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Dekonstruksjon

Dekonstruksjon er en teoriretning som inkluderer ulike analysemetoder. Et felles-element er at en overfor litterære tekster ikke lenger arbeider for å påvise homogenitet. I stedet er det en del av denne retningens prosjekt å vise hvordan tomrom og forskyvninger i enhver struktur og enhver tankebygning blir meningskonstituerende. I tekster som dekonstrueres, leter leserne/verktolkerne fram tilbakeholdt mening som stadig forflytter seg, men som i og med disse forflytningene likevel har en listig og uhandgripelig mening. Stilt overfor litterære tekster innebærer dette en systematisk oppsøking av det i teksten som gjør en enhetlig og organisk meningsintegrasjon umulig å stabilisere.

“Deconstruction has been variously presented as a philosophical position, a political or intellectual strategy, and a mode of reading.” (Culler 1985 s. 85)

Dekonstruksjon kan oppfattes som “a positive technique for making trouble; an affront to every normal and comfortable habit of thought” (Norris 1988 s. xi). Det har blitt oppfattet som “the loosening or weakening of the structures of domination and oppression that now hold us captive” (Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 217).

“[T]o deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise.” (Culler 1985 s. 86) “[F]requently the readings are undermined by the very assumptions that make them possible.” (Culler 1985 s. 240)

“The term deconstruction is normally used to refer to a set of strategies whose operations expose and subvert the unarticulated presuppositions of metaphysical thought which, in remaining unexposed, maintain dominance within Western culture. [...] Rhetoric is basically used to subvert logic rather than to support it. Favourite techniques are: reversal of binary oppositions which appear equal but where one term has a negative or secondary relation to the first; displacement, which renders the first term dependent on the second; parody, which subverts the myth of pure origin; forms of repetition with difference, which have a similar effect; and the demonstration that truth is always a metaphor.” (Waugh 1992 s. 71)

“Deconstruction is, as Barbara Johnson has put it, ‘a careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text.’ Skeptical of the possibility of mastering meaning with a comprehensive system or discipline, it investigates what the most powerful and interesting texts have to tell us about signification and shows how they undo the logics of signification on which they rely.” (Culler 1983 s. ix) Ofte viser en dekonstruktiv analyse “two logics, each of which works by excluding the other” (Culler 1983 s. 177). Dekonstruksjon innebærer en paradoksal “nedoppbygging” (Bohrer 1993 s. 314). Det dekonstruerte konstruerer seg gjennom sin egen destruksjon (Bohrer 1993 s. 23).

Hans Hauge sammenfatter det han oppfatter som dekonstruktivismens to sentrale aspekter slik: “Det ene aspekt kan opfattes som en teori om, at tekster er *selv-dekonstruktive*, eller at de er *ubestemmelige*. Det andet aspekt har at gøre med en tilsyneladende *ophævelse* eller *udjævning* af forskellen mellem genrer: mellem teori og digtning, mellem historie og fiktion, mellem filosofi og litteratur. [...] Hvis teksten fundamentalt set er ubestemmelig, *heterogen*, dialogisk, så umuliggør det både en historisk-materialistisk såvel som en formalistisk-strukturel læsning.” (i Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 14) “Et andet aspekt ved “doktrinen” var [...] udviskningen af forskellen mellem genrer: mellem poesi og kommentar, mellem fiktion og teori, mellem litteratur og filosofi, mellem historie og historiefilosofi, mellem fiktion eller historie o.s.v.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 17-18)

“The effect of deconstruction is to disrupt the hierarchical relation that previously determined the concept of literature by reinscribing the distinction between literary and nonliterary works within a general literarity or textuality, and thus to encourage projects, such as the literary reading of philosophical texts and the philosophical reading of literary texts, that allow these discourses to communicate with one another.” (Culler 1985 s. 184-185)

“Deconstruction shatters their “faith in reason” by revealing the uncanny irrationality of texts and their ability to confute or subvert every system or position they are thought to manifest.” (Culler 1985 s. 220)

“If it has questioned the boundary lines of literature, it has done so not with respect to the noncanonical but with respect to the line between literature and philosophy or between literature and criticism. It is as a rethinking of those distinctions that deconstruction most radically displaces certain traditional evaluative assumptions.” (Johnson 1987 s. 19) “Philosophy turns out to be an endless reflection on its own destruction at the hands of literature. This endless reflection is itself a rhetorical mode, since it is unable ever to escape from the rhetorical deceit it denounces.” (Man 1979 s. 115)

“[T]he relation between literature and philosophy involves the repetitive set-up and collapse of their difference: philosophy’s self-definition relies on a claim to rigor

that is subverted by the literarity of its rhetoric of truth, but it is precisely that literarity that turns out to be the very model for philosophical rigor. Philosophy is defined by its refusal to recognize itself as literature; literature is defined as the rhetorical self-transgression of philosophy. This positing and erasing of difference, this fluctuation between two and one, could perhaps be called a hendiadys [...] the rhetorical figure that most aptly names such versions of the question of the chicken and the egg. What is at stake in the hendiadys “philosophy and literature” is precisely the status of values: if literature resorts to philosophically inadmissible value-seductions in order to out-philosophize philosophy, then the distinction between the “serious” and the “arbitrary” breaks down.” (Johnson 1987 s. 20)

“Deconstruction, too, is “apolitical” when it is used to show that the meaning of a text is *undecidable*: the text’s meaning can’t be pinned down and, therefore, the text has no meaning in the traditional sense of the word.” (Tyson 2006) “Indeed, to put it in a nutshell, deconstruction is the reading of texts in terms of their marks, traces, or undecidable features, in terms of their margins, limits, or frameworks, and in terms of their self-circumscriptions or self-delimitations as texts. But what does this mean? It means that deconstruction is concerned with offering an account of what is going on in a text – not by seeking out its meaning, or its component parts, or its systematic implications – but rather by marking off its relations to other texts, its contexts, its sub-texts. It means that deconstruction accounts for how a text’s explicit formulations undermine its implicit or non-explicit aspects. It brings out what the text excludes by showing what it includes. It highlights what remains undecidable and what operates as an undecidable in the text itself.” (Silverman 1989 s. 4)

I stället för “helhet och sammanhang betonar man det “spel av skillnader” som urholkar textens identitet och förändrar dess gränser. Ingen är skickligare än [den franske filosofen] Derrida att påvisa betydelsen av, men också relativiteten, i de ramar – genrer, konventioner, signaturer, titlar etc – som vi ofta omedvetet vägleds av när vi läser text. Vi får ett mer pragmatiskt textbegrepp, beroende av den serie beslut som gör att en viss text blir läsbar för oss i en viss situation.” (Olsson 1987 s. 121) “[D]econstruction elucidates the heterogeneity of the text.” (Culler 1985 s. 135)

“Literature, as much as philosophy, then, lends itself to “transcendent readings.” If the aim of philosophy could be said to be the effacement of its written, textual characteristics before the signified it wants to convey, the same could be said for literature and literary theory – at least in the great majority of cases. [...] [Jacques] Derrida’s stated critical project is certainly to push both philosophy and literature beyond their traditional delimitations and to rework their relations with each other through the transformation of each. From his perspective, any *theory* of literature that does not work towards this double transformation is limiting the critical impact of deconstruction by making it a defense of literature. And, it should be added, any treatment of deconstruction as primarily a model or methodology for reading

literary (or philosophical) texts is certain to have these restrictive effects – even if it initially challenges and disturbs more conventional forms of literary criticism and techniques of reading.” (Carroll 1987 s. 89)

David Lehman siterer i en bok om den amerikanske litteraturteoretikeren og kritikeren Paul de Man disse uttalelsene om dekonstruksjon:

“Deconstruction is the practice, in reading, of one who refuses to be lulled into the complacency of self, into believing in the stability of reference, or in the appearance of a seamless web of meanings. It is a debunking of the delusory tokens of meaning and reference.

... the term invented by Derrida in the 1960’s to describe analysis showing that the major structures by which we organize our thoughts are *constructions*, not natural and inevitable.

... a form of commentary that shows the connection between the stated content of a piece of writing and the rhetorical system which controls it. The connection establishes a discrepancy between the content and the rhetorical system ...

A deconstructive reading is an attempt to show how the conspicuously foregrounded statements in a text are systematically related to discordant signifying elements that the text has thrown into its shadows or margins, an attempt both to recover what is lost and to analyze what happens when a text is read solely in function of intentionality, meaningfulness, and representativity. Deconstruction thus confers a new kind of readability on those elements in a text that readers have traditionally been trained to disregard, overcome, explain away, or edit out – contradictions, obscurities, ambiguities, incoherences, discontinuities, ellipses, interruptions, repetitions, and plays of the signifier.

... the dismantling of conceptual oppositions, the taking apart of hierarchical systems of thought ...

To deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise.

A deconstruction always has for its target to reveal the existence of hidden articulations and fragmentations within assumedly monadic totalities.” (Lehman 1992 s. 65-66)

“Derrida and his followers ridicule the notion that deconstruction is a “theory,” or a “philosophical project,” or a “method” – such terms, they maintain, are inaccurate and reductive. This attempt to defy categorization may be part of the seductive

appeal that deconstruction holds for its academic proponents: it is so “new” that you can’t fit it into your existing frames of thought, and so “radical” that it would declare those frames of thought invalid, obsolete, exploded.” (Lehman 1992 s. 23-24)

“Literature creates openings through which critical philosophy can also move in order to do battle with philosophical authority and the various forms of closure it imposes.” (Carroll 1987 s. 89-90) “What philosophy declines to think through with any rigour is the salient fact of its textual constitution, its dependence on the figural resources of a language that opens up strange and unsettling possibilities of sense.” (Norris 1987 s. 176) “[T]he text becomes the successive and cumulative experience of these tangles of meaning and of figuration.” (Man 1984 s. 99) “[A]ttention to the implications of figurality in a discourse [...] is one of the principal resources of deconstruction.” (Culler 1985 s. 243)

Jacques Derridas “goal is to push against the limitations of theory and produce a form of critical discourse mobile enough to pass from art to theory and back again without terminating in either one. His work on art “mobilizes” both theory and art by rethinking each in terms of the frames that both separate them and link them together, that both block and permit passage or movement between them.” (Carroll 1987 s. 144) Det er “not a question of choosing between literature and truth, fiction and psychoanalysis, text and theory; it is, rather, a question of accounting for the “overrun” of one into the other.” (Carroll 1987 s. 151) Dekonstruksjon “shows how discourses undermine the philosophical presuppositions on which they rely” (Culler 1983b s. 88-89). En av “the fundamental themes in Derrida’s own thought [...] [is] the textuality of philosophy.” (Rudolf Bernet i Silverman 1989 s. 139)

“In Jacques Derrida’s performance of presence/absence, presence is allied with Logos, God, teleology – in general, with an originary plenitude that can act to ground signification and give order and meaning to the trajectory of history. The work of Eric Havelock, among others, demonstrates how in Plato’s *Republic* this view of originary presence authorized a stable, coherent self that could witness and testify to a stable, coherent reality. Through these and other means, the metaphysics of presence front-loaded meaning into the system. Meaning was guaranteed because a stable origin existed. It is now a familiar story how deconstruction exposed the inability of systems to posit their own origins, thus ungrounding signification and rendering meaning indeterminate. As the presence/absence hierarchy was destabilized and as absence was privileged over presence, lack displaced plenitude, and desire usurped certitude. Important as these moves have been in late-twentieth-century thought, they still took place within the compass of the presence/absence dialectic. One feels lack only if presence is posited or assumed; one is driven by desire only if the object of desire is conceptualized as something to be possessed. Just as the metaphysics of presence required an originary plenitude to articulate a stable self, deconstruction required a metaphysics of presence to articulate the destabilization of that self.” (Hayles 1999 s. 285)

“Derrida’s most typical deconstructive moves [...] is the dismantling of conceptual oppositions, the taking apart of hierarchical systems of thought which can then be *reinscribed* within a different order of textual signification. Or again: deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those ‘aporias’, blindspots or moments of self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly *means to say* and what it is nonetheless *constrained to mean*. To ‘deconstruct’ a piece of writing is therefore to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely those unregarded details (casual metaphors, footnotes, incidental turns of argument) which are always, and necessarily, passed over by interpreters of a more orthodox persuasion. For it is here, in the margins of the text – the ‘margins’, that is, as defined by a powerful normative consensus – that deconstruction discovers those same unsettling forces at work. So there is at least a certain *prima facie* case for the claim that deconstruction is a ‘method’ of reading with its own specific rules and protocols. [...] it is precisely this idea – this assumption that meaning can always be grasped in the form of some proper, self-identical concept – that Derrida is most determinedly out to deconstruct.” (Norris 1987 s. 18-19)

For Derrida “there is no *concept* as such, no stable or self-identical idea, that attaches to the word ‘writing’.” (Norris 1987 s. 117) Dekonstruksjon innebærer blant annet “undermineringen av idén om texten som ett avslutat helt.” (Olsson 1987 s. 101) “[H]os Derrida är varken medvetande eller text identiska med sig själva.” (Olsson 1987 s. 121)

“[T]he Derridean project of dismantling binary oppositions and subverting the transcendental signifier [...] the revulsion from the dominative, totalizing, and unequivocally denotative; the privileging of plurality and heterogeneity, the recurrent gestures of hesitation and indeterminacy, the devotion to gliding and process, slippage and movement [...] The epistemological scepticism and historical relativism of certain militant forms of deconstruction are profoundly antithetical to academic orthodoxy, shaking as they do the very foundations of scholarly objectivity. [...] Deconstruction rescues the heterogeneity of the subject from its hypostatization, but only at the cost of liquidating the subjective agency which might engage, politically rather than textually, with the very ideological systems which necessitated this strategy in the first place. It is for this reason that it reproduces a blending of bleakness and euphoria, affirmation and resignation, characteristic of the liberal humanist tradition.” (Eagleton 1985 s. 98-99)

