band, eats only

natural foods (whereas the bureaucrat Murdock swills Coke), is close to nature, and is hostile toward bureaucracy, the state, and technology – precisely the position of many 60s counterculturalists. But, as Russell Berman (1985: 145) has pointed out, Rambo’s real enemy is the “governmental machine, with its massive technology, unlimited regulations, and venal political motivations. Rambo is the anti-bureaucratic nonconformist opposed to the state, the new individualist activist.” Thus Rambo is a supply-side hero, a figure of individual entrepreneurship, who shows how Reaganite ideology is able to assimilate earlier countercultural figures, much as fascism was able to provide a “cultural synthesis” of nationalist, primitivist, socialist, and racist ideologies (Bloch 1933). This analysis suggests that Reaganism should be seen as revolutionary conservatism with a strong component of radical conservative individualism and activism, and that this fits in with *Star Wars*, *Indiana Jones*, *Superman*, *Conan* and other films and television series which utilize individualist heroes who are anti-state and who are a repository of conservative values.” (Kellner 1991)

“The representations and thematics of race also contribute fundamentally to the militarist theme. The Vietnamese and Russians are presented as alien Others, as the embodiment of Evil, in a typically Hollywood manichean scenario that presents the Other, the Enemy, “Them,” as the embodiment of evil, and “Us,” the good guys, as the incarnation of virtue, heroism, goodness, innocence, etc. *Rambo* appropriates stereotypes of the evil Japanese and Germans from World War II movies in its representations of the Vietnamese and the Russians, thus continuing a manichean Hollywood tradition with past icons of evil standing in for – from the Right’s point of view – contemporary villains. The Vietnamese are portrayed as duplicitous bandits, ineffectual dupes of the evil Soviets, and cannon fodder for Rambo’s exploits while the Soviets are presented as sadistic torturers and inhuman, mechanistic bureaucrats. And yet reflections on the construction of gender and race in the film make clear that these phenomena are socially constructed, are artificial constructs that are produced in such things as films and popular culture. The stereotypes of race and gender in *Rambo* are so exaggerated, so crude, that they point to the artificial and socially constructed nature of all ideals of masculinity, femininity, race, ethnicity, and other subject positions.” (Kellner 1991)

“The generic war film and “return to Vietnam” codes, combined with Rambo’s triumph, present the film as a conservative imperialist/militarist fantasy which transcodes Reaganite anti-communist and pro-militarist discourses. In fact, Reagan himself stated during a frustrating period of dealing with so-called terrorists that “I’ve just seen *Rambo* and I’ll know what to do the next time”; indeed, Reagan constantly employed Ramboesque solutions to the political challenges of the day, fighting secret wars all over the world and engaging in overt military actions. Thus Reagan’s response to *Rambo* disclosed that he really believed that violence was the best way to solve conflicts, and not by accident were Oliver North and other members of Reagan’s secret government referred to as “Rambos” when they engaged in their illegal and criminal covert operations. Furthermore, the “happy

ending” closure situates the film as a return to the conservative Hollywood adventure tradition, and the victory over the evil communists codes *Rambo* as a mythic redemption of U.S. defeat in Vietnam by heroic action – a trope reproduced in the films of Stallone, Chuck Norris, and countless other films, pulp novels, and television shows and which was instantiated in the political actions of Ronald Reagan and Oliver North (Jewett and Lawrence 1988: 248f.). Although the U.S. was denied victory in Vietnam, it has attempted to achieve it in popular culture. This phenomenon shows some of the political functions of popular culture which include providing compensations for irredeemable loss while offering reassurances that all is well in the American body politic – reassurance denied in less conservative films such as Oliver Stone’s *Salvador*, *Platoon*, *Wall Street* and *Talk Radio* which provide an instructive counter-cycle to the Stallone Rocky/Rambo cycles and which thus testify to the conflictual nature of cinematic ideology in the contemporary period.” (Kellner 1991)

Presidentens uttalelse “Boy, after seeing Rambo last night, I know what to do next time” skal ha blitt sagt med en lur blinking med et øye (Dörner og Vogt 2013 s. 191).

