

Bibliotekarstudentens nettleksikon om litteratur og medier

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Sist oppdatert 04.12.20

Dekonstruksjon

Dekonstruksjon er en teoriretning som inkluderer ulike analysemetoder. Et felles-element er at en overfor litterære tekster ikke lenger arbeider for å påvise homogenitet. I stedet er det en del av denne retningens prosjekt å vise hvordan tomrom og forskyvninger i enhver struktur og enhver tankebygning blir meningskonstituerende. I tekster som dekonstrueres, leter leserne/verktolkerne fram tilbakeholdt mening som stadig forflytter seg, men som i og med disse forflytningene likevel har en listig og uhåndgripelig mening. Stilt overfor litterære tekster innebærer dette en systematisk oppsøking av det i teksten som gjør en enhetlig og organisk meningsintegrasjon umulig å stabilisere.

Dekonstruksjon kan oppfattes som “a positive technique for making trouble; an affront to every normal and comfortable habit of thought.” (Norris 1988 s. xi) Det har blitt oppfattet som “the loosening or weakening of the structures of domination and oppression that now hold us captive.” (Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 217)

“The term deconstruction is normally used to refer to a set of strategies whose operations expose and subvert the unarticulated presuppositions of metaphysical thought which, in remaining unexposed, maintain dominance within Western culture. [...] Rhetoric is basically used to subvert logic rather than to support it. Favourite techniques are: reversal of binary oppositions which appear equal but where one term has a negative or secondary relation to the first; displacement, which renders the first term dependent on the second; parody, which subverts the myth of pure origin; forms of repetition with difference, which have a similar effect; and the demonstration that truth is always a metaphor.” (Waugh 1992 s. 71)

“Deconstruction is, as Barbara Johnson has put it, ‘a careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text.’ Skeptical of the possibility of mastering meaning with a comprehensive system or discipline, it investigates what the most powerful and interesting texts have to tell us about signification and shows how they undo the logics of signification on which they rely.” (Culler 1983 s. ix) Ofte viser en dekonstruktiv analyse “two logics, each of which works by excluding the other.” (Culler 1983 s. 177) Dekonstruksjon innebærer en paradoksal “nedoppbygging” (Bohrer 1993 s. 314). Det dekonstruerte konstruerer seg gjennom sin egen destruksjon (Bohrer 1993 s. 23).

Hans Hauge sammenfatter det han oppfatter som dekonstruktivismens to sentrale aspekter slik: “Det ene aspekt kan oppfattes som en teori om, at tekster er *selv-dekonstruktive*, eller at de er *ubestemmelige*. Det andet aspekt har at gjøre med en tilsyneladende *ophævelse* eller *udjævning* af forskellen mellem genrer: mellem teori og digtning, mellem historie og fiktion, mellem filosofi og litteratur. [...] Hvis teksten fundamentalt set er ubestemmelig, *heterogen*, dialogisk, så umuliggjør det både en historisk-materialistisk såvel som en formalistisk-strukturel læsning.” (i Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 14) “Et andet aspekt ved “doktrinen” var, sagde jeg, udviskningen af forskellen mellem genrer: mellem poesi og kommentar, mellem fiktion og teori, mellem litteratur og filosofi, mellem historie og historiefilosofi, mellem fiktion eller historie o.s.v.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 17-18)

“Deconstruction, too, is “apolitical” when it is used to show that the meaning of a text is *undecidable*: the text’s meaning can’t be pinned down and, therefore, the text has no meaning in the traditional sense of the word.” (Tyson 2006)

“Literature, as much as philosophy, then, lends itself to “transcendent readings.” If the aim of philosophy could be said to be the effacement of its written, textual characteristics before the signified it wants to convey, the same could be said for literature and literary theory – at least in the great majority of cases. [...] Derrida’s stated critical project is certainly to push both philosophy and literature beyond their traditional delimitations and to rework their relations with each other through the transformation of each. From his perspective, any *theory* of literature that does not work towards this double transformation is limiting the critical impact of deconstruction by making it a defense of literature. And, it should be added, any treatment of deconstruction as primarily a model or methodology for reading literary (or philosophical) texts is certain to have these restrictive effects – even if it initially challenges and disturbs more conventional forms of literary criticism and techniques of reading.” (Carroll 1987 s. 89)

“Literature creates openings through which critical philosophy can also move in order to do battle with philosophical authority and the various forms of closure it imposes.” (Carroll 1987 s. 89-90)

Den franske filosofen Jacques Derridas “goal is to push against the limitations of theory and produce a form of critical discourse mobile enough to pass from art to theory and back again without terminating in either one. His work on art “mobilizes” both theory and art by rethinking each in terms of the frames that both separate them and link them together, that both block and permit passage or movement between them.” (Carroll 1987 s. 144) Det er “not a question of choosing between literature and truth, fiction and psychoanalysis, text and theory; it is, rather, a question of accounting for the “overrun” of one into the other.” (Carroll 1987 s. 151) Dekonstruksjon “shows how discourses undermine the philosophical presuppositions on which they rely” (Culler 1983b s. 88-89).

Derrida var påvirket av den tyske filosofen Martin Heideggers kritikk av den vestlige metafysikken. Heidegger prøvde å undergrave det språket som tvinger oss til å tenke innen tradisjonelle begreper og “logiske” oppfatninger om tid og eksistens (Steiner 1989 s. 121).

“Dekonstruksjonen ble utformet i forlengelsen av Derridas lesninger av Heidegger, i forsøk på videreføring av 1800-tallets kritikk av vestlig metafysikk, særlig hos Friedrich Nietzsche. Heideggers uttrykk, “Destruktion” eller “Abbau”, kan riktignok ha mange betydninger: fjerning, demontering, reduksjon, svekkelse, nedbryting, oppløsning, avvikling, nedbygging, rasing. Derrida ville unngå de overveldende negative konnotasjonene ved Heideggers begreper. Valget falt på “dekonstruksjon”, med virkninger langt inn i norsk kulturdebatt et halvt århundre senere. På fransk kan ordet betegne det å ta en maskin fra hverandre, del for del, for å transportere den til et nytt sted og bygge den opp igjen; et vakkert bilde på oversettelse, som dekonstruksjon er nær forbundet med. Derrida ønsket å kombinere arkitektoniske og mekaniske betydninger med de retoriske – det dreier seg om *tankebygninger*.” (Tom Egil Hverven i *Klassekampens* bokmagasin 19. januar 2013 s. 6)

“Poststrukturalismen er primært språkfilosofi” (Frank 1984 s. 488). Innen poststrukturalistisk teori blir det retoriske sett på som en uttryddelig dimensjon ved språket. Dette synet står i motsetning til troen på at sannheter hviler i absolutt selvidentitet uavhengig av språk og deretter kan formidles u-retorisk gjennom språket. Det er umulig å formidle innsikter uten omsvøp av retorisk art. De følgende dikotomiene kan sies å ha ligget til grunn i det tradisjonelle og metafysiske synet på retorikk:

	realiteter / illusjoner	
	fakta / meninger	
	stabilt / foranderlig	
	fornuft / følelse	
	dybde / overflate	
Sannhet <-----	essensiell / perifer	-----> Retorikk
	indre / ytre	
	umediert / mediert	
	klar / dunkel	
	nødvendig / tilfeldig	
	likefram / kronglete	
	nøytralt / partisk	

“A deconstruction involves the demonstration that a hierarchical opposition, in which one term is said to be dependent upon another conceived as prior, is in fact a rhetorical or metaphysical imposition and that the hierarchy could well be reversed.” (Culler 1983 s. 183) Den tyske dikteren og filosofen Johann Gottfried von Herder mente at tanke og språklig uttrykk forholder seg til hverandre som

sjelen og kroppen (Schlingmann 1985 s. 120). Slike motsetningspar blir undergravd innen dekonstruksjon.

Oppgaven er “to deconstruct everything that presents itself as an order, to show that all “order” conceals something else, something that is repressed in this order.” (Jean-François Lyotard sitert fra Carroll 1987 s. 27)

Jacques Derrida oppløser forskjellene og hierarkiene mellom kulturelt/naturlig, skriftlig/talt og andre begrepspar (Klepper, Mayer og Schneck 1996 s. 273). I opposisjonspar som sjel/kropp, ånd/materie, fornuft/følelse blir den siste kategorien tradisjonelt oppfattet som underlagt og sekundær i forhold til den første (Dery 1997 s. 256). Postmodernistene vil skake disse dualistiske hierarkiene. Et av poststrukturalistenes prosjekter har vært å vise hvordan den ene polen alltid infiltreres av den andre, og at retorikk er en uatskillelig del av all kommunikasjon mellom mennesker. Det er umulig å tenke eller argumentere utenfor retorikken eller hinsides metaforene (Zima 1994 s. 50). Fokus på retorikk erstatter fokus på semantikk (Bohrer 1993 s. 321).

Håpet “om sansningens “gennembrud” til en umiddelbar, intuitiv opplevelse af natur, krop eller bevidsthed [tar] sig derfor ud som en forglemmelse af at sproget, som forståelsens ultimative medium, endegyldigt blokerer for en sammensmelting af natur og ånd, tegn og idé, subjekt og objekt. [...] dekonstruktionismens sprogtenkning. Modsat klassiske mimetiske sprogteorier, der hævder en *naturlig* forbindelse mellem tegn og betydning, symbol og idé, signifiant og signifié, fokuserer dekonstruktionismen, med støtte i (post)strukturalismens begreb om sprog som et system af differenser, på det litterært-figurative sprogs mulige underminering af denne stabile relation” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 91).