“The only tolerable gesture of authority, accordingly, becomes self-molesting and self-abnegating – one which combines the authoritarian abrasiveness of informing you that you do not know what you are saying, with the humility of acknowledging that this very statement is by the same token utterly suspect. In this way deconstruction is able to outflank every existing knowledge to absolutely no effect. Like some other modern philosophy, it cancels all the way through and leaves

everything just as it was. [...] literature becomes the truth, essence or self-consciousness of all other discourses precisely because, unlike them, it knows that it does not know what it is talking about. [...] Literature, paradoxically, becomes the centre from which all centring is denounced, the truth by which all truth may be deconstructed.” (Eagleton 1985 s. 103-104)

“The technology of writing cannot therefore be counted as subsidiary and external to thought and speech, as an entire tradition from Plato to Rousseau and beyond has desired and described it to be. This tradition would see in writing a scandalous form of contamination of the purity of the closed inner circuit of thought-speech, an unnatural and unnecessary adjunct to the autonomous consciousness. The actual inevitability of such contamination, if one accepts that mind, language, writing, technology, society, are *open* systems, is one of the most insistent themes in Derrida’s work.” (Johnson 1993 s. 152)

Derrida var påvirket av den tyske filosofen Martin Heideggers kritikk av den vestlige metafysikken. Heidegger prøvde å undergrave det språket som tvinger oss til å tenke innen tradisjonelle begreper og “logiske” oppfatninger om tid og eksistens (Steiner 1989 s. 121). “The deconstruction appeals to no higher logical principle or superior reason but uses the very principle it deconstructs.” (Culler 1985 s. 87) “Derrida recognizes, in following Heidegger, that no philosophical or literary text can simply step outside of a historico-metaphysical framework, since language will be brought back to its own finitude at the point when its boundaries or limits are worn and torn away. Destruction or deconstruction are not in themselves terms which prophesy the “end” of a historico-metaphysical temporal structure, a going beyond metaphysics, but terms which address the destiny of thought which through translation and reinscription allows us to consider and even perform those textual enactments of menacing limits whose effect is to counter the premises upon which an authority of the self-givenness of meaning is established.” (Rapaport 1989 s. 33-34)

Derrida mener at “det inte finns något enhetligt självmedvetande, uten att detta är en “effekt” av språkliga skillnader, av *différance*. [...] Inte så att Derrida skulle förneka människan eller det mänskliga subjektet, utan så att han i likhet med Nietzsche och Heidegger misstror människans anspråk på att vara tillvarons mittpunkt och att utifrån denna mitt – denna “närvaro” som Derrida kallar det – nå en sann kunskap om världen. Föreställningen om människans medvetande som naturens spegel är en gammal topos i Västerlandets idéhistoria som bygger på en förmåga till direkt och förspråklig kontakt med naturens väsen. [...] När Derrida talar om “närvarons metafysik” i västerlandsk tradition innebär det ett försök att ringa in myten om ett rent självmedvetande, obefläckat av språkliga kategorier.” (Olsson 1987 s. 76-77 og 79)

“Dekonstruksjonen ble utformet i forlengelsen av Derridas lesninger av Heidegger, i forsøk på videreføring av 1800-tallets kritikk av vestlig metafysikk, særlig hos

Friedrich Nietzsche. Heideggers uttrykk, “Destruktion” eller “Abbau”, kan riktignok ha mange betydninger: fjerning, demontering, reduksjon, svekkelse, nedbryting, oppløsning, avvikling, nedbygging, rasing. Derrida ville unngå de overveldende negative konnotasjonene ved Heideggers begreper. Valget falt på “dekonstruksjon”, med virkninger langt inn i norsk kulturdebatt et halvt århundre senere. På fransk kan ordet betegne det å ta en maskin fra hverandre, del for del, for å transportere den til et nytt sted og bygge den opp igjen; et vakkert bilde på oversettelse, som dekonstruksjon er nær forbundet med. Derrida ønsket å kombinere arkitektoniske og mekaniske betydninger med de retoriske – det dreier seg om *tankebygninger*.” (Tom Egil Hverven i *Klassekampens* bokmagasin 19. januar 2013 s. 6)

For Derrida er et av målene å finne grunnlaget for at meningsfullhet blir til, altså før mening får bestemte utforminger (Kimmerle 1988 s. 116).

“Poststrukturalismen er primært språkfilosofi” (Frank 1984 s. 488). Innen poststrukturalistisk teori blir det retoriske sett på som en uttryddelig dimensjon ved språket. Dette synet står i motsetning til troen på at sannheter hviler i absolutt selvidentitet uavhengig av språk og deretter kan formidles u-retorisk gjennom språket. Det er umulig å formidle innsikter uten omsvøp av retorisk art. De følgende dikotomiene kan sies å ha ligget til grunn i det tradisjonelle og metafysiske synet på retorikk:

	realiteter / illusjoner	
	fakta / meninger	
	stabilt / foranderlig	
	fornuft / følelse	
	dybde / overflate	
Sannhet <-----	essensiell / perifer	-----> Retorikk
	indre / ytre	
	umediert / mediert	
	klar / dunkel	
	nødvendig / tilfeldig	
	likefram / kronglete	
	nøytralt / partisk	

“A deconstruction involves the demonstration that a hierarchical opposition, in which one term is said to be dependent upon another conceived as prior, is in fact a rhetorical or metaphysical imposition and that the hierarchy could well be reversed.” (Culler 1983 s. 183) Den tyske dikteren og filosofen Johann Gottfried von Herder mente at tanke og språklig uttrykk forholder seg til hverandre som sjelen og kroppen (Schlingmann 1985 s. 120). Slike motsetningspar blir undergravd innen dekonstruksjon.

“En dekonstruktiv læsning er et forsøg på at vise, hvordan udsagn, der tydeligt er sat i forgrunden i en tekst, er systematisk forbundne med betydningsgivende elementer, som teksten har kastet ud i skyggen eller marginen; den er et forsøg på at genvinde det, der er tabt og at analysere, hvad der sker, når en tekst læses ene og alene i overensstemmelse med tekstens intention, mening eller repræsentativitet. På den måde forlener dekonstruktionen en ny form for læsbarhed til elementer i en tekst, som læsere traditionelt er blevet opdraget til at se bort fra, overvinde, bortforklare, eller redigere væk – modsigelser, vanskelige steder, flertydigheder, manglende kohærens, spring, ellipser, afbrydelser, gentagelser, og signifiantens spil.” (Barbara Johnson sitert fra Ørum 1994 s. 60)

“If deconstruction is, in Barbara Johnson’s happy phrase, “the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text” (*The Critical Difference*, p. 5), the critic will be on the lookout for different sorts of conflict. The first [...] is the asymmetrical opposition or value-laden hierarchy, in which one term is promoted at the expense of the other. The question for the critic is whether the second term, treated as a negative, marginal, or supplementary version of the first, does not prove to be the condition of possibility of the first. Along with the logic that asserts the preeminence of the first term, is there a contrary logic, covertly at work but emerging at some crucial moment or figure in the text, which identifies the second term as the enabling condition of the first? The relation between speech and writing, as Derrida has expounded it, is the best known version of this structure, but it can appear in numerous unpredictable guises that may be difficult to detect and dissect.” (Culler 1985 s. 213)

“[O]ne might say that to deconstruct an opposition, such as presence/absence, speech/writing, philosophy/literature, literal/metaphorical, central/marginal, is not to destroy it, leaving a monism according to which there would be *only* absence or writing or literature, or metaphor, or marginality. To deconstruct an opposition is to undo and displace it, to situate it differently. Schematically, this involves several distinguishable moves: (A) one demonstrates that the opposition is a metaphysical and ideological imposition by (1) bringing out its presuppositions and its role in the system of metaphysical values – a task which may require extensive analysis of a number of texts – and (2) showing how it is undone in the texts that enunciate and rely on it. But (B) one simultaneously maintains the opposition by (1) employing it in one’s argument (the characterizations of speech and writing or of literature and philosophy are not errors to be repudiated but essential resources for argument) and (2) reinstating it with a reversal that gives it a different status and impact. When speech and writing are distinguished as two versions of a generalized protowriting, the opposition does not have the same implications as when writing is seen as a technical and imperfect representation of speech. The distinction between the literal and the figurative, essential to discussions of the functioning of language, works differently when the deconstructive reversal identifies literal language as figures whose figurality has been forgotten instead of treating figures as deviations from proper, normal literality. Working in this way, with a double movement, both

inside and outside previous categories and distinctions, deconstruction is ambiguously or uncomfortably positioned and particularly open to attack and misunderstanding. Relying on distinctions that it puts in question, exploiting oppositions whose philosophical implications it seeks to evade, it can always be attacked both as an anarchism determined to disrupt any order whatever and, from the opposite perspective, as an accessory to the hierarchies it denounces. Instead of claiming to offer firm ground for the construction of a new order or synthesis, it remains implicated in or attached to the system it criticizes and attempts to displace.” (Culler 1985 s. 150-151)

“[W]hat is most radical in deconstruction is precisely that it questions this basic logic of binary opposition, but not in a simple, binary, antagonistic way. [...] The very word *deconstruction* is meant to undermine the either/or logic of the opposition “construction/destruction.” [...] It is the attempt to *write with* this “other” logic that produces the appearance of obscurity in many deconstructive texts. Any statement that *affirms* while using a logic different from the logic of binary opposition will necessarily not conform to binary notions of “clarity.” ” (Johnson 1987 s. 12-13)

“Analytical writings that attempt to neutralize the male/female opposition are extremely important, but, as Derrida says, “the hierarchy of the binary opposition always reconstitutes itself,” and therefore a movement that asserts the primacy of the oppressed term is strategically indispensable” (Culler 1985 s. 173).

“[D]econstruction attempts to subvert this dialectical logic that would reincorporate whatever operated outside its system by virtue of its being in charge of the opposition between the inside and outside. To do so, it employs the logic of neither/nor and both/and against that of binary opposition.” (Walter Brogan i Silverman 1989 s. 9)

Oppgaven er “to deconstruct everything that presents itself as an order, to show that all “order” conceals something else, something that is repressed in this order.” (Jean-François Lyotard sitert fra Carroll 1987 s. 27)

Jacques Derrida oppløser forskjellene og hierarkiene mellom kulturelt/naturlig, skriftlig/talt og andre begrepspar (Klepper, Mayer og Schneck 1996 s. 273). I opposisjonspar som sjel/kropp, ånd/materie, fornuft/følelse blir den siste kategorien tradisjonelt oppfattet som underlagt og sekundær i forhold til den første (Dery 1997 s. 256). Postmodernistene vil skake disse dualistiske hierarkiene. Et av poststrukturalistenes prosjekter har vært å vise hvordan den ene polen alltid infiltreres av den andre, og at retorikk er en uatskillelig del av all kommunikasjon mellom mennesker. Det er umulig å tenke eller argumentere utenfor retorikken eller hinsides metaforene (Zima 1994 s. 50). Fokus på retorikk erstatter fokus på semantikk (Bohrer 1993 s. 321).

Ifølge Paul de Man mening “hides instead behind rhetorical devices of language that disguise and distort what the writer is actually saying, perhaps in contrast to what he meant to say.” (Man 1989 s. 152) De Mans “close readings concentrate on crucial rhetorical structures in passages with a metalinguistic function or meta-critical implications: passages which comment directly on symbolic relations, textual structures, or interpretive processes, or which by their discussion of philosophical oppositions on which rhetorical structures depend (such as essence/accident, inside/outside, cause/effect) have an indirect bearing on problems of rhetoric and reading.” (Culler 1985 s. 245)

“We know that our entire social language is an intricate system of rhetorical devices designed to escape from the direct expression of desires that are, in the fullest sense of the term, unnameable – not because they are ethically shameful (for this would make the problem a very simple one), but because unmediated expression is a philosophical impossibility.” (Man 1989 s. 9)

“[F]ilosofernas texter, med alla deras höga anspråk på logisk stringens och motsägelsefrihet, rymmer retoriska element som troper, figurer, förskjutningar och tomrum som när de väl kan lockas fram som dolda rörelser i texten rubbar de logiska sammanhangen.” (Olsson 1987 s. 103)

“[E]n individuell språkhandling [kan inte] [...] härledas ur språkssystemets regler, utan innebär en omvandling och därmed en förskjutning av systemets möjligheter. Dessutom kan man inte stänga ett system eller en ordning utan att hänvisa till en princip som ligger *utanför* systemet. Och därmed har man öppnat dess gränser, vare sig man vill det eller ej. [...] samtidigt som det inte finns någon möjlighet att fly undan språket för att i en akt av närvaro eller omedelbar evidens kontrollera det” (Olsson 1987 s. 69 og 72).

“Sproget repræsenterer en egenmekanik, der absorberer det indhold, det betjener sig af. Indholdet er så at sige kun til stede som passivt substrat for det spil, ordene sætter i værk med hinanden. [...] Sprogspil er sprogets sjæl for [Geoffrey] Hartman, fornemmer man. [...] Sproget er, siger han, helt overordnet kategorierne *person* og *handling*. Han forstår ikke personerne primært som personer, der formidler sig sprogligt med hinanden, men som effekter af og ved sprogets egen mekanik. Det er altså sproget, der symbolsk udveksler personerne for at generere sig selv i sprogspillet – ikke personerne der udveksler tegn for at få et forhold til hinanden. “Person” og “handling” er – i en mere traditionel analyse – kategorier for indhold. Men indholdspladsen findes egentlig ikke. Sagen er: sproget indtager hos Hartman en dobbelt funktion. Det er både indhold og form, både signifiant og signifié. Samtidig er “sprog” et andet ord for formen og signifianten – en benægtelse af indholdet. På den ene side læser Hartman dramaerne i sprogets egne dikotome kategorier (signifiant/signifié), og på den anden side anbringer han “sprog” på begge sider af dikotomiens barre, (S/s), der skelner mellem repræsentationen og det repræsenterede. Han fastholder en distinktion. Men han ønsker også at opløse den.