“Reagan’s most “popular” acts were his invasion of Grenada and bombing of Libya – precisely the sort of “action” celebrated in *Rambo*, *Top Gun*, *Iron Eagle* and the other militarist epics of the Reagan era. And so it is that Hollywood film in the Age of Reagan enacts rites of mythical redemption in narratives which attempt to manage social anxieties, to soothe and alleviate the sense of shame associated with defeat, and to smooth away the rough edges of history (i.e. U.S. atrocities in Vietnam as depicted in *Platoon*) in a mythical scenario where the Americans incarnate goodness and innocence while the communists represent pure evil – precisely the fantasy of Ronald Reagan in his pre-detente incarnation and precisely the mind-set of the classical Hollywood cinema in which Reagan dutifully performed.” (Kellner 1991)

“*Rambo* presents a fantasy of rightwing heroism and ideological compensation for loss in Vietnam, it depicts a fundamentally corrupt political establishment, and Rambo’s final assault against the computer system inadvertently depicts the obsolescence of the primitive warrior in a high tech weapons system where chumps like Rambo are at best cannon fodder who will be increasingly irrelevant to high-tech warfare. Read against the grain, *Rambo* can be seen as testimony to working class victimization and as a demonstration of the cynical uses and manipulation of uneducated working class youth like Rambo – an explicit theme of *Platoon* which early on establishes that it is poor white working class and third world ethnics who are being used as fodder in the Vietnam war games.” (Kellner 1991)

Den amerikanske regissøren John Milius’ film *Red Dawn* (1984) “appeared during a period of intense debate over Reagan’s support of the Nicaruguan contras and other anti-communist, counterrevolutionary groups all over the world, accompanied

by his military build-up and hostile posture toward the Soviet Union. *Red Dawn* thus advances an anti-communist, counterrevolutionary position which plays on and reproduces specific political fears that Reagan constantly played on. The film opens with titles on the screen narrating a rightwing nightmare of the Left taking over the world with the United States completely isolated. Ponderous Germanic music then accompanies images of clouds and sky, and the camera zooms down to a mountain vista, zeroing in on a monument – all aggressively fascist images culled from the work of Nazi filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl: the opening homage to her film *The Triumph of the Will* clearly signals the rightwing nature of Milius' vision. The monument contains an ideological text by ultra-imperialist Theodore Roosevelt whose warrior values the film obviously wants to advance: “Far better is it to dare mighty things than to take rank with those poor timid spirits who know neither victory nor defeat.” ” (Kellner 1991)

“*Red Dawn* wants to advance a specifically anti-communist agenda by showing Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaruguan troops invading and occupying the United States after their seizure of a highly strategic high school in the countryside of Colorado. This scenario, however, forces Milius to present a fullscale communist invasion – surely the sort of “mighty” daring that Roosevelt/Milius praise. Moreover, the opening images show small town America as the locus of “poor timid spirits” where football and a Saturday night date are the most highly valued activities. In other words, the patriotic film is really anti-American, highly contemptuous of contemporary American society, while the anti-communist film is secretly sympathetic to communist revolution, to the daring and audacity of communist revolutionaries. *Red Dawn* enacts its militarist scenario through scenes which transform a small group of teenagers into partisan resistance fighters, and attempts the daring feat of recuperating for the Right the figure of the heroic revolutionary freedom fighter – a figure that played a central role in 60s leftist mythology in the form of Che Guevera, the Viet Cong, and others, which the Reagan administration was trying to seize for the Right in its attempt to present U.S.-funded Nicaruguan terrorists as “freedom-fighters.” In making a Cuban communist, Col. Bella (Ron O’Neil), the emblem of such a figure, Milius, however, undercuts his rightwing comic book anti-communism. Furthermore, the supposedly “democratic” freedom fighters are highly authoritarian. In a key early scene, the teen leader Jed refuses to allow democratic voting and beats up the liberal high school President who opposes him. We are supposed to sympathize with Jed’s “strength” and to see democracy as the ploy of weak, self-interested politicians.” (Kellner 1991)