Derrida “argues that philosophers have been able to impose their various systems of thought only by ignoring, or suppressing, the disruptive effects of language. His aim is always to draw out these effects by a critical reading which fastens on, and skilfully unpicks, the elements of metaphor and other figurative devices at work in the texts of philosophy. Deconstruction in this, its most rigorous form acts as a constant reminder of the ways in which language deflects or complicates the philosopher’s project. Above all, deconstruction works to undo the idea – according to Derrida, the ruling illusion of Western metaphysics – that reason can somehow dispense with language and arrive at a pure, self-authenticating truth or method. Though philosophy strives to efface its textual or ‘written’ character, the signs of that struggle are there to be read in its blind-spots of metaphor and other rhetorical strategies.” (Norris 1988 s. 18-19)

Derridas analyser avslører at “even when a text tries to privilege speech as immediacy, it cannot completely eliminate the fact that speech, like writing, is based on a *différance* (a Derridean neologism meaning both “deferment” and “difference”) between signifier and signified inherent in the sign. Speakers do not

beam meanings directly from one mind to another. Immediacy is an illusion. Properties normally associated with writing inevitably creep into a discussion designed to privilege speech. [...] This emphasis on writing as the more originary category is designed to counter the history of logocentrism and to track the functioning of *différance* in structures of signification.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 43)

“The logic of writing is thus a double logic: writing is called upon as a necessary remedy for *différance*, but at the same time it is the very *différance* for which a remedy must be sought. In Derrida’s analyses of writing, this logic is called the logic of the *supplément*. In French, the word *supplément* means both an “addition” and a “substitute.” To say that “A is a *supplément* to B” is thus to say something ambiguous. Addition and substitution are not exactly contradictory, but neither can they be combined in the traditional logic of identity. [...] Some sense of the way in which supplementary logic differs from the binary logic of identity ($A = A$) and noncontradiction ($A \neq \text{not } A$) may be derived from the following list. In this list, all statements are to be taken as *simultaneously* equivalent to the statement “A is a supplement to B.” [...]

- A is added to B.
- A substitutes for B.
- A is a superfluous addition to B.
- A makes up for the absence of B.
- A usurps the place of B.
- A makes up for B’s deficiency.
- A corrupts the purity of B.
- A is necessary so that B can be restored.
- A is an accident alienating B from itself.
- A is that without which B would be lost.
- A is that through which B is lost.
- A is a danger to B.
- A is a remedy to B.
- A’s fallacious charm seduces one away from B.
- A can never satisfy the desire for B.
- A protects against direct encounter with B.

Supplementary logic is not only the logic *of* writing – it is also a logic that can only really exist in writing. That is, it is a nonintuitive logic that inheres (Lacan would say, “in-sists”) in a text as a system of traces. Like an algebraic equation with more than one unknown, supplementary logic cannot be held in the head but must be worked out in external form. It is no accident that the word “differential” is central both to calculus and to Derrida’s theory of writing.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 45)

“What enslaves is not writing per se but *control* of writing, and writing as control. What is needed is not less writing but more consciousness of how it works. If, as Derrida claims, the importance of writing has been “repressed” by the dominant culture of the Western tradition, it is because writing can always pass into the hands of the “other.” The “other” can always learn to read the mechanism of his or her own oppression. The desire to repress writing is thus a desire to repress the fact of the repression of the “other.” What is at stake in writing is the very structure of authority itself.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 48)

“[S]ince communication does take place we must discover how it occurs if we wish to understand ourselves as social and cultural beings. But literature itself, in its continual pressure on and violation of codes, reveals a paradox inherent in the semiotic project and in the philosophic orientation of which it is the culmination. To account for the signification of, shall we say, a metaphor is to show how the relationship between its form and its meaning is already virtually present in the systems of language and rhetoric. The metaphor itself becomes not a radical or inaugural act but a manifestation of a preexistent connection. Yet the value of the metaphor, the value of our experience of the metaphor, lies in its innovatory, inaugural force. Indeed, our whole notion of literature makes it not a transcription of preexisting thoughts but a series of radical and inaugural acts: acts of imposition which create meaning. The very conventions to which we appeal in explaining literary meanings are products: products which, it would seem, must have acts as their source. This second perspective deconstructs the first; it seems to bring about a reversal, explaining meaning not by prior conventions but by acts of imposition. However, the first perspective also deconstructs the second in its turn, for acts of imposition are themselves made possible by the situations in which they occur, and meanings cannot be imposed unless they are understood, unless the conventions which make possible understanding are already in place. The semiotics of literature thus gives rise to a ‘deconstructive movement’ in which each pole of an opposition can be used to show that the other is in error but in which the undecidable dialectic gives rise to no synthesis because the antinomy is inherent in the very structure of our language, in the possibilities of our conceptual framework.” (Culler 1983 s. 39)

For de Man omfatter retorikk både grammatiske, epistemologiske, historiske, logiske og estetiske aspekter ved språket i teksten (Bohrer 1993 s. 198). Retorikk er for han “et system uten system” (Bohrer 1993 s. 199). Retorikken gjennomtrenger alt språk, men fremmer diskrepans, fordobling, ubestemthet og brudd. Den gjør enhver epistemologisk overbevisning tvilsom, og legger en uovervinnelig hindring i veien for enhver lese måte og forståelse (Bohrer 1993 s. 199).

Tekst blir “considered as an open, infinite *process* that is both meaning-generating and meaning-subverting. [...] Closure versus subversion, product versus practice, meaning-containing object versus significance-scattering process [...] The rebus, the anagram, and the letter are clearly all manifestations of *writing*. They are graphic, articulated, material instantiations of systems of marks that simultaneously

obscure and convey meaning.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 40 og 42).

“Litteraturens overlegne retoriske selvbevidsthed viser sig netop som evnen til at iscenesætte en dekonstruktion af metaforens eller symbolets påståede mulighed for at totalisere og forsonne modsætninger. Retorik forstår de Man her i den klassisk “oprindelige” forstand som studiet af figurer og troper, ikke i den alment udbredte forstand som overtalelse, eller negativt: som forførelse af tilhørere gennem veltalende tilsidesættelse af sandheden. Hovedinteressen gælder forholdet mellem sprogets figuralitet, eller metaforicitet, og erkendelsens mulighed, i kort begreb: retorikkens epistemologi. Litteraturen vidner om sprogets uafvendelige figuralitet, der hjemsøger og forhindrer filosofiens sandhedsprojekt. Sandheden beror traditionelt på muligheden for et figurrensset sprog, men når figuraliteten modstår enhver lingvistisk hygiejne, bliver sandheden en ikke-positivérbar bagside af litteraturens vedvarende dramatiseringer af det figurative sprogs vildfarelser. En retorisk litteraturkritik kan systematisere det litteræres nødvendige fejltagelser i et negativt sandhedsbegreb. Den forbliver dog fuldstændig afhængig af litteraturens projekt, og følgelig sekundær i forhold til den. Paul de Man kommer således til at fremstå som en subtil og urokkelig forsvarer af det litteræres primat, imod såvel kritikens forvandling til en selvstændig og ligeværdig genre som filosofiens ubegrundet selvsikre subsumering af det litterære i en æstetik, men også imod hans egen retoriks behov for at systematisere dét som alligevel altid undslipper begrebslig bestemmelse.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 29)

Mening oppstår gjennom et spill mellom differenser, der opposisjonspar oppløses og oppløsningenes epistemologiske effekter undersøkes (Bohrer 1993 s. 103). Blant opposisjonsparene er mening/meningsløshet, spill/alvor, kunst/virkelighet, sann/falsk, god/ond, vakker/stygg, indre/ytre, konservativ/revolusjonær. Dekonstruktiv-retorisk tekstanalyse negerer tradisjonelle totalitetsmodeller (Bohrer 1993 s. 103). Ethvert totaliserende sentralperspektiv avvises til fordel for et produktivt spill mellom en hermeneutisk totaliseringsbevegelse og en retorisk avtotaliseringsbevegelse (Bohrer 1993 s. 108). Filosofiens teser og argumenter blir mistenkeliggjort til fordel for tolkninger og “et avansert spill med tegn” (Joch og Wolf 2005 s. 309). “Erkendelsen af, at der ikke gives noget ståsted udenfor “tegnenes gådefulde spil”, er omdrejningspunktet” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 55). Alt som er lukket, stabilt og selvidentisk undergraves. Hver detalj teller, men ikke fordi den bidrar til en harmonisk helhet; verken forfatterens bevissthet eller verket er enhetlig (Tadié 1987 s. 298). Verket er ikke selvidentisk, alltid ustabilt.