Som “form” kan sproget dermed referere til indholdet “sprog”. Det finder sin mening i sig selv, lukker sig om sig selv, bliver suverænt og selvgyldigt. Som var det uafhængigt af alle andre instanser – eller som måtte alle andre instanser søge deres mening her: i sprogets spændvidde mellem dets afgrundsdybe væsen og dets overflade af ordspil, vitser og leg. Et ikke blot talt, men selv talende sprog.” (Claus B. Østergaard i Ørum 1994 s. 91-92)

“ “Sprog” bliver den instans, kritikken henviser til, når andre instanser går til grunde i indre relativitet. Hvorledes er dette muligt, må vi spørge? Sagen er, at “sprog” i (visse dele af) den amerikanske dekonstruktion indtager en fortryllet og fortryllende position. På den ene side er det i sproget som udtryksstørrelse, de øvrige tekstkategorier spejler deres egen relativitet, for sproget er netop en instans, der er mere relativ end alle andre. På den anden side kan sproget kun få denne plads ved at indtage en privilegeret position. Sproget bliver dermed absolut, et mål for andre kategoriers relative gyldighed – ironisk nok netop i kraft af at være det topos, hvor den generelle relativitet argumenteres.” (Claus B. Østergaard i Ørum 1994 s. 94)

“In characterizing philosophy as logocentric, Derrida identifies its basic project as that of determining the nature of truth, reason, being, and of distinguishing the essential from the contingent, the well-grounded from the factitious.” (Culler 1985 s. 151) Derrida dekonstruerer “that loaded system of binary distinctions – speech/writing, presence/absence, origin/ supplement – which marks the discourse of logocentric reason. And indeed, it is a main part of Derrida’s argument that there can be no thinking back to origins and sources, no escaping from the ‘logic of supplementarity’ upon which these crucial oppositions finally break down. [...] this desire to fix an origin for truth and knowledge must always get entangled in textual complications beyond its power to predict or control.” (Norris 1987 s. 34)

Håpet “om sansningens “gennembrud” til en umiddelbar, intuitiv oplevelse af natur, krop eller bevidsthed [tar] sig derfor ud som en forglemmelse af at sproget, som forståelsens ultimative medium, endegyldigt blokerer for en sammensmeltning af natur og ånd, tegn og idé, subjekt og objekt. [...] dekonstruktionismens sprogtænkning. Modsat klassiske mimetiske sprogteorier, der hævder en *naturlig* forbindelse mellem tegn og betydning, symbol og idé, signifiant og signifié, fokuserer dekonstruktionismen, med støtte i (post)strukturalismens begreb om sprog som et system af differenser, på det litterært-figurative sprogs mulige underminering af denne stabile relation” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 91).

Derrida “argues that philosophers have been able to impose their various systems of thought only by ignoring, or suppressing, the disruptive effects of language. His aim is always to draw out these effects by a critical reading which fastens on, and skilfully unpicks, the elements of metaphor and other figurative devices at work in the texts of philosophy. Deconstruction in this, its most rigorous form acts as a constant reminder of the ways in which language deflects or complicates the

philosopher's project. Above all, deconstruction works to undo the idea – according to Derrida, the ruling illusion of Western metaphysics – that reason can somehow dispense with language and arrive at a pure, self-authenticating truth or method. Though philosophy strives to efface its textual or 'written' character, the signs of that struggle are there to be read in its blind-spots of metaphor and other rhetorical strategies." (Norris 1988 s. 18-19) Det fokuseres på "the decentering power of metaphor" (Silverman 1989 s. 46). "Paul de Man shows that attempts to control metaphor cannot extract themselves from metaphor and that in each case a crucial distinction between the literal and metaphorical breaks down." (Culler 1985 s. 148)

Dekonstruksjon skal få oss til å "think twice about claiming that our discourse has accomplished what it sets out to do. It throws a scare into our discourse, destroys a bit of the prestige and self-importance of 'reference,' and ends up creating a salutary distrust in the power of language to do what it sets out to do (along with providing an account of how language accomplishes what it does manage to do)." (John D. Caputo i Silverman 1989 s. 29)

Det er "not out of "hostility" to the moral values of Western civilization that deconstruction has arisen, but out of a desire to understand how those values are potentially already different from *themselves*. By rereading the texts of writers and philosophers that have made a difference to Western history, it might be possible to become aware of the repressions, the elisions, the contradictions, and the linguistic slippages that have functioned unnoticed and that undercut the certainties those texts have been read as upholding. If certainty had never produced anything but just and life-affirming results, there would be no need to analyze it. It is because of the self-contradictions and ambiguities already present within the text and the history of even the clearest and most admirable statements that careful reading is essential. Such a reading does not aim to eliminate or dismiss texts or values, but rather to see them in a more complex, more *constructed*, less idealized light." (Johnson 1987 s. xvii-xviii)

"[D]econstruction has focused on the ways in which the Western white male philosophico-literary tradition subverts itself *from within*" (Johnson 1987 s. 19). Mange dekonstruktive lesninger er en "demonstration of the self-subverting heterogeneity of each great work of Western literature" (Culler 1985 s. 270).

"One cannot simply 'decide to change terrain, in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an absolute break and difference' (*Margins*, p. 135). [...] no case can be argued, no proposition stated – however radical its intent – without falling back on the conceptual resources vested in natural language. And that language is in turn shot through with all the anthropocentric, 'metaphysical' meanings which determine its very logic and intelligibility. Any claim to have broken once and for all with the humanist 'sciences of man' is a claim which can only be self-deluding and devoid of critical power. 'The simple practice of language ceaselessly reinstates the new terrain on

the oldest ground ... thereby inhabiting more naively and more strictly than ever the inside one declares one has deserted' (p. 135)." (Norris 1987 s. 219-220)

Derridas analyser avslører at "even when a text tries to privilege speech as immediacy, it cannot completely eliminate the fact that speech, like writing, is based on a *différance* (a Derridean neologism meaning both "deferment" and "difference") between signifier and signified inherent in the sign. Speakers do not beam meanings directly from one mind to another. Immediacy is an illusion. Properties normally associated with writing inevitably creep into a discussion designed to privilege speech. [...] This emphasis on writing as the more originary category is designed to counter the history of logocentrism and to track the functioning of *différance* in structures of signification." (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 43)

"[I]t follows from the purely differential, nonsubstantial nature of the sign that the difference between signifier and signified cannot be one of substance and that what we may at one point identify as a signified is also a signifier. There are no final meanings that arrest the movement of signification. [...] "The 'primacy' or 'priority' of the signifier," writes Derrida, "would be an absurd and untenable expression. ... The signifier will never by rights precede the signified, since it would no longer be a signifier and the signifier 'signifier' would have no possible signified" (*De la grammatologie*, p. 32n/324). The structural redoubling of any signified as an interpretable signifier does suggest that the realm of signifiers acquires a certain autonomy, but this does not mean signifiers without signifieds, only the failure of signifieds to produce closure." (Culler 1985 s. 188-189)

"På franska har 'différet' två betydelser: att skapa ett avstånd mellan två tillstånd i bemärkelsen "skjuta upp" eller "fördröja", samt att "vara olik", "skilja sig från". I nybildningen *différance* är båda dessa betydelser inbegripna. Saussure talade om språket som ett "spel av skillnader" som när väl språkvärdet bildats övergår i fastlagda "oppositioner", det han kallade "ett positivt faktum". Denna frysta, kristallina form av olikheter var strukturalismens utgangspunkt, men som vi såg utesluter den enligt Derrida tiden. Det finns inga frysta "oppositioner", bara ett fortlöpande spel mellan olikheter och därför betonar Derrida aktiviteten i själva åtskiljandet och uppskjutandet genom att skriva termen med "a" – som motiveras av presens participformen "différent" – i stället för med "e"." (Olsson 1987 s. 75)

"In Postmodernism's celebration of fragmentation, there is thus an underlying belief in *différance*, a belief that unity, meaning, coherence is continually postponed." (Nasrullah Mambrol i <https://literariness.org/2016/03/31/postmodernism/>; lesedato 30.11.22) For Derrida finnes det ingen opprinnelig betydning som andre betydninger er avledet fra. Opprinnelse er "inherently differed and deferred from itself." (Rapaport 1989 s. 49) Alle betydninger er foranderlige og forandrer seg i et spill av forskjeller (Kimmerle 1988 s. 25). *Différance* består i en uendelig dialektikk mellom bestemmelse av det Egne gjennom identifisering av det

Andre (Ulrike Steierwald i <https://journals.openedition.org/germanica/2903>; lesedato 15.03.21).

“The term *différance*, which Derrida introduces here, alludes to this undecidable, nonsynthetic alternation between the perspectives of structure and event. The verb *différer* means to differ and to defer. *Différance* sounds exactly the same as *différence*, but the ending *ance*, which is used to produce verbal nouns, makes it a new form meaning “difference-differing-deferring.” *Différance* thus designates both a “passive” difference already in place as the condition of signification and an act of differing which produces differences. [...] *Différance*, he writes, “is a structure and a movement that cannot be conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/absence. *Différance* is the systematic play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing [*espacement*] by which elements relate to one another. This spacing is the production, simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *différance* indicates this indecision as regards activity and passivity, that which cannot yet be governed and organized by that opposition), of intervals without which the “full” terms could not signify, could not function” (*Positions*, pp. 38-39/27)” (Culler 1985 s. 97)

“Lacking all ontological profundity and mystical depth, *différance* stretches out laterally over the surface as the chain of substitutability, as the coded tracing, within which are generated all names, all the relatively stable nominal unities, including the name of God, including even the name *différance*.” (John D. Caputo i Silverman 1989 s. 26)

“The role of difference/*différance* is to establish the conditions within which discourse functions. It founds (and un-founds, undermines) languages, vocabularies, showing how they are both possible and impossible, that is, incapable of a closure which would give them self-sufficiency and a feeling of success in nailing things down.” (John D. Caputo i Silverman 1989 s. 28)

“For Derrida, the time-design of *différance* precludes the possibility of any element of discourse signifying in and of itself. Each element acquires meaning only through a play of differences, the intersignificative relations to one another of elements which themselves lack self-present meaning. Each element is so interwoven with every other that it is constituted only by the traces within it of the other bits in the chain or system. There are no independent meanings but only ‘traces of traces.’ ” (Edith Wyschogrod i Silverman 1989 s. 192) “[T]he inscription or trace: it is itself nothing or next to nothing, a minimal cause that occasions a maximal effect.” (Johnson 1993 s. 114)

“The logic of writing is thus a double logic: writing is called upon as a necessary remedy for *différance*, but at the same time it is the very *différance* for which a remedy must be sought. In Derrida’s analyses of writing, this logic is called the logic of the *supplément*. In French, the word *supplément* means both an “addition”

and a “substitute.” To say that “A is a *supplément* to B” is thus to say something ambiguous. Addition and substitution are not exactly contradictory, but neither can they be combined in the traditional logic of identity. [...] Some sense of the way in which supplementary logic differs from the binary logic of identity ($A = A$) and noncontradiction ($A \neq \text{not } A$) may be derived from the following list. In this list, all statements are to be taken as *simultaneously* equivalent to the statement “A is a supplement to B.” [...]

- A is added to B.
- A substitutes for B.
- A is a superfluous addition to B.
- A makes up for the absence of B.
- A usurps the place of B.
- A makes up for B’s deficiency.
- A corrupts the purity of B.
- A is necessary so that B can be restored.
- A is an accident alienating B from itself.
- A is that without which B would be lost.
- A is that through which B is lost.
- A is a danger to B.
- A is a remedy to B.
- A’s fallacious charm seduces one away from B.
- A can never satisfy the desire for B.
- A protects against direct encounter with B.

Supplementary logic is not only the logic *of* writing – it is also a logic that can only really exist in writing. That is, it is a nonintuitive logic that inheres (Lacan would say, “in-sists”) in a text as a system of traces. Like an algebraic equation with more than one unknown, supplementary logic cannot be held in the head but must be worked out in external form. It is no accident that the word “differential” is central both to calculus and to Derrida’s theory of writing.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 45)

“Every origin is always already displaced in the activity of writing. Writing poses signs as substitutes for the intrinsically absent and nonlocatable origin, an origin, therefore, that is always other and different – an origin that is perpetually deferred by writing. But this origin is itself writing, a ‘protowriting’ that produces difference, and within this productive, doubling repetition opens up an interval in which a dialogue can take place.” (Walter Brogan i Silverman 1989 s. 11-12)

“What enslaves is not writing per se but *control* of writing, and writing as control. What is needed is not less writing but more consciousness of how it works. If, as Derrida claims, the importance of writing has been “repressed” by the dominant culture of the Western tradition, it is because writing can always pass into the hands of the “other.” The “other” can always learn to read the mechanism of his or her

own oppression. The desire to repress writing is thus a desire to repress the fact of the repression of the “other.” What is at stake in writing is the very structure of authority itself.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 48)

“Writing, according to Derrida, entails the ‘disqualification or the limit of the concept of the “real” or “linguistic” context, whose theoretical determination or empirical saturation are, strictly speaking, rendered impossible or insufficient by writing.’ The essentially iterable character of writing dis-joins it, not from all context, but from any specific context or singular event. Indeed Derrida has shown us throughout the course of his writings that the desire to occult the essential iterability of writing, thereby rendering it indissolubly linked to the event of self-presence, is the constitutive, if impossible, desire of metaphysics. [...] It is true that the project of the writer of spiritual exercises is to link his writing to events in the experience of a subject, to a passage ‘from darkness to light, from impurity to purity, from the constraint of passions to detachment’; however, this desire is thwarted by the divine (as Hegel would have it) or demonic nature of language. It is frustrated because the essential iterability of writing carries with it the possibility of a re-contextualization without reference to the signifying intentions of the author, the context of its production, or the event in the experience of a subject from which it would proceed or to which it would give rise.” (Bernard Flynn i Silverman 1989 s. 217-218)

“[I]n its critique of philosophy and of other essentializing theories, deconstruction emphasizes that discourse, meaning, and reading are historical through and through, produced in processes of contextualization, decontextualization, and recontextualization.” (Culler 1985 s. 128)

“[A] deconstructive reading breaks with all traditional, normative ideas of textual commentary and critique. It is not so much interested in what the text says – what it is ‘about’ at the express thematic level – as in the organization of its logical resources *despite or against* its manifest drift.” (Norris 1987 s. 109)

“[W]hat lies at one extreme of Derrida’s project: a writing that would finally enact the break with all received ideas of the ‘proper’ relationship between author, text and commentary.” (Norris 1987 s. 46) Med “the radical de-contextualizing quality of writing as such” (Silverman 1989 s. 217).