Red Dawn “displays the extreme contempt that the Right feels for democracy in the United States – a contempt then being acted out in the political adventures of the time directed by William Casey, George Bush, and their stooge Oliver North. In *Red Dawn*, anyone associated with democracy is presented as corrupt: the high school President betrays the “resistance fighters” and is assassinated by one of the members in the group and his father, the mayor, is also shown as a spineless collaborator. In addition, the film (inadvertently?) puts on display the masculist

socialization in patriarchal society. When Jed and Matt visit their father incarcerated in a prison camp, he tells them that he was “tough” with them as children to prepare them for the hard knocks of life – a conservative view of the world confirmed in the film’s ideological scenario. His final advice to them is an order not to cry and a pathetic plea to “avenge me!” One then sees Jed being equally authoritarian and “tough” as his father as the film creaks along, signalling the way that patriarchal authority is handed down from father to son, in which the sons replay the authoritarian and aggressive roles of their father (though one might note that this conservative socialization scenario being touted in the film is under attack by more liberal socialization practices in the United States today). The film also attempts to incorporate women and feminism into its rightwing warrior ideology. Two teenage girls join the “resistance fighters” and become warriors, every bit as effective as the men. The message seems to be that real women are most like real men and thus incorporates feminism into its militarist agenda at a time when the U.S. was becoming dependent upon women recruits for its volunteer army. Indeed, the film suppresses sexuality altogether, with one of the young women, Erika (played by Lea Thompson), developing a crush on an older pilot who joins the warrior band but later is conveniently killed. The other woman warrior, Toni, only expresses her feelings for the band’s *fuhrer* Jed when she is dying, as he cautiously plants a chaste kiss on her forehead.” (Kellner 1991)

“Marginal elements, however, undercut in subtle ways the film’s [*Red Dawn*] rightist ideology. Cracks in the dominant American ideology show through in a scene in the Arapaho National Battlefield where one of “the great battles of the American West” took place. Milius tries to cover over the theft of Indian land and butchery of Native American resistance fighters by having a Russian Communist translate the plaque into Marxist terminology: “There was a great peasant uprising in 1908 of wild Indians. They were crushed by President Theodore Roosevelt, leading armies of imperialist cossacks and cowboys. The Battle lasted all winter. More than 35,000 were killed.” While Milius may be trying to occlude the colonial history here by utilizing off-putting Soviet communist jargon, the “marginal” statistic of “35,000 killed” uncovers and points to the violent destructiveness of American imperialist adventures. The episode also (unwittingly?) equates the communist invaders with the American pioneers who had earlier invaded Indian territory, thus showing Communist and American aggressors to be brothers under their imperialist skins, one no better or worse than the other. It is also unclear what the teen warriors are supposed to be fighting and dying for. At the point where they confront the need to kill the traitor in their midst, one of the teens asks: “what’s the difference between us and them,” and the teen fascist Jed offers the rather feeble response: “we live here!” [...] both *Red Dawn* and the TV mini-series *Amerika* represent the ideological bankruptcy of rightist ideology. As symbols of patriotism worth fighting and dying for about all they can come up with is the flag, the national anthem, and masculist self-assertion.” (Kellner 1991)

“Furthermore, while *Red Dawn* attempts to advance an entire agenda of rightwing values, I would argue that the ideological project ultimately is incoherent and falls apart (one could make similar arguments concerning Milius’ earlier *Conan* film). Far from glorifying war and the warrior, *Red Dawn* ultimately shows the futility, emptiness, and destructiveness of military violence (much as does *Platoon* from an explicitly critical-liberal position). For after glorifying the teen resistance Fighters’ heroics, during the last third of the film one by one they are progressively brutalized and eventually killed off. Thus, *Red Dawn*, arguably, undercuts the warrior ethic as the teen warriors become more and more brutalized and pay with their lives for their heroism. In one poignant scene near the end, Jed and his brother Matt return to the park where they used to play football as children and one takes out a childhood picture of two smiling happy young faces. Mentally comparing this childhood idyll with what they have become, Jed tears up the picture and begins crying. In the violent finale, some of the remaining teen warriors are killed and the fate of the two brothers, Jed and Matt, is left up in the air in the final narration as Ericka (Lea Thompson) describes her escape to the “free zone” and indicates that she never saw the two brothers again. These final war scenes thus, inadvertently perhaps, portray warrior heroism as an ode of death and destruction opposed to the pleasures and joys of life. The most interesting moment, however, occurs when the Cuban revolutionary, Col. Bella, whose love of life had led him to decide to resign his position when he saw that he was becoming more of a police official than a revolutionary emancipator – playing once again on the Che Guevara myth – decides not to shoot Jed who is carrying the mutilated body of his brother Matt. Bella throws down his rifle in disgust and walks away. What is happening here? Is the self-proclaimed Zen fascist warrior John Milius really a closet liberal and pacifist? Or is even the rightwing becoming aware of the human costs of military adventures?” (Kellner 1991)