Kulturen opererer med poler som organisk og mekanisk, fri originalitet og imitasjon, og oppretter verdibaserte hierarkier, men “[t]he repressed term always inhabits its opposite. Accounts of true creativity, for example, cannot escape from a notion of imitation; they always rely on it in one way or another, so that what is called ‘free origination’ can in fact be seen as a particular version of imitation. If we are now better placed to see how the privileged terms in such hierarchical

oppositions are inhabited by their opposites – if we are now able to explain how this relationship deconstructs the opposition itself – this does not mean that we can relegate the distinctions of romantic esthetics to the past and view them as errors. On the contrary, we continue to work and think within this system even as we deconstruct its oppositions.” (Culler 1983 s. 168)

Tekster er ikke organiske enheter slik nykritikken oppfattet det (Zima 1994 s. 128). Markeringslinjene mellom innenfor og utenfor, mellom slutt og begynnelse, mellom midte og rand går i oppløsning (Kofman 1987 s. 102 og 156). Tolkninger oppfattes som aktive intervensjoner i tekster, uten begynnelses- eller slutt punkt (Bohrer 1993 s. 108). For den franske filosofen Jacques Derrida er gode tolkninger aktive, produktive, transformerende (gjengitt fra Müller 1995 s. 16). Alt inngår i en vev av spor som henviser til hverandre i det uendelige, som relaterer seg til andre differensielle spor. “Derrida would wean us [...] to speaking of marks which are re-marks of re-marks, and so on.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 56) En tekst blir alltid transformert av andre tekster (Kofman 1987 s. 156-157) “Teksten er ikke lenger middelet til inderlighet eller et avtettet indre som er identisk med seg selv.” (Derrida sitert fra Kofman 1987 s. 9) Tekster er fulle av heterogenitet og motsetninger. Dekonstruksjon inkluderer, gjennom leserens aktivitet, tekstens uavsluttbare selvrefleksjon (Cebulla 1992 s. 162).

I den irske dikteren William Butler Yeats’ dikt “Among School Children” (1928) “underminerer to retoriske modi i samme sætning hinanden: den spørgende dekonstruerer den ironiske, og omvendt.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 28)

Derrida skrev: “Every sign ... can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring.” (sitert fra Poster 1990 s. 109) “All communications, all utterances, all signs contain as their structure, Derrida contends, the possibility of separation from their senders, their speakers, their referents. This postulate is at the heart of deconstruction and is central to its heuristic strength.” (Poster 1990 s. 109)

Språkvitenskap var utgangspunkt for strukturalismen, som kritiseres eller undergraves av dekonstruktivistene. Forskjellen mellom Saussures signifikanter (tegnmaterialet som er synlig og hørlig) og deres motstykker signifikatene (begrepsinnholdet som tegnene representerer) blir dekonstruert. Et tegn består av et uttrykk (et signal eller en signifikant) og et innhold (en mening, et signifikat). Den vestlige verden har idealisert lukkede systemer underlagt Signifikatets lov (Barthes 1970b s. 14). Signifikantene henviser til hverandre i det uendelige på en måte som gjør at det aldri kan nås fram til et fullstendig sikkert eller transcendentalt signifikat (Bennington og Derrida 1991 s. 77). Den endelige forståelsen eller meningen utsettes i det uendelige, den er “alltid imellom, i ferd med ..., aldri seg selv, aldri nærværende” (Bennington og Derrida 1991 s. 79). Denne utsettende

forskjelligheten (“la *différance*) kan sammenlignes med en samling av krefter eller energier (s. 79 og 82). Derrida bruker begrepet “*différance*” for å innsirkle det opprinnelses- og rotløse ved meningsinnhold, dets brudd og ikke-identitet med seg selv (Frank 1984 s. 329; “ihre Nicht-Identität mit sich selbst”).

“Allied to the postmodern and poststructuralist movements, deconstruction involves an interrogation of language and the very terms, systems and concepts which are constructed by that language. Deconstruction rejects the primacy of meaning fixed in the word and instead foregrounds or ‘deconstructs’ the ways in which a text undermines its own assumptions and reveals its internal contradictions (Norris 2002). The movement has its origins in France in the 1960s. Its leading figure was the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). The terminology employed by Derrida is complex and shifting, like the meaning it dismantles. The term *différance* is perhaps the most significant; it plays on the two meanings of the French verb *différer* (‘defer’ and ‘differ’), neither of which totally encompasses its meaning, and its spelling shift (from the standard *différence* to *différance*) is a silent, visual indication of a blurring of the signifier and the dislocation or deferral of meaning.” (Munday 2016 s. 263)

“Derrida coined the artificial word *différance* for this play of differences which keeps deferring the presence of the sense and makes reaching its fullness impossible. In French, it differs by one (written) letter, but not by its pronunciation from the normal word *différence*, “difference.” The termination “-ance” makes it clear that the word is a verbal noun derived from the verb *différer* which means “to differ” as well as “to defer.” The deferment of the full sense which is always promised, yet never delivered by the linguistic sign, is inherent in the language itself. *Différance* is not a mark of some shortcomings in a language, of misunderstandings that should be eliminated; instead, it is a fundamental characteristic of every linguistic utterance. [...] language is characterized by an immanent play of *différance* which can never be limited. It prevents the sense of a word or an utterance from ever being fully present in this utterance itself. This is true for any kind of use of language – even when we “hear ourselves speak,” the meaning of our own words can never be fully present to ourselves because its deferment by means of *différance* is inherent in language itself. It is especially philosophers who find this situation hard to accept: they want to arrive at the true nature of things, using language as a tool only; they do not want to deal with words which just refer to each other, but with concepts that exist beyond the sphere of language and of *différance* and are really present.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 14.10.15)

“[T]he history of Western philosophy witnesses numerous attempts to deny the existence of this *différance*, for instance by limiting its play by means of the living consciousness of the speaking subject. Derrida calls the totality of these strategies logocentrism. He himself pleads for accepting this absence and unattainableness of linguistic meaning. Hence, to conventional linguistic phonology, he opposes his

own grammatology which no longer uses the living voice and its (alleged) presence as a model of philosophical exploration; instead, grammatology turns to writing in which speaker and context are always absent and require of the reader (listener) to fill this absence herself or himself.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 15.10.15) Dekonstruksjonister vil lede oss “*beyond* linguistics to a ‘grammatology’, or science of writing and textuality in general.” (Norris 1988 s. 28) “The centre of logocentrism is the idea or ideal of understanding (*entendement*) which hears itself speak (*s’entend parler*) in closest proximity to itself and in the immediate presence of its subject matter.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 4)

“There are, Derrida continues, two kinds of interpretation: ‘the one tries to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which lies outside the realm of signs and their play, and it experiences the need to interpret as a kind of exile’, an exclusion from the original plenitude that it seeks; the other accepts its active, creative function and joyfully proceeds without looking back (*ibid.*, p. 427). At one level it is not difficult to see the attractions of this approach, which tries to replace the anguish of infinite regress by the pleasure of infinite creation. Given that there is no ultimate and absolute justification for any system or for the interpretations flowing from it, one tries to value the activity of interpretation itself, or the activity of theoretical elaboration, rather than any results which might be obtained. There is nothing to which results ought to correspond; and so, rather than think of interpretation as a game in the world, whose results might be of interest if they approximate some truth outside the game, one must recognize that the activity of writing, in its widest Derridean sense of ‘production of meaning’, is the game or play of the world.” (Culler 1986 s. 247-248)

“Interpretation is no longer turned back in a deluded quest for origins and truth. Rather, it assumes the vertiginous freedom of writing itself: a writing launched by the encounter with a text which itself acknowledges no limit to the free play of meaning. [...] This ludic or playful dimension is very much a part of Derrida’s refusal to subjugate ‘writing’ to ‘philosophy’, or style to the kind of repressive regime that treats figurative language as a blemish on the surface of logical thought. Pushed to an extreme, this means suspending all question as to Nietzsche’s likely or intended import, and accepting that his texts exist in a realm of open potential, beyond any hope of assured ‘hermeneutic’ recovery.” (Norris 1988 s. 70-71)

“The critic comes to focus, therefore, on the play of the legible and illegible, on the role of gaps, silence, opacity. Although this approach may be thought of as a version of formalism, the attempt to turn content into form and then to read the significance of the play of forms reflects not a desire to fix the text and reduce it to a structure but an attempt to capture its *force*. The force, the power of any text, even the most unabashedly mimetic, lies in those moments which exceed our ability to categorize, which collide with our interpretive codes but nevertheless seem right.” (Culler 1986 s. 260-261)

“Just as Freud rendered dreams and slips of the tongue readable rather than dismissing them as mere nonsense or error, so Derrida sees signifying force in the gaps, margins, figures, echoes, digressions, discontinuities, contradictions, and ambiguities of a text. When one writes, one writes more than (or less than, or other than) one thinks. The reader’s task is to read what is written rather than simply attempt to intuit what might have been meant. The possibility of reading materiality, silence, space, and conflict within texts has opened up extremely productive ways of studying the politics of language.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 46)

“Derrida maintains an extreme and exemplary scepticism when it comes to defining his own methodology. The deconstructive leverage supplied by a term like *writing* depends on its resistance to any kind of settled or definitive meaning.” (Norris 1988 s. 31)

“If there is one applied lesson to be taken away, it is the powerlessness of ready-made concepts to explain or delimit the activity of writing.” (Norris 1988 s. xiii) Skrift er ikke bare “innhold”, men også et grafisk uttrykk. “With the mark, *alias* writing, *alias* the trace, *alias* differance, *alias* the grapheme, and so on, the object does fall away.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 57) Derrida var opptatt av “the nomadic homelessness of the graphematic trace” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 59).