“Derrida will catch at those moments of ‘undecidability’ where writing complicates the meaning of a text beyond its express intentions or its self-authorized logic of sense. ‘There is a point in the system’, he writes, ‘where the signifier can no longer be replaced by its signified, so that in consequence no signifier can be replaced, purely and simply’ (p. 266). The classical definition of writing – as found in thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel, Husserl and Saussure – takes it as axiomatically the ‘sign of a sign’, a mere supplementary inscription, twice removed from origins and truth. Derrida will not so much reject this definition as extend it to

cover *every* kind of discourse, spoken language included. [...] For if language is *always and everywhere* a system of differential signs – if meaning subsists in various structures of relationship and *not* in some ideal correspondence between sound and sense – then the classical definition of writing would apply to every form of language whatsoever. [...] Deconstruction defines its own project by contrast as a perpetual reminders that meaning is always the ‘sign of a sign’; that thought cannot escape this logic of endless supplementarity; and that *writing* is in at the origin of language, since that origin cannot be conceived except by acknowledging the differential nature of signs.” (Norris 1987 s. 85-86)

“[T]he point is *not* simply to invert this binary opposition, so that writing would henceforth take absolute priority over speech. This gesture would still be inscribed within the same logocentric order of thought. Rather, what Derrida is asking us to conceive is the radical instability, the strictly *undecidable* character, of any such loaded metaphysical opposition.” (Norris 1987 s. 133) “[W]riting, once it enters the public domain, must always be subject to possible misunderstandings which cannot be ruled out of court by any straightforward appeal to context or authorial intentions.” (Norris 1987 s. 194)

Dekonstruksjon viser “an oscillation between the dialectic and a totally other logic, that of the indecidable” and “opens the space of play, of oscillation, of indecidability – the space where literature originates.” (Sarah Kofman i Silverman 1989 s. 120 og 123-124) “[T]he natural state or system in fact possesses an *autonomous* tendency to destabilization, a play (‘jeu’) inherent in its constitution.” (Johnson 1993 s. 116)

“Derrida described writing (in *Of Grammatology*) as the ‘wandering outcast’ of Western logocentric tradition, denounced by philosophers from Plato to Husserl for its proneness to misinterpretation, its lack of that self-authorizing power or presence vested in spoken language. Writing exerts a ‘disseminating’ influence on language, such as to multiply the possibilities of meaning and prevent any assurance that ‘true’ communication has in fact taken place. And it is here that the postcard comes to signify, for Derrida, the existence of a writing at the utmost remove from traditional ideas of meaning and communicative truth. The postcard is indeed a ‘wandering exile’, a message most often casually inscribed and promiscuously open for all to read. At the same time it is a writing that can only make sense to one person (the presumed addressee) whose knowledge of the sender enables him or her to figure out its otherwise impossibly cryptic message. The postcard thus exemplifies the twofold sense in which language eludes the sovereignty of philosophic reason. On the one hand textuality exceeds all the limiting specifications placed upon language by the need to maintain a strictly controlled economy of concepts. On the other, the postcard may be seen to insist that meaning is indeed *irreducibly* specific, but tied down to local particulars of time and place that likewise escape the universalizing drift of reason. In both respects it serves as an emblem of everything that is forgotten or repressed on the

way to philosophic truth. [...] so many messages that circulate without any absolutely authorized source or destination. [...] It suggests that writing is in at the source of philosophy; that there is no thinking back to an authorized voice that doesn't pass by way of certain images or metaphors derived from writing.” (Norris 1987 s. 186-187)

“Derrida diskuterar skillnaden i texten “La double séance” i *La dissémination*, 1972, s. 294. “Om det således inte finns någon tematisk enhet eller en fullständig mening att återerövra bortom händelserna i texten, i en fantasi, en intentionalitet eller en erfarenhet, är inte texten längre ett uttryck för eller en representation [...] av en viss sanning som kommer att brytas eller koncentreras i en mångtydig litteratur. Det är detta hermeneutiska begrepp *polysemi* som man måste ersätta med *dissemination*” ” (Olsson 1987 s. 145).

“Derrida’s contention in his deconstructive reading of the *Phaedrus* as an allegory of logocentric reason forced up against its own self-generated textual paradoxes. [...] the topos of writing and thus undermined any straightforward univocal reading of Plato’s text. [...] What it cannot take in is the notion of a writing that is cut off completely from authorial presence and addressed to no particular (professionalized) community of interests. Hence Derrida’s fascination with the postcard, at once the most ephemeral kind of writing and the kind most open to interpretative guesswork by those who lack the privileged means to crack its otherwise impenetrable codes. [...] this is precisely what Derrida denies, this pitiless divorce between essence and accident, the genuine concerns of ‘philosophy’ on the one hand and mere circumstantial life-history on the other. His point in deploying the postcard (of all things) as a tactical resource against the tyranny of concepts is to show how circumstance always and everywhere enters the discourse of philosophic reason.” (Norris 1987 s. 188-189)

“The *opacity* of writing – its physical embodiment as mere inert marks on a page – thus came to signify the weaknesses of human understanding, the necessity of falling back upon man-made sources of knowledge. Writing was a strictly *instrumental* medium, a mortal script whose small claim to truth lay in its self-effacing readiness to yield up meanings ‘written in the soul’ by some higher, ineffable power. [...] To set the Jewish against the Graeco-Christian tradition is implicitly to foreground the matter of writing and its place in the economy of knowledge and truth. Derrida adopts various techniques for reminding the reader of his own close involvement with Rabbinical sources and traditions. These may take the form of riddling autograph signatures (‘Reb Derissa’), of allusion to the methods of Talmudic commentary, or of multiple insets and other such graphic devices which refuse any clear demarcation between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ texts.” (Norris 1987 s. 229)

I et essay om den franske poeten og filosofen Paul Valéry (i *Margins of Philosophy*) siterer Derrida poetens “prescient remarks on the pervasiveness of

figural language in philosophy, the effects of uncontrolled semantic slippage and the ways in which philosophic *concepts* – the very touchstones of intellectual rigour and truth – are often found to rest on buried or forgotten metaphors. Most striking of all is Valéry's insistence on the sheer impossibility of grounding knowledge and truth in that idea of authentic, self-present awareness achieved by the speaking subject. [...] The assumed priority of speech over writing goes along with the idea of a pure, self-authenticating knowledge, such that the intrusion of written signs – mere arbitrary marks upon a page – could only represent a deplorable swerve from truth. It is in the face of this deep-grained metaphysical prejudice that Valéry, like Derrida, asserts the ubiquity of writing and the fact that philosophy is simply *unthinkable* outside this encompassing textual domain.” (Norris 1987 s. 22-23)

Derrida's “point is to expose that habitual presumption which enables philosophers to go (as they think) straight to the conceptual heart of a text without wasting time over matters of resistant or (to them) unrewarded detail. Hence Derrida's contrary insistence: that it is often in the margins or obscure minor passages of a text – in the footnotes, perhaps, or a casual parenthesis – that its strains and contradictions stand most clearly revealed. Such passages are the starting-point for many of Derrida's most powerful deconstructive readings. The very fact that they bear a problematical relation to the rest of an author's work – or, beyond that, to the ruling assumptions of philosophic discourse – may have caused them to be tucked away out of sight in a footnote or simply passed over by commentators in search of more enduring truths. It is precisely by seizing on such uncanonical texts, passages or details that deconstruction seeks to resist the homogenizing pressure of received ideas.” (Norris 1987 s. 183-184)

“[S]ince communication does take place we must discover how it occurs if we wish to understand ourselves as social and cultural beings. But literature itself, in its continual pressure on and violation of codes, reveals a paradox inherent in the semiotic project and in the philosophic orientation of which it is the culmination. To account for the signification of, shall we say, a metaphor is to show how the relationship between its form and its meaning is already virtually present in the systems of language and rhetoric. The metaphor itself becomes not a radical or inaugural act but a manifestation of a preexistent connection. Yet the value of the metaphor, the value of our experience of the metaphor, lies in its innovatory, inaugural force. Indeed, our whole notion of literature makes it not a transcription of preexisting thoughts but a series of radical and inaugural acts: acts of imposition which create meaning. The very conventions to which we appeal in explaining literary meanings are products: products which, it would seem, must have acts as their source. This second perspective deconstructs the first; it seems to bring about a reversal, explaining meaning not by prior conventions but by acts of imposition. However, the first perspective also deconstructs the second in its turn, for acts of imposition are themselves made possible by the situations in which they occur, and meanings cannot be imposed unless they are understood, unless the conventions

which make possible understanding are already in place. The semiotics of literature thus gives rise to a ‘deconstructive movement’ in which each pole of an opposition can be used to show that the other is in error but in which the undecidable dialectic gives rise to no synthesis because the antinomy is inherent in the very structure of our language, in the possibilities of our conceptual framework.” (Culler 1983 s. 39)

“No more frame, no more border, no more certain boundaries between a text and its outside, the end and the beginning of a text, the unity of a *corpus*, the title, the margins, etc. – more than a differential network, a web of traces indefinitely referring to each other. Each text transforms the other, and, a fortiori, what writes itself between them, resembles no other form, no other genre, no other mode of literature or philosophy.” (Sarah Kofman i Silverman 1989 s. 127) Og “the work in question can be shown to contradict its own power to make a meaning.” (Lehman 1992 s. 53)

“Authoritative language is that which obediently ‘returns to the Father’ in a circuit of self-assured mastery and rational control. Like the postal system in good working order, it guarantees the passage of known information from authorized sender to proper addressee. It is against this monopolistic system that Derrida proposes a different communicative model, one that would acknowledge those random, aleatory effects of meaning that philosophy has traditionally sought to repress.” (Norris 1987 s. 192)

“Derridean readings mark edges, barriers, or obstructions to the smooth passage through the text(s) in question. They also highlight places of indecidability: hinge elements that separate off and bring together at the same time. [...] For Derrida, the place of difference is a line, a line between, a pairing and separating. For Derrida, deconstruction will provide an accounting of the very textualities of a text, its lines of demarcation and its lines of contrition, its lines of marginality and its lines of delimitation. The textualities of the text are differential considerations, features that identify and mark as different, that present and postpone the meaning(s) of the text, that clarify and obscure what is happening in the text.” (Silverman 1989 s. 165-166)

“Derrida points out in his essay ‘White Mythology’ [...] that all our working definitions of metaphor – from Aristotle down – have been couched in terms that ultimately derive from the language and conceptual resources of philosophy. It is impossible to break with that tradition simply by reversing one’s priorities, declaring the omnipresence of metaphor and hence the bankruptcy of philosophic reason. Such moves represent the first stage only in a deconstructive strategy which must then go on to re-think the whole structure of opposing valuations attached to the ideas of ‘metaphor’ and ‘concept’. For it is only insofar as we have inherited certain ways of *conceptualizing* metaphor techniques, that is to say, for distinguishing between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ language – that we can get any kind of argumentative hold for discussing these questions. [...] One cannot simply

say (in a gesture common to structuralism and post-structuralism alike) that language determines the very concepts and categories by which different cultures or philosophic systems interpret the world. For it is precisely *from* philosophy – from the terms and distinctions made available by analytic reason – that linguists have adopted their various ways of arguing this relativist case. ‘Whoever alleges that philosophical discourse belongs to the closure of a language must still proceed within this language and with the oppositions it furnishes. According to a law that can be formalized, philosophy always reappropriates for itself the discourse that delimits it.’ ” (Norris 1987 s. 170-171)

For de Man omfatter retorikk både grammatiske, epistemologiske, historiske, logiske og estetiske aspekter ved språket i teksten (Bohrer 1993 s. 198). Retorikk er for han “et system uten system” (Bohrer 1993 s. 199). Retorikken gjennomtrenger alt språk, men fremmer diskrepans, fordobling, ubestemthet og brudd. Den gjør enhver epistemologisk overbevisning tvilsom, og legger en uovervinnelig hindring i veien for enhver lese måte og forståelse (Bohrer 1993 s. 199). De Man har en svært avansert “understanding of the figural powers of language” (Man 1984 s. 301).

Tekst blir “considered as an open, infinite *process* that is both meaning-generating and meaning-subverting. [...] Closure versus subversion, product versus practice, meaning-containing object versus significance-scattering process [...] The rebus, the anagram, and the letter are clearly all manifestations of *writing*. They are graphic, articulated, material instantiations of systems of marks that simultaneously obscure and convey meaning.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 40 og 42).