“*Red Dawn* is an incoherent text torn by contradictions. [...] Milius sets up the communist invaders as barbaric hordes by introducing them after a black high school teacher is lecturing on Ghenghis Khan and is then shot and killed by the communist invaders. He also employs the aesthetic of realism to use details of the visual screen to depict the ways that the communists have set up a police state, drawing on the earlier codes of the anti-communist genre which was a staple of Hollywood film during the late 1940s and early 1950s. As in the Jack Webb film *Red Nightmare*, there are images of individuals torn from their houses, marched through the streets, and interned in concentration camps; another image portrays the local movie theater playing classical Russian films. Yet the triumphant entrance into the town of Colonel Bella to the martial music of the *International* codes him as a powerful and heroic figure and his sympathetic portrayal throughout the film wins some sympathy for the communist revolutionary – a trope repeated with the later entrance of the Russian leader of a special forces group, Strelnikov, who is also presented sympathetically. So a contradiction emerges between Milius’ anti-communist scenario and his pro-warrior ethos with his cinematography investing both the communist and “resistance” warriors with the most positive resonance.

[...] [*Red Dawn*] becomes more and more incoherent and confusing as it proceeds, thus depriving Milius of the honor of becoming the foremost cinematic auteur and ideologue of Reaganite anti-communist (a prize that Stallone wins hands down). Consequently, whereas Milius may have intended to make a rightist, militarist, and anti-communist film – and it certainly contains ample examples of these themes and was read in this way when it came out – the film is ultimately incoherent and undercuts in various ways its militarist and anticommunist project.” (Kellner 1991)

Tyrkias “recent growing interest in conservative film production, in many cases, is understood to have connections with the so called light-Islamist party, Justice and Development Party, AKP. A commonly held belief is that the ruling party, AKP, supported conservative cinema-art sector because they both shared the same cause (Uguz, 2010). For instance, Uguz claims that the director of *New York'ta Beş Minare* (*Five Minarets in New York*, 2010), a Mahsun Kırmızıgül film, enforces AKP-oriented international and national policies, and Fetullah Gulen tendentious world view. Several comments connect this tradition and the film to the currently increasing political Islam and the Fetullah Gulen movement. It is only recently that cinema's socio-political effects have been rediscovered by conservative cinema producers and they have begun to include Islamic and traditional topics in their films (Güven, 2008). This new interest for making films about conservative and nationalist themes grew exponentially especially when Islamic and/or conservative business firms increased their market share in the Turkish economy and began investing in the art sector as they used to invest in religious structures and activities. These wealthy business people backed art forms that would highlight traditional values, enforce cultural unity and advocate for national togetherness as seen in the TV series *Kurtlar Vadisi* (*Valley of the Wolves*, 2003), *New York'ta Beş Minare* (*Five Minarets in New York*, 2010), *Hür Adam* (*Free Man*, 2010), and *Fetih 1453* (*Conquest 1453*, 2012). For example, the producer and the director of *Free Man*, Mehmet Tanrisever (he is known to have close relations with the Fetullah Gulen Movement), is also a businessman and the owner of the Feza Film company which produced other conservative cinema films such as *Minyeli Abdullah I* and *II*. Tanrisever's return to cinema as a producer and director after 20 years of absence was because of his belief in cinema's role in educating people. [...] Often referred to as ‘The Gulen Movement’ or ‘The Fetullah Gulen Community’, it is a social (Islamic) movement that originates in Turkey. The movement has millions of supporters in Turkey and hundreds of schools and cultural centers, many publication houses, and television stations in Turkey and all around the world. The leader of the community, Fetullah Gulen (Hodja Effendi), currently [2014] resides in the Poconos of Pennsylvania, USA.” (Necati Anaz i <http://www.participations.org/Volume%2011/Issue%201/2.pdf>; lesedato 22.06.15)

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