“En tekst siger to “entirely incompatible things at the same time”, og derfor er enhver tekst åben for, sårbar overfor, en dekonstruktion. Den siger noget, som kan fortolkes på to helt forskjellige måder, der ikke kan forenes eller opæves (*aufheben*). Teksten er altså på en gang referentiel (der er en oprindelse, en grund, et fundament, et mimesis) og en underminering af denne referentialitet (der er intet center, oprindelse, kun lingvistiske substitutioners frie spil).” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 15)

“Dekonstruksjonen viser at teksters betydning aldri kan fikses eller være stabil, noe som til syvende og sist kan tilbakeføres til det språklige systemets desentrerte natur.” (Rainer Winter sitert fra Geimer 2010 s. 81) Dekonstruktivistene oppfatter ikke språket (i egenskap av et system av tegn og konvensjoner) som et transcendentalt prinsipp, men et system som avhenger av tolkning, individualitet (for Deleuze) og *différance* (for Derrida) (Frank 1984 s. 492). Dette systemet er skriften. “Skrift” brukes som betegnelse for en sprengning av verkbegrepet og en “aforistisk energi” (Kofman 1987 s. 12). Skriften er desentrert, atopisk og utenfor den tradisjonelle logos (Kofman 1987 s. 19). “Derrida argued that writing preceded speaking. By the term *writing*, he referred to a process of psychological imprint by images of the things “out there,” not to a literary writing.” (Kim 1996 s. 228) Den franske litteraturteoretikeren Roland Barthes knyttet skrift til “tapet av opprinnelse” (1970 s. 149). Teksttolkning går ikke ut på å “forklare” teksten slik at dens sannhet kommer til syne, men at leserens trer inn i tekstens mangfold og overflod av

betydningsbærere (Barthes 1972 s. 145). Teksten er et absolutt mangfold der meningssystemene aldri kan lukkes fordi de er styrt av språkets uendelighet (Barthes 1970b s. 12).

“Paleonymics[:] Derrida begins to introduce this word into his work in 1972. It is his invention. By a characteristic inverse irony, then, the *new* word *paleonymy* comes to designate a certain operation according to which one continues to put *old* words to work. By that time the (old) word *deconstruction* had caught on but Derrida seems intent in introducing this alternative alongside it, a kind of repetition with a difference. [...] *paleonymy* is a new name for old words (like *writing*) that operate both inside and outside the system to which they problematically belong. There would, of course, be no *paleonymics* without the mobilization of these problematic old words, so it's not a matter simply of refuting or denying the senses given to them by the tradition. These are exactly the senses that help the work of *paleonymy* along (which “critiques, deconstructs, wrenches apart the traditional, hierarchical opposition” [...]). Derrida also acknowledges the “risk” involved in paleonymics: “the risk of settling down or of regressing into the system that has been, or is in the process of being, deconstructed” ” (John Phillips i <https://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/elljwp/deconstruction&paleonymy.htm>; lesedato 06.07.18).

“En kritiker som Harold Bloom mener i princippet ikke, at det er muligt at “læse rigtigt”; det nærmeste man kan komme en “rigtig” læsning, er at præstere det han kalder en “stærk mislæsning”. Det vil sige en læsning, som senere læsninger ikke kan komme udenom. Forskellen mellem *sand* og *falsk* er hermed udskiftet med *stærk* og *svag*.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 138)

“The work, as Barthes says, is like an onion, “a construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body contains, finally no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing except the infinity of its own envelopes – which envelop nothing other than the unity of its own surfaces.” (‘Style and its Image’, p. 10) To read is to participate in the play of the text, to locate zones of resistance and transparency, to isolate forms and determine their content and then to treat that content in turn as a form with its own content, to follow, in short, the interplay of surface and envelope.” (Culler 1986 s. 259)

For en eksemplarisk dekonstruktør som amerikaneren Paul de Man er en tekst en vev av forskjellige retoriske manøvrer, og retorikken er et tekstlig felt som på mange måter er usolidarisk overfor det innhold det inkorporerer. Paul de Mans lesestrategi innebærer å trekke alle grunnleggende begreper og metafysiske kategorier inn i veven av tekstens retoriske operasjoner for derved å nyansere disse kategoriene i deres filosofiske spillerom. Retorikken er ikke bare allestedsnærværende – den svarer også til sitt gamle rykte om å være slø, unnvikende, full av indre falskhet. Dermed undergraver alle tekster i siste instans sine egne premisser, går i sine egne retoriske feller, blir mer kompliserte enn de kan tåle. Beviset er “aporiene”, logiske utveisløsheter. Språket kan på grunn av sin retoriske

status aldri bli transparent, slik Platon trodde. Det er dømt til å forbli en vev av tegn med en alltid økende grad av kompleksitet, en kompleksitet som de Man leser som figuralitet, dvs. retorikkens språk- og tankefordreininger. Det finnes aldri noe entydig. Går vi et skritt videre i en retorisk-figural undersøkelse, oppdager vi alltid at det er enda mer komplisert enn vi trodde, og at Meningen (den enhetlige) følgelig er enda fjernere. Poststrukturalistene vil vise den systematiske umuligheten i at et tegn kan gjentas uten å forandre betydning (Frank 1984 s. 488). Det foregår figurasjon og defigurasjon samtidig, som en double-bind (Bohrer 1993 s. 41).

Paul de Man tar utgangspunkt i at mening er et dobbelt fenomen fordi språket er figurativt – en dobbelhet som han ikke ser på som berikende, men som en konflikt. Nivåene er ikke i samarbeid med hverandre og det er umulig å vite hvilket av nivåene som dominerer (Masiello 2012 s. 89). De Man er en skeptiker som ikke tror at en tolkning kan nå fram til noen sikkerhet.

“In this process of mutual transformation and subversion, there is really no reliable perspective on the question of the relationship of the various elements. No perspective or positioning can be considered to be more than strategic, a part of the conflict of forces and shifting boundaries between entities with no one perspective or position dominating the field. If displacement, excessiveness, instability are the characteristics of rhetoric, then one cannot fall back on rhetoric or on a notion of literature revealing itself to be fundamentally or explicitly rhetorical without immediately being drawn into the non- or para-rhetorical, the non- or para-literary. “Rhetoric,” Lacoue-Labarthe concludes from all this, “is a monstrosity” (63). The radical place it holds in Nietzsche’s work undermines boundaries and makes it impossible to locate definitively any pure exteriority: “The boundary that separates philosophy from its *other* then begins to be blurred. The emphasis on rhetoric leads to a point where it is no longer possible to turn against philosophy, as if from its pure ‘outside’ (that is, dialectically speaking, from its purest intimacy), any musical, mythical, etc. originality. Rhetoric contaminates an entire system of belief” ([Philippe Lacoue-Labarthes *Filosofiens tema*] 65-66). Rhetoric problematizes an entire system of belief in mythical or musical purity, in origins of all sorts, even or especially a belief in any form of “original language.” In the same way, it has “contaminated” the belief in literature as originally exterior to philosophy, as well as the belief in a form of rhetoric which would also remain exterior to philosophy – because it could provide *the linguistic paradigm*, the origin and truth of language itself. For Lacoue-Labarthe, the “lesson of Nietzsche” is that it is precisely the “unreliability” or “monstrous” character of rhetoric that makes it an important critical tool, a means (and not the only one) of questioning the integrity not only of philosophy but also of literature. Rhetoric is no more characteristic of literature than of philosophy, no more exterior to one than to the other.” (Carroll 1987 s. 20-21)

Paul de Man vil “konfrontere den litterære tekst med den filosofiske ratios krav på sandhed og logik, blot for at vise at teksten allerede selv har undermineret dette

krav, at den inneholder sin egen dekonstruksjon.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 92) Han “insisterer [...], som den radikale Saussurelæser han er, at forholdet mellom signifiant og signifié alene er konventionelt bestemt, hvilket betyr, at tegnets verdi udelukkende er bestemt av sproglige, nærmere bestemt tekstuelle relasjoner. Konsekvensen av dette er, at æstetiske begreper som f.eks. mimesis, metafor, symbol konsekvent læses som retoriske figurer eller troper på linie med andre troper. En sådan læsning fører til en systematisk nedbrytning av den tradisjonelle æstetiks verdihierarki, hvor metafor settes over metonymi, symbol over allegori, mimesis over imitation etc.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 101)

“Yale-skolen privilegerer ikke den store romantiske poesi, men den retter all interesse mot den, for det første fordi vi endnu er romantikere, og for det andre fordi den romantiske poesi *mislykkes*. Det er de digtere, der feiler, som man interesserer seg for: derfor Wordsworth og ikke Coleridge. Det, der mislykkes, er at forene subjekt og objekt via imaginasjonen. Der er på ingen måte tale om en idealisering av fantasien. Fantasi er død, splittelse, adskillelse, “failure”. Når den romantiske digter (hvis han er “deluded”) tror, at han gjennom symbolet har opphevet splittelsen, så kan Paul de Man vise, at symbolet skjuler, at det bygger på en mekanisk og tilfældig allegori. Uden at vi kan nå at utvikle det, så er der tale om et forsøk på endelig, omsider, at forstå romantikken *hegelsk*. Paul de Man har antydning ved flere leiligheter (og hans læsninger av Hegel, Kant og Nietzsche er epokegørende), medens J. Hillis Miller i “praksis” har søgt at gjøre det.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 17)

“To deconstruct a text in Nietzschean-Derridean terms is to arrive at a limit-point or deadlocked *aporia* of meaning” (Norris 1988 s. 80). “In the end it is only by confronting its limits – by forcing analysis to the point of *aporia* or self-contradiction – that thought comes up against the gap between itself and the aberrant ‘logic’ of the text.” (Norris 1988 s. 105) “[T]hought continually runs up against ‘unthinkable’ twists of paradox.” (Norris 1988 s. 146)

“Derrida’s re-reading of contradiction as a conflict of forces or of energies, instead of a conflict of concepts or propositions, is one way in which he tries to loosen the grip which the conception of dialectical difference and the metaphysics of meaning have on the project of difference.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 8) “Den tilsynelatende forståeligheten som hefter ved en tekst, er av ideologisk opprinnelse [...] Tekster er uleselige, og all lesning er ideologisk.” (Bohrer 1993 s. 17) Noen tekster “iscenesetter” ifølge de Man sin egen uleselig på en selvreflekterende måte (Bohrer 1993 s. 88). De Man mener at han selv bare oppsporer tekstens egne dekonstruktive bevegelser (Bohrer 1993 s. 183).