“Litteraturens overlegne retoriske selvbevidsthed viser sig netop som evnen til at iscenesætte en dekonstruktion af metaforens eller symbolets påståede mulighed for at totalisere og forsone modsætninger. Retorik forstår de Man her i den klassisk “oprindelige” forstand som studiet af figurer og troper, ikke i den alment udbredte forstand som overtalelse, eller negativt: som forførelse af tilhørere gennem veltalende tilsidesættelse af sandheden. Hovedinteressen gælder forholdet mellem sprogets figuralitet, eller metaforicitet, og erkendelsens mulighed, i kort begreb: retorikkens epistemologi. Litteraturen vidner om sprogets uafvendelige figuralitet, der hjemsøger og forhindrer filosofiens sandhedsprojekt. Sandheden beror traditionelt på muligheden for et figurrenset sprog, men når figuraliteten modstår enhver lingvistisk hygiene, bliver sandheden en ikke-positivérbar bagside af litteraturens vedvarende dramatiseringer af det figurative sprogs vildfarelser. En retorisk litteraturkritik kan systematisere det litteræres nødvendige fejltagelser i et negativt sandhedsbegreb. Den forbliver dog fuldstændig afhængig af litteraturens projekt, og følgelig sekundær i forhold til den. Paul de Man kommer således til at fremstå som en subtil og urokkelig forsvarer af det litteræres primat, imod såvel kritikens forvandling til en selvstændig og ligeværdig genre som filosofiens ubegrundet selvsikre subsumering af det litterære i en æstetik, men også imod hans

egen retoriks behov for at systematisere dét som alligevel altid undslipper begrebslig bestemmelse.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 29)

Mening oppstår gjennom et spill mellom differenser, der opposisjonspar oppløses og oppløsningenes epistemologiske effekter undersøkes (Bohrer 1993 s. 103). Blant opposisjonsparene er mening/meningsløshet, spill/alvor, kunst/virkelighet, sann/falsk, god/ond, vakker/stygg, indre/ytre, konservativ/revolusjonær. Dekonstruktiv-retorisk tekstanalyse negerer tradisjonelle totalitetsmodeller (Bohrer 1993 s. 103). Ethvert totaliserende sentralperspektiv avvises til fordel for et produktivt spill mellom en hermeneutisk totaliseringsbevegelse og en retorisk avtotaliseringsbevegelse (Bohrer 1993 s. 108). Dekonstruksjon er “the dismantling of these notions of evolutionary continuity, totalization, organicism, and “proper” traditions.” (Johnson 1987 s. xvi) Filosofiens teser og argumenter blir mistenkeliggjort til fordel for tolkninger og “et avansert spill med tegn” (Joch og Wolf 2005 s. 309). “Erkendelsen af, at der ikke gives noget ståsted udenfor “tegnesnes gådefulde spil”, er omdrejningspunktet” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 55). Alt som er lukket, stabilt og selvidentisk undergraves. Hver detalj teller, men ikke fordi den bidrar til en harmonisk helhet; verken forfatterens bevissthet eller verket er enhetlig (Tadié 1987 s. 298). Verket er ikke selvidentisk. Det er ustabilt. Det er alltid en differens innad i et fenomen.

“While traditionalists say that a thing cannot be both A and not-A, deconstructors open up ways in which A is necessarily but unpredictably already different from A. [...] Any discourse that is based on the questioning of boundary lines must never stop questioning its own.” (Johnson 1987 s. 14)

“Difference is not engendered in the space between identities; it is what makes all totalization of the identity of a self or the meaning of a text impossible. It is this type of textual difference that informs the process of deconstructive criticism. *Deconstruction* is not synonymous with *destruction*, however. It is in fact much closer to the original meaning of the word *analysis*, which etymologically means “to undo” – a virtual synonym for “to de-construct.” The de-constructing of a text does not proceed by random doubt or arbitrary subversion, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text itself. If anything is destroyed in a deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another. A deconstructive reading is a reading that analyzes the specificity of a text’s critical difference from itself.” (Johnson 1988 s. 4-5)

“The differences *between* entities (prose and poetry, man and woman, literature and theory, guilt and innocence) are shown to be based on a repression of differences *within* entities, ways in which an entity differs from itself.” (Johnson 1988 s. x-xi)

“It is not a difference between (or at least not between independent units), but a difference within. Far from constituting the text’s unique identity, it is that which

subverts the very idea of identity, infinitely deferring the possibility of adding up the sum of a text's parts or meanings and reaching a totalized, integrated whole.” (Johnson 1988 s. 4)

“Derrida, it could be said, is pursuing with the greatest possible rigor the structuralist principle that in the linguistic system there are only differences, without positive terms.” (Culler 1985 s. 28) “The logic of difference is a non-self-identical logic, one that eludes all the normative constraints which govern classical reason. If language is marked by the absence of ‘positive terms’ – if meaning is differential through and through – then any theory which attempts to conceptualize language will find itself up against this ultimate limit to its own explanatory powers.” (Norris 1987 s. 91) “Writing and narrative are different names for this self-alienating process at work within language, a process that makes it strictly impossible for thought to achieve the authentic condition of self-present, living recall.” (Norris 1987 s. 102)

“Derrida and his acolytes tend merely to invert the *status quo ante*, so that what used to be seen as an unbearable loss of the proper, authentic or originary is now grasped as enabling and productive” (Eagleton 2003 s. 200).

Kulturen opererer med poler som organisk og mekanisk, fri originalitet og imitasjon, og oppretter verdibaserte hierarkier, men “[t]he repressed term always inhabits its opposite. Accounts of true creativity, for example, cannot escape from a notion of imitation; they always rely on it in one way or another, so that what is called ‘free origination’ can in fact be seen as a particular version of imitation. If we are now better placed to see how the privileged terms in such hierarchical oppositions are inhabited by their opposites – if we are now able to explain how this relationship deconstructs the opposition itself – this does not mean that we can relegate the distinctions of romantic esthetics to the past and view them as errors. On the contrary, we continue to work and think within this system even as we deconstruct its oppositions.” (Culler 1983 s. 168)

Tekster er ikke organiske enheter slik nykritikken oppfattet det (Zima 1994 s. 128). Markeringslinjene mellom innenfor og utenfor, mellom slutt og begynnelse, mellom midte og rand går i oppløsning (Kofman 1987 s. 102 og 156). Tolkninger oppfattes som aktive intervensjoner i tekster, uten begynnelses- eller slutt punkt (Bohrer 1993 s. 108). For den franske filosofen Jacques Derrida er gode tolkninger aktive, produktive, transformerende (gjengitt fra Müller 1995 s. 16). Alt inngår i en vev av spor som henviser til hverandre i det uendelige, som relaterer seg til andre differensielle spor. “Derrida would wean us [...] to speaking of marks which are re-marks of re-marks, and so on.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 56) En tekst blir alltid transformert av andre tekster (Kofman 1987 s. 156-157) “Teksten er ikke lenger middelet til inderlighet eller et avtettet indre som er identisk med seg selv.” (Derrida sitert fra Kofman 1987 s. 9) Tekster er fulle av heterogenitet og

motsetninger. Dekonstruksjon inkluderer, gjennom leserens aktivitet, tekstens uavsluttbare selvrefleksjon (Cebulla 1992 s. 162).

I den irske dikteren William Butler Yeats' dikt "Among School Children" (1928) "underminerer to retoriske modi i samme setning hinanden: den spørgende dekonstruerer den ironiske, og omvendt." (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 28)

Derrida skrev: "Every sign ... can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring." (siteret fra Poster 1990 s. 109) "All communications, all utterances, all signs contain as their structure, Derrida contends, the possibility of separation from their senders, their speakers, their referents. This postulate is at the heart of deconstruction and is central to its heuristic strength." (Poster 1990 s. 109)

Språkvitenskap var utgangspunkt for strukturalismen, som kritiseres eller undergraves av dekonstruktivistene. Forskjellen mellom Saussures signifikanter (tegnmaterialet som er synlig og hørlig) og deres motstykker signifikatene (begrepsinnholdet som tegnene representerer) blir dekonstruert. Et tegn består av et uttrykk (et signal eller en signifikant) og et innhold (en mening, et signifikat). Den vestlige verden har idealisert lukkede systemer underlagt Signifikatets lov (Barthes 1970b s. 14). Signifikantene henviser til hverandre i det uendelige på en måte som gjør at det aldri kan nås fram til et fullstendig sikkert eller transcendentalt signifikat (Bennington og Derrida 1991 s. 77). Den endelige forståelsen eller meningen utsettes i det uendelige, den er "alltid imellom, i ferd med ..., aldri seg selv, aldri nærværende" (Bennington og Derrida 1991 s. 79). Denne utsettende forskjelligheten ("la différence) kan sammenlignes med en samling av krefter eller energier (s. 79 og 82). Derrida bruker begrepet "différance" for å innsirkle det opprinnelses- og rotløse ved meningsinnhold, dets brudd og ikke-identitet med seg selv (Frank 1984 s. 329; "ihre Nicht-Identität mit sich selbst").

"Allied to the postmodern and poststructuralist movements, deconstruction involves an interrogation of language and the very terms, systems and concepts which are constructed by that language. Deconstruction rejects the primacy of meaning fixed in the word and instead foregrounds or 'deconstructs' the ways in which a text undermines its own assumptions and reveals its internal contradictions (Norris 2002). The movement has its origins in France in the 1960s. Its leading figure was the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). The terminology employed by Derrida is complex and shifting, like the meaning it dismantles. The term *différance* is perhaps the most significant; it plays on the two meanings of the French verb *différer* ('defer' and 'differ'), neither of which totally encompasses its meaning, and its spelling shift (from the standard *différence* to *différance*) is a silent, visual indication of a blurring of the signifier and the dislocation or deferral of meaning." (Munday 2016 s. 263)

“Derrida coined the artificial word *différance* for this play of differences which keeps deferring the presence of the sense and makes reaching its fullness impossible. In French, it differs by one (written) letter, but not by its pronunciation from the normal word *différence*, “difference.” The termination “-ance” makes it clear that the word is a verbal noun derived from the verb *différer* which means “to differ” as well as “to defer.” The deferment of the full sense which is always promised, yet never delivered by the linguistic sign, is inherent in the language itself. *Différance* is not a mark of some shortcomings in a language, of misunderstandings that should be eliminated; instead, it is a fundamental characteristic of every linguistic utterance. [...] language is characterized by an immanent play of *différance* which can never be limited. It prevents the sense of a word or an utterance from ever being fully present in this utterance itself. This is true for any kind of use of language – even when we “hear ourselves speak,” the meaning of our own words can never be fully present to ourselves because its deferment by means of *différance* is inherent in language itself. It is especially philosophers who find this situation hard to accept: they want to arrive at the true nature of things, using language as a tool only; they do not want to deal with words which just refer to each other, but with concepts that exist beyond the sphere of language and of *différance* and are really present.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 14.10.15)

“[T]he history of Western philosophy witnesses numerous attempts to deny the existence of this *différance*, for instance by limiting its play by means of the living consciousness of the speaking subject. Derrida calls the totality of these strategies logocentrism. He himself pleads for accepting this absence and unattainableness of linguistic meaning. Hence, to conventional linguistic phonology, he opposes his own grammatology which no longer uses the living voice and its (alleged) presence as a model of philosophical exploration; instead, grammatology turns to writing in which speaker and context are always absent and require of the reader (listener) to fill this absence herself or himself.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 15.10.15) Dekonstruksjonister vil lede oss “*beyond* linguistics to a ‘grammatology’, or science of writing and textuality in general.” (Norris 1988 s. 28) “The centre of logocentrism is the idea or ideal of understanding (*entendement*) which hears itself speak (*s’entend parler*) in closest proximity to itself and in the immediate presence of its subject matter.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 4) “Deconstruction – or Derridean grammatology – will seek out the blindspots of this logocentric discourse, the points at which writing as it were returns to haunt the scene of its own repression.” (Norris 1987 s. 84)

“There are, Derrida continues, two kinds of interpretation: ‘the one tries to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which lies outside the realm of signs and their play, and it experiences the need to interpret as a kind of exile’, an exclusion from the original plenitude that it seeks; the other accepts its active, creative function and joyfully proceeds without looking back (*ibid.*, p. 427). At one

level it is not difficult to see the attractions of this approach, which tries to replace the anguish of infinite regress by the pleasure of infinite creation. Given that there is no ultimate and absolute justification for any system or for the interpretations flowing from it, one tries to value the activity of interpretation itself, or the activity of theoretical elaboration, rather than any results which might be obtained. There is nothing to which results ought to correspond; and so, rather than think of interpretation as a game in the world, whose results might be of interest if they approximate some truth outside the game, one must recognize that the activity of writing, in its widest Derridean sense of 'production of meaning', is the game or play of the world." (Culler 1986 s. 247-248)

"Interpretation is no longer turned back in a deluded quest for origins and truth. Rather, it assumes the vertiginous freedom of writing itself: a writing launched by the encounter with a text which itself acknowledges no limit to the free play of meaning. [...] This ludic or playful dimension is very much a part of Derrida's refusal to subjugate 'writing' to 'philosophy', or style to the kind of repressive regime that treats figurative language as a blemish on the surface of logical thought. Pushed to an extreme, this means suspending all question as to Nietzsche's likely or intended import, and accepting that his texts exist in a realm of open potential, beyond any hope of assured 'hermeneutic' recovery." (Norris 1988 s. 70-71)

"Om hermeneutiken utgått från verkets meningsskikt i sina tolkningar, ifrågasätter dekonstruktionen meningens dominans över ljud, skriftbild eller retoriska effekter. Om hermeneutiken betonar textens enhet och inre sammanhang sätter dekonstruktionen fingret på sprickor och öppningar, reliefer och avvikelser. Om den förra vill klargöra och precisera innebörden hos en text, vill den senare framhålla motsägelser och tvetydigheter som omintetgör en sådan klarhet. Om den förra av hävd befinner sig i pakt med sitt föremål, är den senare väsentligen en utlöpare av den skepsis mot all manifest mening som bär Friedrich Nietzsches signum. Om, slutligen, hermeneutiken baseras på en språkuppfattning som gör det möjligt att avbilda eller representera verklighet – sedan må denna verklighet vara en yttre som hos [Johann Martin] Chladenius eller en inre som hos romantikerna eller [Wilhelm] Dilthey – förnekar dekonstruktionen denna möjlighet och betonar snarare den retoriska kraften och det pragmatiska beslutet som meningsskapande faktorer." (Olsson 1987 s. 59)