“What do we learn about the ideology (or ideologies) operating in the text by analyzing the text’s self-contradictions rather than by trying to resolve those contradictions into some overarching theme?” (Tyson 2006)

For de Man er estetikk et ideologisk fenomen, en “nødvendig falsk bevissthet” om hva som er kunst og litteratur, og samtidig en vilje til makt, med totalitære tendenser (Bohrer 1993 s. 333). Hans kritikk av estetisk ideologi, hans avsløring av retoriske forførelsesstrategier, kan være en konsekvens av hans egne fascistiske villfarelser i ungdommen og hans senere anger (Bohrer 1993 s. 340).

Aporier kan innebære det samme som Nietzsche uttrykker: “motsetningene er sanne samtidig” (Zima 1994 s. 138-139). Logikk, grammatikk og retorikk oppfattes ikke bare som forskjellige aspekter ved språket, men aspekter som frambringer aporier, og som forårsaker at tekster blir “uleselige” (“unreadability”) (Zima 1994 s. 109). Retorikk og logikk “angriper hverandre gjensidig” (Bohrer 1993 s. 345). Men det kan innvendes mot dekonstruktivistene, slik Peter V. Zima gjør, at denne ubestemmeligheten og uavsluttbarheten, alle aporiene, ikke er i teksten selv, men snarere i leseren (1994 s. 110-111). Ofte står to perspektiver eller sider mot hverandre, og begge sidene motsier hverandres mulighetsbetingelser, samtidig som sidene forutsetter hverandre (Bohrer 1993 s. 45).

“Jacques Derrida’s practice of placing certain verbal signs *sous rature*, under erasure [med et kryss over et ord, slik at ordet likevel er leselig] [...] Physically canceled, yet still legible beneath the cancelation, these signs *sous rature* continue to function in the discourse even while they are excluded from it. Derrida’s purpose in using this typographical sleight-of-hand is, of course, to remind us that certain key concepts in western metaphysics – such as, in this case, *existence* and *objecthood* – continue to be indispensable to philosophical discourse even though that same discourse demonstrates their illegitimacy. They both cannot be admitted, yet cannot be excluded; so he places them *sous rature*. [...] laying bare the *aporias* of western metaphysics” (McHale 1987 s. 100).

“Deconstruction has been particularly acute in showing the uncanny involvement of theories in the domains they claim to describe, in showing how critics become engaged in a displaced reenactment of a text’s scenario.” (Culler 1983 s. viii og xi)

Den amerikanske medieprofessoren Mark Poster skriver om implikasjoner av å dekonstruere det logosentriske:

“1 that deconstruction is a profound critique of logocentric texts and the (male) subject’s relation to them, a critique that draws attention to the disruptive role of textuality understood as written traces;

2 that Derrida presents this critique in a situation he rightly defines as one of general confusion amidst massive historical change, inscribing his position as a step necessary to clarify that historical situation;

3 that because logocentrism plays a key role in the present culture its critique has prime political importance;

4 that one major problem is to develop a politics that avoids the totalizing strategies and stabilizing closures of the old “modern” politics, which are closely related to logocentrism.” (Poster 1990 s. 104)

“The Derridean effort to forestall a closure of meaning in his own text, the insistence on vigilant, unrelenting subversion of textual stabilities, the consistent disruption of logocentric discourse and its attendant subject – these hallmarks of deconstruction have been interpreted by some, including at times Derrida himself, as the first step toward a new politics, a politics that goes beyond the outworn standpoints of liberalism and socialism.” (Poster 1990 s. 103)

“[T]here is a moral imperative implicit not only in Derrida but in most of the postmodern and poststructuralist discussions that are often seen as abdicating the possibility of a moral position. But because they challenge, deconstruct, or problematize conventional understandings – like those of the unitary subject or of “truth” as traditionally understood – understandings that seem essential to maintaining any kind of ethics or epistemology, they are often taken as advocating an amoral or nihilistic position. Nevertheless, in nearly all such discussions there is some thing, being, group, or truth that is done violence by representation and the symbolic, by being repressed, marginalized, denied representation, or misrepresented.” (Gaggi 1997 s. 149)

“Dekonstruktion er, siger Barbara Johnson, en “transvaluation” – en omvendning af værdier. Vi er oplærte i at koncentrere os om det, der i teksten og af teksten er sat i forgrunden. “Foregrounding” var jo de tjekkiske strukturalisters ord for litteraritet. Vi har lært, at vi skal se bort fra marginale elementer, der fra en kommunikationsmæssig synsvinkel blot er at opfatte som “støj”. I stedet for at koncentrere os om det centrale, skal vi nu se at genoprette det marginale.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 21)

“Litteraturens figurative sprog kan kun forstås ad retorikkens vej. Den retoriske model af tropen er lig det specifikt litterære, som de Man læser henimod en apori mellem logisk begreb og retorisk figur.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 27)

Paul de Man er svært opptatt av allegorien som språk- og tankefigur. Når en tekst kan leses allegorisk, så betyr det at den kan leses på to plan eller nivåer samtidig. I praksis betyr det oftest: ett konkret nivå som ligger åpent i dagen, og et bakenforliggende, abstrakt nivå som består av en slags overført mening. Dette abstrakte nivået kan være svært åpent og uavklart, dvs. diffust eller uavsluttet. Det konkrete nivået og det abstrakte, overførte nivået faller ikke sammen i en organisk enhet, men holdes fra hverandre. Det finnes imidlertid også tekster der det konkrete nivået er helt sammenfiltret med det abstrakte. Nivåene inngår i en evig differens, i aldri sammenfallende forskyvninger. Måten det ene planet/nivået skal forstås på, kompliseres stadig på nytt av spørsmålet om hvordan det andre i så fall skal forstås.

Et litterært verk som leses som en allegori, ligger altså foruroligende åpent for glidninger og forskyvninger innenfra i sin egen struktur.

“Til forskel fra referentiel (symbolsk) læsning henviser den allegoriske læsning ikke til teksten som en meningstotalitet, men til teksten som et system af troper, hvor mening opløses i et irreducibelt fravær. [...] Dekonstruktionen er således også en allegori på sin egen mislæsning og der kan derfor aldrig være tale om én dekonstruktion, men om dekonstruktioner af 1., 2., 3., ... og n. grad, svarende til ironiens uendeligt potenserede refleksion. Læsningens allegori bliver således en beretning, der konsekvent stiller spørgsmål til autoriteten af sin egen læsnings hermeneutiske performance, hvorved de begreber, der produceres i teksten og i læsningen bliver beretninger om deres egen umulige lukning i forhold til det de subsumerer. Herved fastholdes læsningens principielt uafsluttelige karakter eller for at sige det de Mansk: læsning er altid dømt til at være en mislæsning.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 115)

“Some of Jacques Derrida’s most powerful essays are devoted to the task of dismantling a concept of ‘structure’ that serves to immobilize the play of meaning in a text and reduce it to a manageable compass. [...] Deconstruction is avowedly ‘post-structuralist’ in its refusal to accept the idea of structure as in any sense given or objectively ‘there’ in a text.” (Norris 1988 s. 2-3)

Ifølge de Man avlegger en tekst vitnesbyrd om sin retoriske beskaffenhet i allegorisk form (Bohrer 1993 s. 289). For å få dette fram i lesningen av teksten, må en generelt ta de retoriske sidene ved den alvorlig, dvs. legge mening i måten det som sies er organisert på. Utformingen av budskapet blir uhyre viktig: formuleringer, omskrivninger, mer eller mindre presise ord, sammenfatninger, utelatelser osv. Forfatteren eller fortelleren undergraver ufrivillig sine egne moralske, estetiske og stilistiske utkast (Zima 1994 s. 142).

Paul de Man vil gjennom sine retoriske analyser vise at det litterære verket består av et samspill av kontradiktoriske troper (Zima 1994 s. 234). I boka *Blindness & Insight* (1971) skriver de Man: “the statement about language, that sign and meaning can never coincide, is what is precisely taken for granted in the kind of language we call literary. [...] Literature, unlike everyday language, begins on the far side of this knowledge; it is the only form of language free from the fallacy of unmediated expression.” (her sitert fra Cebulla 1992 s. 96) Paul de Man mener er at litterære tekster rommer et begjær etter å opprette en metaforisk forbindelse mellom den bokstavelige og den overførte betydning av ordene (Cebulla 1992 s. 153). Det finnes ifølge Paul de Man ingen kjennetegn eller kvalitet, verken formalt eller funksjonelt, som kan avgrense en teksts “litteraritet” (dvs. det spesifikt litterære ved teksten) (Bohrer 1993 s. 19).

“The conceptual ‘totality’ is always undone by the ruses of signification, those ‘slidings and differences of discourse’ that deconstruction is at pains to uncover.”

(Norris 1988 s. 77) Ifølge de Man er ironi uttrykk for en dobbelthet: på den ene siden den alltid gjentatte gesten av bestemmelse og fastsettelse og på den andre siden innrømmelsen av det umulige i å oppnå totalitet og syntese (Cebulla 1992 s. 128). Han hevder at tolkningene er uatskillelige fra tekstene som tolkes. Tolkningene/lesningene blir litteratur de også (Cebulla 1992 s. 203-204).

“Nietzsche often seems to spell out in advance the programme and systematic ruses of deconstruction, adopting the same attitude of sceptical rigour and denying himself any secure resting-place in method or concept. Philosophers, he argued, were the self-condemned dupes of a ‘truth’ which preserved itself simply by effacing the *metaphors*, or figurative discourse, which brought it into being. If language is radically metaphorical, its meanings (as Saussure was later to show) caught up in an endless chain of relationship and difference, then thought is deluded in its search for a truth beyond the mazy detours of language. Only by suppressing its origins in metaphor had philosophy, from Plato to the present, maintained the sway of a tyrannizing reason which in effect denied any dealing with figural language. Reason had crushed out the imaginative life of philosophy [...] For Nietzsche this insight led to the conclusion that all philosophies, whatever their claim to logic or reason, rested on a shifting texture of figurative language, the signs of which were systematically repressed under the sovereign order of Truth. This bottomless relativity of meaning, and the ways in which philosophers have disguised or occluded their ruling metaphors, are the point of departure for Derrida’s writing like Nietzsche’s before him.” (Norris 1988 s. 57-58) “Derrida deploys every possible means of liberating Nietzsche’s stylistic energies, allowing his text to ‘disseminate’ sense beyond all the bounds of conceptual closure.” (Norris 1988 s. 71)

Paul de Man deler Nietzsches definisjon av sannhet som et motsigelsesfullt, aporetisk fenomen, med uunngåelige indre motsigelser (Bohrer 1993 s. 209). Nietzsche ville kritisere og undergrave alle fundamenter (Müller 1995 s. 94). Innen dekonstruktivismen er sannheten er så å si “hul” (Frank 1984 s. 461), slik at den forblir relativ til alle tolkninger som uavsluttbart fylles inn i den. Grunnen til denne uendelige prosessen er individualiteten, det at ethvert enkelt menneske tolker, forskyver og medskaper mening. Den franske filosofen Gilles Deleuze skrev i boka *Forskjell og gjentakelse* (1968): “Enhver individuell faktor derimot, er allerede forskjell, og forskjellenes forskjell” (sitert fra Frank 1984 s. 486). Mening skapes og forstås fra det subjektive i det individuelle (Frank 1984 s. 518). Men for Nietzsche fantes det ikke noe “in-divid”, men kun et “divid” (“dividum”) som består av et mangfold av drifter og krefter (Müller 1995 s. 96). Nietzsche opererer i sin filosofi ikke med noe absolutt eller definitivt senter, men med stadig nye perspektiver som forskyver hva som er i fokus (S. Kofman gjengitt fra Müller 1995 s. 219). Han oppfattet mennesket som et “pluraletantum” (noe som bare kan finnes i flertall), en samling av krefter og perspektiver (Müller 1995 s. 233).

Også Jacques Derrida fokuserer på det usikre, ikke-bestemte og ubestembare, og på hvordan “sannheter” danner motsigelser og oppveier hverandre. Derrida stiller seg i opposisjon til den vestlige “onto-teo-teleo-logikken” (siteret fra Frank 1984 s. 351) og framhever den uendelige kjeden av negasjoner som skaper en unnvikende mening. Han påpeker i sine lesninger av litteratur og filosofiske tekster det uregjerlige og divergerende, inkonsekvenser, ambivalenser, paradokser, hull, brudd og aporier. Aporier er innebygde kollisjoner der språket vikler seg inn i inkonsekvenser, trekkes mot grenser der det ikke bærer sin intenderte mening. En apori er en struktur med indre motsigelse (Cebulla 1992 s. 153). Derridas tanke om “disseminasjon” i språket innebærer at det er noe ubetvingelig i hvordan mening blir til (Frank 1984 s. 573). Derrida er interessert i de minste enkeltheter som unnslipper den logosentriske tradisjonen, i det som framstår som spor og rest (Kofman 1987 s. 96). “Derrida traces traces which are traces only of traces and signs which are only signs of signs.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 43) Tekstlesningene til Derrida er basert på en slags “assosiativ tiltrekning” snarere enn rasjonell logikk (Kofman 1987 s. 35). Lesemåtene har et “ideal of an infinitely ‘plural’ text” (Norris 1988 s. 79).

“The properties that supposedly distinguish constatives from performatives – fidelity to preexisting facts, accountability to a criterion of truth – turn out to be as dependent on particular conditions of production and reception as performatives. “True” and “false,” [John L.] Austin concludes, are not names for the possible relationships between freestanding (constative) utterances and an equally freestanding state of affairs; rather they are situation-specific judgments on the relationship between contextually produced utterances and states of affairs that are themselves no less contextually produced. At the end of the book constatives are “discovered” to be a subset of performatives, and with this discovery the formal core of language disappears entirely and is replaced by a world of utterances vulnerable to the sea change of every circumstance – the world, in short, of rhetorical (situated) man.” (Stanley Fish i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 213)

“Austin continues to think of infelicity – of those cases in which the tethering origin of utterances is obscure and must be constructed by interpretive conjecture – as special, whereas, in Derrida’s view, infelicity is itself the originary state in that any determination of meaning must always proceed within an interpretive construction of a speaker’s intention. In short, there are no ordinary circumstances, merely those myriad and varied circumstances in which actors embedded in stage settings hazard interpretations of utterances produced by actors embedded in other stage situations. All the world, as Shakespeare says, is a stage, and on that stage “the quality of risk” admitted by Austin is not something one can avoid by sticking close to ordinary language in ordinary circumstances, but is rather “the internal and positive condition” of any act of communication (Derrida 1977, 190). [...] Although it is true that we consider promises uttered in everyday contexts more direct – less etiolated – than promises made on a stage, this (Derrida would say) is only because the stage settings within which everyday life proceeds, are so powerfully – that is,

rhetorically – in place that they are in effect invisible, and therefore the meanings they make possible are experienced as if they were direct and unmediated by any screens. [...] The “citationality” – the condition of being in quotes, of being indirect – of an utterance in a play is not the same as the citationality of a philosophical reference or a deposition before a court; it is just that no one of these performatives is more serious – more direct, less mediated, less rhetorical – than any other.” (Stanley Fish i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 214-215)

“One recognizes in these assertions the familiar world of Rhetorical Man, teeming with roles, situations, strategies, interventions, but containing no master role, no situation of situations, no strategy for outflanking all strategies, no intervention in the arena of dispute that does not expand the arena of dispute, no neutral point of rationality from the vantage point of which the “merely rhetorical” can be identified and held in check. Indeed deconstructive or poststructuralist thought is in its operation a rhetorical machine: it systematically asserts and demonstrates the mediated, constructed, partial, socially constituted nature of all realities, whether they be phenomenal, linguistic, or psychological. To deconstruct a text, says Derrida, is to “work through the structured genealogy of its concepts in the most scrupulous and immanent fashion, but at the same time to determine from a certain external perspective that it cannot name or describe what this history may have concealed or excluded, constituting itself as history through this repression in which it has a stake” (1981, 6). The “external perspective” is the perspective from which the analyst knows in advance (by virtue of his commitment to the rhetorical or deconstructive worldview) that the coherence presented by a text (and an institution or an economy can in this sense be a text) rests on a contradiction it cannot acknowledge, rests on the suppression of the challengeable rhetoricity of its own standpoint. A deconstructive reading will surface those contradictions and expose those suppressions and thus “trouble” a unity that is achieved only by covering over all the excluded emphases and interests that might threaten it. Nor is this act performed in the service of something beyond rhetoric. Derridean deconstruction does not uncover the operations of rhetoric in order to reach the Truth; rather it continually uncovers the truth of rhetorical operations, the truth that all operations, including the operation of deconstruction itself, are rhetorical.” (Stanley Fish i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 215)

“Hvis det er umulig å nå dybden, må en innstille seg på inkoherenser, revner. Utgangspunktet er språkets tvetydigheter: alt kan tolkes annerledes, og også motsatt. Tekstens mening kan derfor aldri bli fastlagt én gang for alle. Teksten er “åpen”, og andre tekster kan vise seg i den.” (Masiello 2012 s. 88)

Derrida kan bruke en tilsynelatende perifer detalj i en tekst “as a springboard into regions of giddy uncertainty, where details merge and cross in a joyful breakdown of all proprietary limits. Any talk of meaning or structure is ineluctably ‘caught up in a process which it does not control’, which for Derrida signals the

total dissolution of those boundaries that mark off one text from another, or that try to interpose between poem and commentary.” (Norris 1988 s. 114)

“According to Derrida, all texts are born together with subcodes to deconstruct themselves. Deconstruction as a method for critical theorists involves two gestures. One is to gaze at the boundary of the discourse where binary oppositions arise, thereby deconstructing the text of the discourse and retrieving what is marginalized by logocentrism. The other is to recreate new meanings by reconstructing what was previously deconstructed.” (Kim 1996 s. 226)

“[S]mall causes can lead to large effects. What is the preference for the marginal in deconstruction but a similar appreciation that seemingly trivial deviations can lead to large-scale effects?” (Hayles 1991 s. 11) “[D]er synes – bl.a. omkring begrebet ‘bifurcation’ – at være en vis konvergens mellem de Mans (og Derridas) tekststrategier og den såkaldte ‘kaosteor’ som den bl.a. er udviklet af Prigogine.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 118)