"The critic comes to focus, therefore, on the play of the legible and illegible, on the role of gaps, silence, opacity. Although this approach may be thought of as a version of formalism, the attempt to turn content into form and then to read the significance of the play of forms reflects not a desire to fix the text and reduce it to a structure but an attempt to capture its *force*. The force, the power of any text, even the most unabashedly mimetic, lies in those moments which exceed our ability to categorize, which collide with our interpretive codes but nevertheless seem right." (Culler 1986 s. 260-261)

Vi Leser “simultaneously what is there in front of us and also, in the process, a potentially infinite range of intertextual meanings and allusions, some of which may very well obscure or efface the immediate sense of the ‘words on the page’. [...] Rather we should think (as Derrida suggests) in terms of ‘mimetic perversion’, of a reading that can seize upon the text’s various resources (of syntax, metaphor, structural economy) and bend them to its own purpose.” (Norris 1987 s. 201)

“As with Derrida’s readings of Plato, Rousseau and Hegel, it is a matter of enlisting the conceptual resources of a text, reading it with meticulous attention to detail, but doing so in order to challenge or subvert the received (consensual) account. [...] There occurs, in Derrida’s words, a ‘regular, rhythmic blindness’ in the text which marks those points where a meaning is unloosed beyond its power to acknowledge or ‘consciously’ grasp. [...] Nietzsche (like Derrida) sets out to expose some of the ruses that have kept philosophy from examining its own constitutive figures and metaphors. [...] What Nietzsche does is press this critique to the point where any distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘metaphor’ must seem just a species of enabling fiction designed to keep philosophy in business.” (Norris 1987 s. 202-203)

“Where Derrida had deconstructed Rousseau, de Man countered by saying that Rousseau had deconstructed himself; authors, according to de Man, have already known everything he says about them.” (Lehman 1992 s. 145)

“Nietzsche’s deconstruction of the value of values leads precisely to the discovery that philosophy *is* always already literature.” (Johnson 1987 s. 20)

Christopher Norris understreker Paul de Mans “distance from those varieties of “advanced” poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking that would simply collapse the difference between philosophy and literature. For the upshot of such counterdisciplinary gestures is first to reduce every discourse to an undifferentiating general rhetoric, and then to deprive rhetoric itself of any critical or epistemological force. [...] The most relevant contexts for assessing his work are those provided by the various modern forms of analytical philosophy of language.” (Norris 1988b s. 101)

“Just as Freud rendered dreams and slips of the tongue readable rather than dismissing them as mere nonsense or error, so Derrida sees signifying force in the gaps, margins, figures, echoes, digressions, discontinuities, contradictions, and ambiguities of a text. When one writes, one writes more than (or less than, or other than) one thinks. The reader’s task is to read what is written rather than simply attempt to intuit what might have been meant. The possibility of reading materiality, silence, space, and conflict within texts has opened up extremely productive ways of studying the politics of language.” (Barbara Johnson i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 46)

“Derrida maintains an extreme and exemplary scepticism when it comes to defining his own methodology. The deconstructive leverage supplied by a term like *writing* depends on its resistance to any kind of settled or definitive meaning.” (Norris 1988 s. 31)

“If there is one applied lesson to be taken away, it is the powerlessness of ready-made concepts to explain or delimit the activity of writing.” (Norris 1988 s. xiii) Skrift er ikke bare “innhold”, men også et grafisk uttrykk. “With the mark, *alias* writing, *alias* the trace, *alias* differance, *alias* the grapheme, and so on, the object does fall away.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 57) Derrida var opptatt av “the nomadic homelessness of the graphematic trace” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 59).

“For in the wake of the trace of the Other the end is always deferred, divided, shifted, differed, and yet, for all that, imminently on the way, dispatched, sent, given.” (Rapaport 1989 s. 218)

“En tekst siger to “entirely incompatible things at the same time”, og derfor er enhver tekst åben for, sårbar overfor, en dekonstruktion. Den siger noget, som kan fortolkes på to helt forskjellige måder, der ikke kan forenes eller opæves (*aufheben*). Teksten er altså på en gang referentiel (der er en oprindelse, en grund, et fundament, et mimesis) og en underminering af denne referentialitet (der er intet center, oprindelse, kun lingvistiske substitutioners frie spil).” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 15)

“Dekonstruksjonen viser at teksters betydning aldri kan fikseres eller være stabil, noe som til syvende og sist kan tilbakeføres til det språklige systemets desentrerte natur.” (Rainer Winter sitert fra Geimer 2010 s. 81) Dekonstruktivistene oppfatter ikke språket (i egenskap av et system av tegn og konvensjoner) som et transcendentalt prinsipp, men et system som avhenger av tolkning, individualitet (for Deleuze) og *différance* (for Derrida) (Frank 1984 s. 492). Dette systemet er skriften. “Skrift” brukes som betegnelse for en sprengning av verkbegrepet og en “aforistisk energi” (Kofman 1987 s. 12). Skriften er desentrert, atopisk og utenfor den tradisjonelle logos (Kofman 1987 s. 19). “Derrida argued that writing preceded speaking. By the term *writing*, he referred to a process of psychological imprint by images of the things “out there,” not to a literary writing.” (Kim 1996 s. 228) Den franske litteraturteoretikeren Roland Barthes knyttet skrift til “tapet av opprinnelse” (1970 s. 149). Teksttolkning går ikke ut på å “forklare” teksten slik at dens sannhet kommer til syne, men at leserens trer inn i tekstens mangfold og overflod av betydningsbærere (Barthes 1972 s. 145). Teksten er et absolutt mangfold der meningssystemene aldri kan lukkes fordi de er styrt av språkets uendelighet (Barthes 1970b s. 12).

“In leaving the text as heterogeneous and discontinuous as possible, in attempting to avoid the repressiveness of the attempt to dominate the message and force the text into a single ultimate meaning, [Roland] Barthes thus works a maximum of

disintegrative violence and a minimum of integrative violence.” (Johnson 1988 s. 6-7)

“Dekonstruktion är således ett sätt att avtäcka förutsättningar. Till dessa hör “metafysiska” idéer som “struktur”, “ursprung” och “väsen”. Så kräver strukturbegreppet i den klassiska litteraturen en idé om ett centrum som paradoxalt både är en inre princip för strukturens uppbyggnad och en förutsättning som ligger *utanför* den och som är direkt tillgänglig i en kunskapsakt. Derrida tänker sig att det just är denna egenskap hos strukturen att ha ett centrum som ligger utanför strukturen – vilket är åtkomligt för intellektet *som* dess “mening”, “ursprung” eller “ändamål” – som utgör kännetecknet för ett metafysiskt tänkande. Grunden för “metafysikens historia” är, säger han i sin Baltimoreföreläsning, “bestämningen av det varande som *närvaro* i alla betydelser av detta ord. Det skulle vara möjligt att visa att alla namn som är förknippade med grundvalar, principer eller med ett centrum alltid har betecknat konstanten av en närvaro – *eidōs, arché, telos, energeia, ousia* (essens, existens, substans, subjekt), *aletheia*, transcendentalitet, medvetande eller samvete, Gud, människan och så vidare.” ” (Olsson 1987 s. 64-65)

“Paleonymics[:] Derrida begins to introduce this word into his work in 1972. It is his invention. By a characteristic inverse irony, then, the *new* word *paleonymy* comes to designate a certain operation according to which one continues to put *old* words to work. By that time the (old) word *deconstruction* had caught on but Derrida seems intent in introducing this alternative alongside it, a kind of repetition with a difference. [...] *paleonymy* is a new name for old words (like *writing*) that operate both inside and outside the system to which they problematically belong. There would, of course, be no *paleonymics* without the mobilization of these problematic old words, so it’s not a matter simply of refuting or denying the senses given to them by the tradition. These are exactly the senses that help the work of *paleonymy* along (which “critiques, deconstructs, wrenches apart the traditional, hierarchical opposition” [...]). Derrida also acknowledges the “risk” involved in paleonymics: “the risk of settling down or of regressing into the system that has been, or is in the process of being, deconstructed” ” (John Phillips i <https://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/elljwp/deconstruction&paleonymy.htm>; lesedato 06.07.18).

“En kritiker som Harold Bloom mener i princippet ikke, at det er muligt at “læse rigtigt”; det nærmeste man kan komme en “rigtig” læsning, er at præstere det han kalder en “stærk mislæsning”. Det vil sige en læsning, som senere læsninger ikke kan komme udenom. Forskellen mellem *sand* og *falsk* er hermed udskiftet med *stærk* og *svag*.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 138)

“The work, as Barthes says, is like an onion, “a construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body contains, finally no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing except the infinity of its own envelopes – which envelop nothing other than the unity of its own surfaces.” (‘Style and its Image’, p. 10) To read is to

participate in the play of the text, to locate zones of resistance and transparency, to isolate forms and determine their content and then to treat that content in turn as a form with its own content, to follow, in short, the interplay of surface and envelope.” (Culler 1986 s. 259)

For en eksemplarisk dekonstruktør som amerikaneren Paul de Man er en tekst en vev av forskjellige retoriske manøvrer, og retorikken er et tekstlig felt som på mange måter er usolidarisk overfor det innhold det inkorporerer. Paul de Mans lesestrategi innebærer å trekke alle grunnleggende begreper og metafysiske kategorier inn i veven av tekstens retoriske operasjoner for derved å nyansere disse kategoriene i deres filosofiske spillerom. Retorikken er ikke bare allestedsnærværende – den svarer også til sitt gamle rykte om å være slu, unnvikende, full av indre falskhet. Dermed undergraver alle tekster i siste instans sine egne premisser, går i sine egne retoriske feller, blir mer kompliserte enn de kan tåle. Beviset er aporiene, logiske utveisløsheter, som kan være “inbuilt aporias” (Norris 1987 s. 223). Språket kan på grunn av sin retoriske status aldri bli transparent, slik Platon trodde. Det er dømt til å forbli en vev av tegn med en alltid økende grad av kompleksitet, en kompleksitet som de Man leser som figuralitet, dvs. retorikkens språk- og tankefordreininger. Det finnes aldri noe entydig. Går vi et skritt videre i en retorisk-figural undersøkelse, oppdager vi alltid at det er enda mer komplisert enn vi trodde, og at Meningen (den enhetlige) dermed er enda fjernere. Post-strukturalistene vil vise den systematiske umuligheten i at et tegn kan gjentas uten å forandre betydning (Frank 1984 s. 488). Det foregår figurasjon og defigurasjon samtidig, som en double-bind (Bohrer 1993 s. 41).

Paul de Man “argues (notoriously) that *every* form of knowledge – from primitive sense-certainty to pure reason, from ethics to history and politics – is somehow contingent on the radically figural character of language.” (Norris 1988b s. 105) “Any text, any system of signs, can be shown to compromise itself from within.” (Lehman 1992 s. 57)

“The disjunction between the aesthetically responsive and the rhetorically aware reading, both equally compelling, undoes the pseudo-synthesis of inside and outside, time and space, container and content, part and whole, motion and stasis, self and understanding, writer and reader, metaphor and metonymy, that the text has constructed. It functions like an oxymoron, but since it signals a logical rather than a representational incompatibility, it is in fact an aporia. It designates the irrevocable occurrence of at least two mutually exclusive readings and asserts the impossibility of a true understanding, on the level of the figuration as well as of the themes.” (Man 1979 s. 72)

De Man tar utgangspunkt i at mening er et dobbelt fenomen fordi språket er figurativt – en dobbelhet som han ikke ser på som berikende, men som en konflikt. Nivåene er ikke i samarbeid med hverandre og det er umulig å vite hvilket av

nivåene som dominerer (Masiello 2012 s. 89). De Man er en skeptiker som ikke tror at en tolkning kan nå fram til noen sikkerhet.

“[T]heory is a strictly impossible venture in so far as it aims – as most theories do – to achieve a sense of having thoroughly mastered the relevant problems and issues. To de Man, such illusions are precisely what criticism has to give up as it comes to recognize those deviant linguistic structures, or elements of rhetorical “undecidability,” that work to undermine any form of self-assured hermeneutic understanding.” (Norris 1988b s. 42)

Lesningene dreier seg om “the mind’s wrestling with those paradoxes of nature, time, and eternity that lie, in de Man’s words, “at the very limit of comprehensible language.” ” (Norris 1988b s. 8) “[W]e must suspend belief in their manifest truth-claims, the better to grasp how complex and refractory are the ways of language when forced up against the limits of intelligible sense.” (Norris 1988b s. 114)

“[H]ere is an ‘excess’ in the text that the structural analysis can never totally enclose or contain.” (Johnson 1993 s. 151)

“Sagt meget summarisk mente de Man, at sproget repræsenterede en autonom instans, som (det romantiske) subjekt formulerer gyldigheden af sin erfaring i, men at sproget samtidig selv frembragte en deplacering af subjektet i forhold til den erfaring, det formulerer. Hvor meget end romantikerne kritiserede den neo-klassicistiske opfattelse af sproget som transparent i forhold til verden, så opfattede de det selv som transparent i forhold til deres eget subjekt. Derved bliver sproget det sted, hvor det romantiske subjekt bliver fremmed over for sin egen tale om sig selv. Samtidig er det netop, ironisk nok, i den omstændighed, at subjektet formulerer sig som nærværende, erfarende, selv-konstituerende, at den fremmede tale finder sit signifikante udtryk. For romantikerne er sproget rent udtryksstans for det subjekt, der formulerer sin (indre) erfaring. Men sproget rummer ikke en sådan gennemsigtighed, at det kan lade erfaring (eller andre transcendentale romantiske størrelser) træde frem, siger de Man. Erfaring er altid allerede “erfaring”. Når man tror at formulere sig i et suverænt symbol, dæmoniserer sproget ved allerede at være formuleret i allerede gennemskevne (“allegoriske”) koder.” (Claus B. Østergaard i Ørum 1994 s. 95)