“It is difficult for us to speak or write about these “traces,” to provide a scholarly or philosophical analysis of this concept. In the first place, it is impossible to give a definition of it in our ordinary language. Derrida, following the lead of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), sees the entire tradition of Western philosophy dominated by our inability to imagine “being” in other terms than as “presence” (he calls this trait of occidental philosophy the “metaphysics of presence”). Hence, Derrida writes [...]: “*The trace itself does not exist. To exist is to be, to be an entity, a being-present, to on.*” How, then, can we speak about the trace? Even when I write “the trace is something absent, not something present,” I fall into the trap of the metaphysics of presence – since the trace is never present, it cannot be said to “be” in the ordinary sense of the word. Derrida sometimes tries to face this problem by writing “under erasure,” “crossing out,” again following Heidegger’s suggestions [...], such as “the trace is. [NB: “is” skrevet med et kryss over ordet]” It may be easier to describe the effect of the trace in language: by its absent presence (or its present absence), it prevents sense and meaning from ever being fully present. Since every word in a language carries within it the traces of all other, absent words, it always promises to give us its full meaning, but always defers delivering it by referring us from one absent trace to the next. Like in the German folk tale “The Hare and the Hedgehog,” users of language are forever pursuing the sense of language, but whenever we think we are catching up, we “meet” (another word which ought to be written “crossing out”) yet another trace, yet another absence.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 15.10.15)

“More generally, escape from logocentrism is impossible because the language we use to criticize or to formulate alternatives works according to the principles being contested. [...] The very notion of rhetorical effects – the possibility of metaphorical signification, for example – requires there to be a distinction between

literal meaning and metaphorical meaning and hence the beginnings of a rhetorical code. [...] The alternative, then, is not a discipline, not another mode of analysis, but acts of writing, acts of displacement, play which violates language and rationality. Though these acts can themselves be analyzed and understood, discussed in terms of codes which make them meaningful, they are in their moment, as examples of the play of signifiers, challenges to a perspective whose limitations they expose.” (Culler 1983 s. 41-42)

Det er “always possible to read a philosophical text not as truth but as act – as act of persuasion, narrative, trope, rhetoric. Because language can always be read referentially or rhetorically, philosophy needs to constitute itself in opposition to the literary, but it can never avoid the possibility of being read as rhetoric. Indeed, one could argue that reading a philosophical text as rhetoric is *the authentic* philosophical move: to read a philosophical text as rhetoric is to put in question its concepts, to treat them as textual strategies or tropes. This is, for example, what logical positivists did in analyzing the discourse of metaphysics and attempting to show that it was ungrounded, fictional, metaphorical, a kind of literature. It is also the strategy Nietzsche employed in his analyses of cause and effect as a metonymy, of truth as metaphor whose metaphoricity has been forgotten, and of the identity principle as a rhetorical imposition, a synecdoche.” (Culler 1983 s. 222)

“[B]y shifting from one set of categories and distinctions to another he [den franske filosofen Jean-François Lyotard] is in fact pluralizing the concept of language behind each of them and refusing to accept one version of language over another as definitive or determining. Language consists of an unresolvable plurality and conflict of languages for Lyotard; the phrase is, above all, no matter its conceptual limitations, an indication of this heterogeneity. The most critical level of language is, thus, for him not “a deeper ground of language” (as it is, for example, for Heidegger), but the surface of language. In other words, Lyotard’s strategy consists in the infinite deferral of the question of the ultimate ground of language by assuming not what language is, but only, regardless how language is defined, that there are phrases.” (Carroll 1987 s. 165)

“In a close reading of some of Nietzsche’s works [...], de Man demonstrates that this German philosopher had already deconstructed the binary opposition between “literal” and “rhetorical” use. This opposition, then, is a typical example of a “violent hierarchy” in which one term (the literal use of language) is seen as superior and thus made the center of the structure while its opposing term can only play the role of a parasitical supplement. Yet according to Nietzsche [...], “truths are ... metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power.” Or, in de Man’s terms: language can only give the impression of being referential because it denies its own rhetorical character, because this is its blind spot. De Man goes on to apply this insight to Nietzsche’s text itself: if language is always rhetorical and metaphorical, if it cannot claim to tell the truth about its referents, but only refers to itself or to other texts, how can any sentence Nietzsche writes ever lay claim to

expressing a philosophical truth? The reader arrives at a paradoxical situation or, as de Man likes to say, an aporia: on its “philosophical” or “referential” level, the text pretends it is speaking about some extratextual reality; on its “literary” or “rhetorical” level, on the other hand, it seems to say that this is fundamentally impossible [...]: “A more rhetorically aware reading of *The Birth of the Tragedy* shows that all the authoritative claims that it seems to make can be undermined by means of statements provided by the text itself.” This conclusion can be seen as typical of de Man’s manner of reading and interpreting. He believes that a number of literary texts display a similar discrepancy between their rhetorical and their referential content and thus make the possibility of understanding and interpreting them deeply problematic.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 15.10.15)

“Deconstruction enjoys announcing the impossibility of the semiotic activity it inhabits as it undertakes the task it has set itself: reading the major texts of Western literature and philosophy as sites on the boundaries of logocentrism and showing, in the most subtle interpretations that scholarship has yet produced, how these texts are already riven by the contradictions and indeterminacies that seem inherent in the exercise of language.” (Culler 1983 s. 43)

“Read against the grain, what these works prove to be about is not the truths and values that traditional interpretations have found in them, but rather the uncertain, indeterminate nature of their own status as representations. [...] Literary works “thematize” (or take as their theme) those conflicts that make them indeterminate – conflicts between the claims the works make to tell the truth, represent the world, and present an authoritative picture of things, and the way their status as language and fiction calls these claims into question. In other words, the theory is not only that literary works are indeterminate, but that they are at some level commentaries on their own indeterminacy.” (Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 171-172)

“At least since Plato thinking has been thought of as a dialogue of the soul with itself.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 52) Slike ideer tilhører metafysikken (oppfatninger av det ikke-fysiske i tilværelsen). Derrida brukte dekonstruksjon som en systematisk undergraving av selvfølgeligheter i den europeiske metafysikken (Zima 1994 s. 1). Han gjennomførte nærlesninger av verk av filosofer som Platon, Hegel, Rousseau, Kant, Husserl, Lévi-Strauss og Austin, og påpekte hvordan filosofene ekskluderer visse ideer, verdier og argumenter som ikke passer inn i deres systemer. For Derrida fungerer den vestlige metafysikken på samme måte som en nedskrevet drøm, der én hånd skriver og den andre visker ut det skrevne. Han oppfatter metafysikken som fortrenkning av skriften (Kofman 1987 s. 104-105).

“There is no final home of meaning where the trail of indicative signs yields to the expressive core and the last sign is cashed as a meaning that does not point elsewhere. Presence is not a primordial given, existing prior to signs or to language. Language is not surpassed, extinguished in pure self-presence. On the contrary,

self-presence is derived from or is an effect of language. Presence resides in the sign-mediated pursuit of itself; and it *is* that pursuit.” (Tallis 1988 s. 193-194)

Vestlig metafysikk er preget av “a hope for a *telos* hereafter of self-present presence to absolute truth.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 48) I en tekst kan en dekonstruktør finne “hele metafysikkens begrebsterminologi [...]: skabelse, transcendental nødvendighed, totalitet, essens, varighed og umiddelbart nærvær.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 41) “In his texts on Greek philosophy Derrida traces some of the ruses and devices by which writing is systematically opposed to the themes of truth, self-presence and origin.” (Norris 1988 s. 64) “The ‘meaning of history’ and the ‘history of meaning’ are bound up together in that quest for self-authenticating truth that is endemic to Western thought.” (Norris 1988 s. 77) “That consciousness can be present to itself in the pure light of reason, delivered from the snares of opaque textuality, is a recurrent dream of Western thought.” (Norris 1988 s. 82)

“In what sense, according to phonocentrics, is the speaker ‘present’ in his voice? The illusion of vocal presence encompasses many connected beliefs. Here are a few:

- (i) there is a self behind the voice that authenticates or endorses what is said;
- (ii) the self is the point of origin of the speech;
- (iii) the voice is animated by the consciousness of the speaker and expresses what he ‘has in mind’ at the moment of utterance;
- (iv) the meaning of the words used by the voice are what the speaker means by them – in other words, there is a more or less complete coincidence between signifying intention and verbal meaning;
- (v) expressed meaning matches a meaning inherent in the extra-linguistic world so that the voice refers outside of itself to an external state of affairs of which its utterance may be true.” (Tallis 1988 s. 177-178)

“The relationship between the writer and what is written does not feed such illusions of origin, presence, reference, meaning and truth. When we come across a copy of *The Iliad*, we do not imagine that Homer is in the page authenticating what is written on it. He is not currently the origin of what we are reading: the words are not animated by his consciousness, nor do they express what ‘he has in mind’. The text, moreover, does not refer to a world currently surrounding Homer’s body in which the meaning of his words is to be found. Thus common sense. Derrida, however, disputes the validity of this sharp contrast between speaking and writing: “The thesis of the *arbitrariness* of the sign ... must forbid a radical distinction between the linguistic and the graphic sign.” (OG, p. 44)” (Tallis 1988 s. 177-178)

“To see speech as a natural, direct mode of communication and writing as artificial and oblique – ‘the representation of a representation’ – is therefore to see things upside down. It is in writing rather than in speech that we find language in its most artless state: writing is language wearing its essence on its sleeve. For linguistic

signs are *essentially*, rather than *accidentally*, devoid of the presence of a signifying agent.” (Tallis 1988 s. 179)

Derrida vil avsløre “the same logocentric myth – the craving for origins, truth and presence” og “release av multiplicity of meaning” (Norris 1988 s. 70). Tekstens metafysiske antakelser blir undergravd av teksten når den leses på bestemte måter (Zima 1994 s. 143). Derrida vil ryste, få etablerte systemer til å vakle, og sette tekstforståelse i gang på nye måter (Kofman 1987 s. 207).