“In this process of mutual transformation and subversion, there is really no reliable perspective on the question of the relationship of the various elements. No perspective or positioning can be considered to be more than strategic, a part of the conflict of forces and shifting boundaries between entities with no one perspective or position dominating the field. If displacement, excessiveness, instability are the characteristics of rhetoric, then one cannot fall back on rhetoric or on a notion of literature revealing itself to be fundamentally or explicitly rhetorical without immediately being drawn into the non- or para-rhetorical, the non- or para-literary. “Rhetoric,” Lacoue-Labarthe concludes from all this, “is a monstrosity” (63). The

radical place it holds in Nietzsche's work undermines boundaries and makes it impossible to locate definitively any pure exteriority: "The boundary that separates philosophy from its *other* then begins to be blurred. The emphasis on rhetoric leads to a point where it is no longer possible to turn against philosophy, as if from its pure 'outside' (that is, dialectically speaking, from its purest intimacy), any musical, mythical, etc. originality. Rhetoric contaminates an entire system of belief" ([Philippe Lacoue-Labarthes *Filosofiens tema*] 65-66). Rhetoric problematizes an entire system of belief in mythical or musical purity, in origins of all sorts, even or especially a belief in any form of "original language." In the same way, it has "contaminated" the belief in literature as originally exterior to philosophy, as well as the belief in a form of rhetoric which would also remain exterior to philosophy – because it could provide *the linguistic paradigm*, the origin and truth of language itself. For Lacoue-Labarthe, the "lesson of Nietzsche" is that it is precisely the "unreliability" or "monstrous" character of rhetoric that makes it an important critical tool, a means (and not the only one) of questioning the integrity not only of philosophy but also of literature. Rhetoric is no more characteristic of literature than of philosophy, no more exterior to one than to the other." (Carroll 1987 s. 20-21)

Paul de Man vil "konfrontere den litterære tekst med den filosofiske ratios krav på sandhed og logik, blot for at vise at teksten allerede selv har undermineret dette krav, at den indeholder sin egen dekonstruktion." (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 92) Han "insisterer [...], som den radikale Saussurelæser han er, at forholdet mellem signifiant og signifié alene er konventionelt bestemt, hvilket betyder, at tegnets værdi udelukkende er bestemt af sproglige, nærmere bestemt tekstuelle relationer. Konsekvensen af dette er, at æstetiske begreber som f.eks. mimesis, metafor, symbol konsekvent læses som retoriske figurer eller troper på linie med andre troper. En sådan læsning fører til en systematisk nedbrydning af den traditionelle æstetiks værdihierarki, hvor metafor sættes over metonymi, symbol over allegori, mimesis over imitation etc." (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 101)

De Man vil "deconstruct the powers of rhetorical mystification vested in privileged tropes like metaphor and symbol." (Norris 1988b s. 62)

"Yale-skolen privilegerer ikke den store romantiske poesi, men den retter al interesse mod den, for det første fordi vi endnu er romantikere, og for det andet fordi den romantiske poesi *mislykkedes*. Det er de digtere, der fejler, som man interesserer sig for: derfor Wordsworth og ikke Coleridge. Det, der mislykkes, er at forene subjekt og objekt via imaginationen. Der er på ingen måde tale om en idealisering af fantasien. Fantasi er død, splittelse, adskillelse, "failure". Når den romantiske digter (hvis han er "deluded") tror, at han gennem symbolet har ophævet splittelsen, så kan Paul de Man vise, at symbolet skjuler, at det bygger på en mekanisk og tilfældig allegori. Uden at vi kan nå at udvikle det, så er der tale om et forsøg på endelig, omsider, at forstå romantikken *hegelsk*. Paul de Man har antydnet det ved flere lejligheder (og hans læsninger af Hegel, Kant og Nietzsche er

epokegørende), medens J. Hillis Miller i “praksis” har søgt at gøre det.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 17)

“[I]t is essential to de Man’s form of deconstruction that the text contains its negation within itself – its *différance* in Derrida’s terms, that which defers meaning, and that causes meaning to be dual, a matter of difference. All that is possible is for a text to recognize this, and to question its own function. But, for de Man, self-reflexiveness characterizes all literary writing. He holds that metaphor suspends meaning, for example: it does not signify in a definite manner; rather it avoids unitary sense. In *Allegories of Reading*, while equating ‘the rhetorical, figural potential of language with literature itself’, he argues that ‘rhetoric actually suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration ...’ (p. 10).” (Tambling 1988 s. 87)

“To deconstruct a text in Nietzschean-Derridean terms is to arrive at a limit-point or deadlocked *aporia* of meaning” (Norris 1988 s. 80). “In the end it is only by confronting its limits – by forcing analysis to the point of *aporia* or self-contradiction – that thought comes up against the gap between itself and the aberrant ‘logic’ of the text.” (Norris 1988 s. 105) Det er “a paradox that cannot be resolved, an *aporia*” (Man 1989 s. 150). “[T]hought continually runs up against ‘unthinkable’ twists of paradox.” (Norris 1988 s. 146) Det oppspores “aporias of memory, self-knowledge, and desire” (Norris 1988b s. 8). “Each perspective shows the error of the other in an irresolvable alternation or *aporia*.” (Culler 1985 s. 96)

“There is no such thing as the real world; it is a text, subject to misreading, a “problematized” text that invariably resolves itself into an *aporia*, a terminal impasse.” (Lehman 1992 s. 42) “[W]e reach the conclusion that the determining characteristic of literary language is indeed figurality, in the somewhat wider sense of rhetoricity, but that, far from constituting an objective basis for literary study, rhetoric implies the persistent threat of misreading.” (Man 1989 s. 285) Paul de Man “applies the category “literary” to all language – philosophical, historical, critical, psychoanalytic, as well as poetic – that prefigures its own misunderstanding and is misread: “the criterion of literary specificity does not depend on the greater or lesser discursiveness of the mode but on the degree of consistent “rhetoricity” of the language” (p. 137).” (Culler 1985 s. 184)

“[T]here is an interest in the way conflicts or dramas within the text are reproduced as conflicts in and between readings of the text. De Man’s adage that literary language prefigures its own misunderstandings is in part a claim that texts demonstrate allegorically the inadequacy of possible interpretive moves – the moves that their readers will make. Texts thematize, with varying degrees of explicitness, interpretive operations and their consequences and thus represent in advance the dramas that will give life to the tradition of their interpretation. Critical disputes about a text can frequently be identified as a displaced reenactment of conflicts dramatized in the text, so that while the text assays the consequences and

implications of various forces it contains, critical readings transform this difference within into a difference between mutually exclusive positions. What is deconstructed in deconstructive analyses attuned to this problem is not the text itself but the text as it is read, the combination of text and the readings that articulate it. What is put in question are the presuppositions and decisions that convert a complex pattern of internal differences into alternative positions or interpretations.” (Culler 1985 s. 214-215)

“Derrida’s re-reading of contradiction as a conflict of forces or of energies, instead of a conflict of concepts or propositions, is one way in which he tries to loosen the grip which the conception of dialectical difference and the metaphysics of meaning have on the project of differance.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 8) “Den tilsynelatende forståeligheten som hefter ved en tekst, er av ideologisk opprinnelse [...] Tekster er uleselige, og all lesning er ideologisk.” (Bohrer 1993 s. 17) Noen tekster “iscenesetter” ifølge de Man sin egen uleselig på en selvreflekterende måte (Bohrer 1993 s. 88). De Man mener at han selv bare oppsporer tekstens egne dekonstruktive bevegelser (Bohrer 1993 s. 183).

“What do we learn about the ideology (or ideologies) operating in the text by analyzing the text’s self-contradictions rather than by trying to resolve those contradictions into some overarching theme?” (Tyson 2006) “Derridean deconstruction also relies very strongly on the tactic of arresting and rehabilitating terms and also takes the political tactic of destabilizing ideological formations from within rather than through outright opposition or confrontation.” (Rapaport 1989 s. 161)

For de Man er estetikk et ideologisk fenomen, en “nødvendig falsk bevissthet” om hva som er kunst og litteratur, og samtidig en vilje til makt, med totalitære tendenser (Bohrer 1993 s. 333). Hans kritikk av estetisk ideologi, hans avsløring av retoriske forførelsesstrategier, kan være en konsekvens av hans egne fascistiske villfarelser i ungdommen og hans senere anger (Bohrer 1993 s. 340).

Aporier kan innebære det samme som Nietzsche uttrykker: “motsetningene er sanne samtidig” (Zima 1994 s. 138-139). Logikk, grammatikk og retorikk oppfattes ikke bare som forskjellige aspekter ved språket, men aspekter som frambringer aporier, og som forårsaker at tekster blir “uleselige” (“unreadability”) (Zima 1994 s. 109). Retorikk og logikk “angriper hverandre gjensidig” (Bohrer 1993 s. 345). Men det kan innvendes mot dekonstruktivistene, slik Peter V. Zima gjør, at denne ubestemmeligheten og uavsluttbarheten, alle aporiene, ikke er i teksten selv, men snarere i leseren (1994 s. 110-111). Ofte står to perspektiver eller sider mot hverandre, og begge sidene motsier hverandres mulighetsbetingelser, samtidig som sidene forutsetter hverandre (Bohrer 1993 s. 45).

Derrida vil bruke metafysiske begreper på ikke-metafysiske måter, og bruker hermetegn (“”) rundt begreper for å markere dette (Kimmerle 1988 s. 111).

“Jacques Derrida’s practice of placing certain verbal signs *sous rature*, under erasure [med et kryss over et ord, slik at ordet likevel er leselig] [...] Physically canceled, yet still legible beneath the cancelation, these signs *sous rature* continue to function in the discourse even while they are excluded from it. Derrida’s purpose in using this typographical sleight-of-hand is, of course, to remind us that certain key concepts in western metaphysics – such as, in this case, *existence* and *objecthood* – continue to be indispensable to philosophical discourse even though that same discourse demonstrates their illegitimacy. They both cannot be admitted, yet cannot be excluded; so he places them *sous rature*. [...] laying bare the *aporias* of western metaphysics” (McHale 1987 s. 100).

“Perhaps it is possible, as Derrida suggests, to work with terms like *différance* whose non-self-identical play of sense prevents them from rejoining the ‘logocentric’ order of Western metaphysics. Such terms will then be thought of as permanently ‘under erasure’ (*sous rature*), deployed on the page for tactical reasons but subject to a dislocating textual force that denies them any kind of semantic or conceptual stability. [...] It is only possible to criticize existing institutions from *within* an inherited language, a discourse that will always have been worked over in advance by traditional concepts and categories. What is required is a kind of internal distancing, an effort of defamiliarization which prevents those concepts from settling down into routine habits of thought.” (Norris 1987 s. 16)

“Deconstruction has been particularly acute in showing the uncanny involvement of theories in the domains they claim to describe, in showing how critics become engaged in a displaced reenactment of a text’s scenario.” (Culler 1983 s. viii og xi)

Den amerikanske medieprofessoren Mark Poster skriver om implikasjoner av å dekonstruere det logosentriske:

“1 that deconstruction is a profound critique of logocentric texts and the (male) subject’s relation to them, a critique that draws attention to the disruptive role of textuality understood as written traces;

2 that Derrida presents this critique in a situation he rightly defines as one of general confusion amidst massive historical change, inscribing his position as a step necessary to clarify that historical situation;

3 that because logocentrism plays a key role in the present culture its critique has prime political importance;

4 that one major problem is to develop a politics that avoids the totalizing strategies and stabilizing closures of the old “modern” politics, which are closely related to logocentrism.” (Poster 1990 s. 104)

“The Derridean effort to forestall a closure of meaning in his own text, the insistence on vigilant, unrelenting subversion of textual stabilities, the consistent disruption of logocentric discourse and its attendant subject – these hallmarks of deconstruction have been interpreted by some, including at times Derrida himself, as the first step toward a new politics, a politics that goes beyond the outworn standpoints of liberalism and socialism.” (Poster 1990 s. 103)

“[T]here is a moral imperative implicit not only in Derrida but in most of the postmodern and poststructuralist discussions that are often seen as abdicating the possibility of a moral position. But because they challenge, deconstruct, or problematize conventional understandings – like those of the unitary subject or of “truth” as traditionally understood – understandings that seem essential to maintaining any kind of ethics or epistemology, they are often taken as advocating an amoral or nihilistic position. Nevertheless, in nearly all such discussions there is some thing, being, group, or truth that is done violence by representation and the symbolic, by being repressed, marginalized, denied representation, or misrepresented.” (Gaggi 1997 s. 149)

“Dekonstruktion er, siger Barbara Johnson, en “transvaluation” – en omvending af værdier. Vi er oplærte i at koncentrere os om det, der i teksten og af teksten er sat i forgrunden. “Foregrounding” var jo de tjekkiske strukturalisters ord for litteraritet. Vi har lært, at vi skal se bort fra marginale elementer, der fra en kommunikationsmæssig synsvinkel blot er at opfatte som “støj”. I stedet for at koncentrere os om det centrale, skal vi nu se at genoprette det marginale.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 21) “Making a deconstructive move you demote the center and elevate the marginal” (Lehman 1992 s. 238).