Derrida ville løsrive kritisk tenkning fra den institusjonaliserte filosofien og stille spørsmål ved de etablerte begrepene brukt innen f.eks. Hegels totalitetstenkning og Saussures lingvistiske system (Zima 1994 s. 1). Derrida vil etablere eller undersøke begreper som atskiller seg fra filosofiens begreper; det dreier seg om provisoriske eller heuristiske betegnelser som innsirkler grensetilfeller av begrepslighet (Zima 1994 s. 61). Dekonstruktivistene gjør litteratur-vitenskapen til leverandør til andre vitenskaper.

Konsistens-, transparens- og konsekvens-postulater blir forlatt (Bohrer 1993 s. 113). Mening er ikke en stor, avsluttet finale, dvs. en lukket struktur, men en uavlatelig prosess (Barthes 1970b s. 18). Den amerikanske dekonstruktivisten Joseph Hillis Miller “insists on the endlessly *textual* nature of all understanding, the way in which meanings are deferred and multiplied as soon as one begins to interpret.” (Norris 1988 s. 95) Teksten har ikke noe sentrum, snarere et “missing center” (Hillis Miller) (Zima 1994 s. 142). All språkbruk “belong to *writing* in Derrida’s sense of the word: an economy of difference nowhere coinciding with the present intentions of individual speech.” (Norris 1988 s. 110)

Derrida oppfatter etablerte og grunnleggende tankemønstre som strukturer uten sentrum, dvs. uten fast forankring som kunne gitt det øvrige sin ordnede plass, en labyrint der vi aldri kommer fram til midten eller noe oversiktlig orienteringspunkt. Han vil ta vare på pluraliteten og meningsglidningene. Den ubestemmeligheten som Derrida påpeker, forstyrrer de etablerte skillene mellom fiksjon og virkelighet, fiksjon og sannhet, litteratur og filosofi, kunst og teknikk, offentlighet og privatliv (Bennington og Derrida 1991 s. 295). “[C]ritical texts must be read in a radically different way, not so much for their interpretative ‘insights’ as for the symptoms of ‘blindness’ which mark their conceptual limits.” (Norris 1988 s. 23) Litteraturen inngår i et ubestemmelig og endeløst spill (Kofman 1987 s. 93). Det uavsluttbare kan ikke temmes ved å foreta dialektiske synteser eller rasjonalistiske definisjoner (Zima 1994 s. 53). Motsetningene er ikke-dialektiske og ikke-hegelianske (Zima 1994 s. 101). I dekonstruksjon er avdekking av ambivalenser, motsetninger og flertydigheter viktig, i motsetning til begrepslig entydighet (Zima 1994 s. 46).

“Derrida is working, rather, to describe a general process through which texts undo the philosophical system to which they adhere by revealing its rhetorical nature. [...] This displacement has since been transformed into a central methodological

principle by J. Hillis Miller, who argues not just that a text already contains the operation of self-deconstruction, in which two contradictory principles or lines of argument confront one another, but that this undecidability ‘is always thematized in the text itself in the form of metalinguistic statements.’ In other words, the text does not just contain or perform a self-deconstruction but is *about* self-deconstruction, so that a deconstructive reading is an interpretation of the text, an analysis of what it says or means.” (Culler 1983 s. 15)

“There is no final analysis, no metalinguistic method, which could possibly draw a rigorous line between its own operations and the language they work upon. Semiology has to recognize that the terms and concepts it employs are always bound up with the signifying process it sets out to analyse.” (Norris 1988 s. 9)

Ifølge de Man er både menneskets bevissthet og dets språk isolert fra “naturen” og “verden” (Bohrer 1993 s. 320). “[V]estlig filosofi har forestilt seg at språket og skriften kun er redskaper for bevisstheten; [...] erfaringen av stemmen som fenomen er opphav til en vedvarende form for kulturelt selvbedrag, nemlig av at alt lar seg erkjenne, forklare, finne ut og utredes, at alt lar seg fastholde i et overbevisende og varig nærvær bare det språkliggjøres, eksempelvis i vitenskapelige tekster og deres akademiske konvensjoner, inkludert dialog med sekundærlitteratur. Det er et selvbedrag på konkret nivå.” (*Morgenbladet* 25. juni–1. juli 2010 s. 36)

“[F]or all its sins, deconstruction has surely profited us by establishing the unreliable nature of texts” (Wendy Griswold i <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.so.19.080193.002323>; lesedato 28.06.19).

To strategier smelter sammen: “den litterære teksten blir filosofi, og den filosofiske teksten blir litteratur” (Bohrer 1993 s. 184). Dekonstruktivistene opphever langt på vei skillet mellom teori og diktning, historie og fiksjon, litteratur og filosofi. De griper tak i marginale fenomener, det perifere og uavklarte uavhengig av sjanger. Filosofi er alltid avhengig av retoriske figurer som ikke kan beherskes (Bohrer 1993 s. 207). De Man kalte dekonstruksjon for “samtidig teori og ikke teori, den universelle teorien om teoriens umulighet” (sitert fra Bohrer 1993 s. 343). “Deconstruction is no more theory than practice, an opposition he [Derrida] deconstructs.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 46) Avstanden mellom primær- og sekundærtekster forsvinner også, og i stedet inngår alle tekster i et intertekstuell nettverk uten sentrum og periferi, og uten begynnelse eller slutt (Bohrer 1993 s. 345).

“The aesthetic for him [Derrida] is always a little less and a little more than what both its staunchest defenders and most vocal critics claim; it is occulted in the very act of locating and defining it, never completely contained by the frame placed around it and thus never completely “itself.” ” (Carroll 1987 s. 139) “A certain practice of art, then, is still seen as an antidote to the limits of theory, a way of opening theories up to what they exclude or repress.” (Carroll 1987 s. 44)

For de Man tilhører bare de verkene kanon som motsetter seg kanon, og kanon er sterkest når den møter sterkest motstand – hva kanon er må dekonstrueres (Bohrer 1993 s. 23). Litteraturen finnes gjennom å mislykkes i kampen mot å bli kanonisert (s. 23).

Paul de Man sa til studentene i begynnelsen av en av sine forelesninger: “Dere kommer aldri til å forstå noe – vi kan slutte her og nå og gå hjem alle sammen.” (sitert og oversatt fra Perrig 2009 s. 79)

“Amerikas første møte med Derrida skete på en konferanse på Johns Hopkins universitetet i Maryland. Her holdt Derrida, i 1966, det foredrag, der skulle vise sig at blive et slags manifest for dekonstruktion i Amerika. Foredraget hed “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”. Det var et opgør med strukturalismen i almindelighed og med Claude Lévi-Strauss i særdeleshed.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 12)

“The argument that feminists should approach the notion of a total discursive construction of the subject which erases any room for maneuver or radical change by the subject with some trepidation because it could lead to an ineffective, wholly negative feminism (which deconstructs and disrupts but does not construct anything) is usefully developed in: Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism”; and Susan J. Wolfe and Julia Penelope, “Sexual Identity/Textual Politics: Lesbian (De/Com)positions,” *Sexual Practice, Textual Theory: Lesbian Cultural Criticism*, Susan J. Wolfe and Julia Penelope, ed., (Cambridge MA and Oxford UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.” (Connock 1999 s. 40)

Dekonstruksjon er “a dismantling of the text as a coherent signifying system [...] This deconstructive discourse is called ‘radical bricolage’ by Corrigan (1986).” (Anne Jerslev i Mathijs og Mendik 2008 s. 91-92) Den russiske forfatteren Vladimir Georgievitsj Sorokin dekonstruerer ifølge litteraturforskeren Christine Engel alle de tre store, europeiske metafortellingene: den kristelige, den rasjonalistiske og den marxistiske (i Neuhaus og Holzner 2007 s. 709).

“[T]he Parisian journal *Tel Quel*’s brand of ‘libertarian’ textual theory [...] equates radical politics with the free play of an infinitely pluralized meaning.” (Norris 1988 s. 80)

Den amerikanske maleren Mark Tanseys oljemaleri *Derrida queries de Man* (1990) viser de to litteratur-filosofene i kamp med hverandre i Alpene, i rollene som Sherlock Holmes og professor Moriarty ved Reichenbach Falls.

“[H]ovedmålet på Utøya 22. juli var tidligere statsminister Gro Harlem Brundtland. Hun skulle tas til fange og halshugges for åpent kamera. Til dette formålet brakte han håndjern, kniv og bajonett med seg til Utøya. Det forberedte

henrettelsesformularet lød: “Du GHB dømmes til døden for å ha dekonstruert norsk kultur.” [...] I rettssalen begrunner Behring Breivik sine ugjerninger med ønsket om å slå tilbake mot “dekonstruksjonen” og “multikulturalismen”. [...] Dekonstruksjonen observerer imidlertid hvordan jakten på helhet og mening, sammenheng og tilhørighet blir patologisk når man lever i en gjennomstrømmende globalisert verden. Den vil øve oss i å utsette kategoriseringene, respektere forskjellene og fornemme det flyktige ved tilværelsen. Dekonstruksjonen har fremfor alt vært vellykket som litteraturvitenskapelig program. Hvorfor skulle et kunstverk la seg redusere til en helhetlig fortolkning? Bør man ikke snarere undersøke hvordan tekster vender seg bort fra og motsetter seg slike fortolkninger?” (professor Kjetil Jacobsen i *Morgenbladet* 4.–10. mai 2012 s. 42)

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