“This concentration on the apparently marginal puts the logic of supplementarity to work as an interpretive strategy: what has been relegated to the margins or set aside by previous interpreters may be important precisely for those reasons that led it to be set aside. [...] to a subversion of the distinctions between essential and inessential, inside and outside. What is a center if the marginal can become central? “Disproportionate” interpretation is unsettling.” (Culler 1985 s. 140)

“[D]econstruction involves attention to the marginal. We have already noted Derrida’s concentration on elements in a work or a corpus that previous critics had thought unimportant. This is an identification of the exclusions on which hierarchies may depend and by which they might be disrupted but it is also the beginning of an encounter with previous readings which, in separating a text into the essential and marginal elements, have created for the text an identity that the text itself, through the power of its marginal elements, can subvert. Since concentration on the marginal is an identification of what in a text resists the identity established for it by other readings, it is part of an attempt to prevent the work one is studying from being governed or determined by other, less rich or complex texts. Contextualist readings or historical interpretations generally rely on

supposedly simple and unambiguous texts to determine the meaning of passages in more complex and evasive texts. We have already noted Derrida's insistence on the unsaturability of context and the concomitant possibility of extending context in ways that allow further complexities of the text one is studying to emerge. One could, therefore, identify deconstruction with the twin principles of the contextual determination of meaning and the infinite extendability of context. Derrida exploits the force of contextual determination whenever he reads a work in relation to the system of metaphysical values from which it cannot succeed in escaping." (Culler 1985 s. 215)

"A deconstructive reading is an attempt to show how the conspicuously foregrounded statements in a text are systematically related to discordant signifying elements that the text has thrown into its shadows or margins, an attempt both to recover what is lost and to analyze what happens when a text is read solely in function of intentionality, meaningfulness, and representativity. Deconstruction thus confers a new kind of readability on those elements in a text that readers have traditionally been trained to disregard, overcome, explain away, or edit out – contradictions, obscurities, ambiguities, incoherences, discontinuities, ellipses, interruptions, repetitions, and plays of the signifier. In this sense it involves a reversal of values, a revaluation of the signifying function of everything that, in a signified-based theory of meaning, would constitute "noise." Derrida has chosen to speak of the values involved in this reversal in terms of "speech" and "writing," in which "speech" stands for the privilege accorded to meaning as immediacy, unity, identity, truth, and presence, while "writing" stands for the devalued functions of distance, difference, dissimulation, and deferment." (Johnson 1987 s. 17-18)

"Treating philosophical writings not as statements of positions but as texts – heterogeneous discourses structured by a variety of canny and uncanny exigencies – they have taken seriously apparently trivial or gratuitous elements that philosophers might have dismissed as accidents of expression and presentation, and have revealed surprising performative dimensions of these supposedly constative writings. In analyzing the rhetorical strategies focused on *supplement* in Rousseau, *pharmakon* in Plato, and *parergon* in Kant, Derrida in effect makes philosophy a species of an archi-literature, disrupting the hierarchy that treats literature as a nonserious margin of serious conceptual discourse." (Culler 1985 s. 147)

"[T]he example of Derrida's readings leads the critic to look for points of condensation, where a single term brings together different lines of argument or sets of values. Such terms as *parergon*, *pharmakon*, *supplement*, *hymen* figure in oppositions that are essential to a text's argument, but they also function in ways that subvert those oppositions. These terms are the points at which the strains of an attempt to sustain or impose logocentric conclusions make themselves felt in a text, moments of uncanny opacity that can lead to rewarding commentary. Third, the critic will be alert to other forms of the text's *écart de soi* or difference from itself. At its simplest and least specifically deconstructive, this involves an interest in

anything in the text that counters an authoritative interpretation, including interpretations that the work appears most emphatically to encourage. Whatever themes, arguments, or patterns are cited in defining the identity of a particular work, there will be ways in which it differs from the self so defined, systematically or obliquely putting in question the decisions at work in that definition. Interpretations or definitions of identity involve the representation of a text within the experience of a person who writes or reads it, but says Derrida, “the text constantly goes beyond this representation by the entire system of its resources and its own rules” (*De la grammatologie*, p. 149/101). Any reading involves presuppositions, and the text itself, Derrida suggests, will provide images and arguments to subvert those presuppositions. The text will carry signs of that difference from itself which makes explication interminable.” (Culler 1985 s. 213-214)

“Particularly important are the structures described in our discussions of parergonality and self-reference, when the text applies to something else a description, image, or figure that can be read as self-description, as a representation of its own operations. In treating such figures as moments of self-reference, one is often reading against the grain: the Freudian model that Derrida applies to the procedure of Freud’s text is one Freud develops for the activities of a child, and the framing operations at work in Kant’s text are identified by *The Critique of Judgment* as a specifically artistic process. A deconstructive reading of theoretical texts often demonstrates the return in a displaced or disguised form of a procedure that work claimed to criticize in others [...] In other cases, emphasis will fall on ways in which the devices that fold a text back on itself paradoxically dislocate its attempts at self-possession.” (Culler 1985 s. 214)

“Litteraturens figurative sprog kan kun forstås ad retorikkens vej. Den retoriske model af tropen er lig det specifikt litterære, som de Man læser henimod en apori mellem logisk begreb og retorisk figur.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 27)

Paul de Man er svært opptatt av allegorien som språk- og tankefigur. Når en tekst kan leses allegorisk, så betyr det at den kan leses på to plan eller nivåer samtidig. I praksis betyr det oftest: ett konkret nivå som ligger åpent i dagen, og et bakenforliggende, abstrakt nivå som består av en slags overført mening. Dette abstrakte nivået kan være svært åpent og uavklart, dvs. diffust eller uavsluttet. Det konkrete nivået og det abstrakte, overførte nivået faller ikke sammen i en organisk enhet, men holdes fra hverandre. Det finnes imidlertid også tekster der det konkrete nivået er helt sammenfiltret med det abstrakte. Nivåene inngår i en evig differens, i aldri sammenfallende forskyvninger. Måten det ene planet/nivået skal forstås på, kompliseres stadig på nytt av spørsmålet om hvordan det andre i så fall skal forstås. Et litterært verk som leses som en allegori, ligger altså foruroligende åpent for glidninger og forskyvninger innenfra i sin egen struktur.

De Man skriver om ““allegorical,” i.e., repetitive of a potential confusion between figural and referential statement.” (Man 1979 s. 116) “Since any narrative is primarily the allegory of its own reading, it is caught in a difficult double bind.” (Man 1979 s. 76) “Allegorical narratives tell the story of the failure to read” (Man 1979 s. 205).

“Til forskel fra referentiel (symbolsk) læsning henviser den allegoriske læsning ikke til teksten som en meningstotalitet, men til teksten som et system af troper, hvor mening opløses i et irreducibelt fravær. [...] Dekonstruktionen er således også en allegori på sin egen mislæsning og der kan derfor aldrig være tale om én dekonstruktion, men om dekonstruktioner af 1., 2., 3., ... og n. grad, svarende til ironiens uendeligt potenserede refleksion. Læsningens allegori bliver således en beretning, der konsekvent stiller spørgsmål til autoriteten af sin egen læsnings hermeneutiske performance, hvorved de begreber, der produceres i teksten og i læsningen bliver beretninger om deres egen umulige lukning i forhold til det de subsumerer. Herved fastholdes læsningens principielt uafsluttelige karakter eller for at sige det de Mansk: læsning er altid dømt til at være en mislæsning.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 115)

“[B]y seeing interpretation itself as a fiction-making activity, deconstruction has both reversed and displaced the narrative categories of “showing” and “telling,” mimesis and diegesis. Instead of according moments of textual self-interpretation an authoritative meta-linguistic status, deconstruction considers anything the text says about itself to be another fiction, an allegory of the reading process. Hence, the privilege traditionally granted to showing over telling is reversed: “telling” becomes a more sophisticated form of “showing,” in which what is “shown” is the breakdown of the show/tell distinction.” (Johnson 1987 s. 18)

“Some of Jacques Derrida’s most powerful essays are devoted to the task of dismantling a concept of ‘structure’ that serves to immobilize the play of meaning in a text and reduce it to a manageable compass. [...] Deconstruction is avowedly ‘post-structuralist’ in its refusal to accept the idea of structure as in any sense given or objectively ‘there’ in a text.” (Norris 1988 s. 2-3)

Ifølge de Man avlegger en tekst vitnesbyrd om sin retoriske beskaffenhet i allegorisk form (Bohrer 1993 s. 289). For å få dette fram i lesningen av teksten, må en generelt ta de retoriske sidene ved den alvorlig, dvs. legge mening i måten det som sies er organisert på. Utformingen av budskapet blir uhyre viktig: formuleringer, omskrivninger, mer eller mindre presise ord, sammenfatninger, utelatelser osv. Forfatteren eller fortelleren undergraver ufrivillig sine egne moralske, estetiske og stilistiske utkast (Zima 1994 s. 142).

“[A]llegory is a mode that implicitly acknowledges the *arbitrary* link between its literal, surface meaning and those other, more occult levels of sense that provide the occasion for knowing exegesis. Moreover, allegory holds out against the lure of

transcendence or visionary pathos, insisting absolutely on the timebound nature of all understanding and the plain impossibility that language should achieve – as the Romantics desired – a state beyond the antinomies of subject and object, mind and nature, the temporal and the eternal.” (Norris 1988b s. 10)

Paul de Man vil gjennom sine retoriske analyser vise at det litterære verket består av et samspill av kontradiktoriske troper (Zima 1994 s. 234). I boka *Blindness & Insight* (1971) skriver de Man: “the statement about language, that sign and meaning can never coincide, is what is precisely taken for granted in the kind of language we call literary. [...] Literature, unlike everyday language, begins on the far side of this knowledge; it is the only form of language free from the fallacy of unmediated expression.” (her sitert fra Cebulla 1992 s. 96) Paul de Man mener er at litterære tekster rommer et begjær etter å opprette en metaforisk forbindelse mellom den bokstavelige og den overførte betydning av ordene (Cebulla 1992 s. 153). Det finnes ifølge Paul de Man ingen kjennetegn eller kvalitet, verken formalt eller funksjonelt, som kan avgrense en teksts “litteraritet” (dvs. det spesifikke litterære ved teksten) (Bohrer 1993 s. 19).

De Man har en “altopslugende interesse for billedsprog, for spillet mellom bogstav og figur, mellom bogstavelig og overført eller metaforisk betydning. Videre kan man si, at det især er figurernes eller tropernes filosofiske implikasjoner, der undersøges: deres erkendelsesteoretiske autoritet, eller deres logik.” (Jan Rosiek i Ørum 1994 s. 21-22)

Det er “the way in which a text subverts the possibility of any authoritative reading by inscribing the reader’s strategies into its own structures that often, for de Man, ends up being constitutive of literature as such. Deconstructors, therefore, tend to privilege texts that are self-reflexive in interestingly and rigorously unreliable ways.” (Johnson 1987 s. 18-19)

“The conceptual ‘totality’ is always undone by the ruses of signification, those ‘slidings and differences of discourse’ that deconstruction is at pains to uncover.” (Norris 1988 s. 77) Ifølge de Man er ironi uttrykk for en dobbelthet: på den ene siden den alltid gjentatte gesten av bestemmelse og fastsettelse og på den andre siden innrømmelsen av det umulige i å oppnå totalitet og syntese (Cebulla 1992 s. 128). Han hevder at tolkningene er uatskillelige fra tekstene som tolkes. Tolkningene/lesningene blir litteratur de også (Cebulla 1992 s. 203-204).

“Nietzsche often seems to spell out in advance the programme and systematic ruses of deconstruction, adopting the same attitude of sceptical rigour and denying himself any secure resting-place in method or concept. Philosophers, he argued, were the self-condemned dupes of a ‘truth’ which preserved itself simply by effacing the *metaphors*, or figurative discourse, which brought it into being. If language is radically metaphorical, its meanings (as Saussure was later to show) caught up in an endless chain of relationship and difference, then thought is

deluded in its search for a truth beyond the mazy detours of language. Only by suppressing its origins in metaphor had philosophy, from Plato to the present, maintained the sway of a tyrannizing reason which in effect denied any dealing with figural language. Reason had crushed out the imaginative life of philosophy [...] For Nietzsche this insight led to the conclusion that all philosophies, whatever their claim to logic or reason, rested on a shifting texture of figurative language, the signs of which were systematically repressed under the sovereign order of Truth. This bottomless relativity of meaning, and the ways in which philosophers have disguised or occluded their ruling metaphors, are the point of departure for Derrida's writing like Nietzsche's before him." (Norris 1988 s. 57-58) "Derrida deploys every possible means of liberating Nietzsche's stylistic energies, allowing his text to 'disseminate' sense beyond all the bounds of conceptual closure." (Norris 1988 s. 71)

Derrida "betonar det oavslutade hos alla system och möjligheten till förnyelse och okontrollerbar meningsförändring. [...] termen "dissémination", som står för ett alstrande genom spridning [...] ifrågasättande av det mänskliga subjektet som kunskapens grund och att det skulle vara identiskt med sig själv." (Olsson 1987 s. 67)

"När Derrida vill tränga bakom talets och skriftens fenomen i vardagsspråklig mening till en mer fundamental urskrift – *archi-écriture* eller *archi-trace* – kan han inte undvika att använda det metafysiska sökande efter ursprung som han velat förkasta." (Olsson 1987 s. 74-75)

"Derrida has shown how ubiquitous are the metaphors of writing in Freud and how crucial the role they play in his various accounts of the unconscious activity manifest in language and dream. This is writing as *archi-écriture*, a writing that exceeds the classical opposition between self-present speech and mere written signs. For what Freud is forced to think – at whatever 'unconscious' level – is the necessity of a writing *before* speech, a psychic economy that can only be described in a language of traces, differences, inscriptions, subliminal marks and so forth. It is, Derrida writes, 'with a graphematics still to come, rather than with a linguistics dominated by an ancient phonologism, that psychoanalysis sees itself as destined to collaborate' (p. 220). And this because Freud can only think the unconscious in differential terms, as the name of whatever escapes, eludes or discomposes the logic of self-present waking thought. Such thinking involves a movement 'perhaps unknown to classical philosophy', that tradition which – from Plato down – has maintained the sovereignty of logocentric reason precisely by insisting on the derivative, supplementary character of the written. If it was Freud's great achievement – his 'Copernican revolution' – to invert the received order of priority between conscious and unconscious thought, he could do so only by constant resort to metaphors of a generalized writing. Without them he would have been unable to arrive at any workable account of desire, consciousness, perception and the way

these operate to maintain a certain (distinctively Freudian) economy of psychic energies.” (Norris 1987 s. 207)

“Most important here is the *differential* character of writing, its power to hold back, to postpone or to conserve (in latent form) what would otherwise be lost or exhausted in the moment of immediate perception. If such a moment were possible then it would fall outside any possible means of representation, any writing or theory whatsoever. But ‘pure perception’, says Derrida, ‘does not exist: we are written only as we write, by the agency within us which always keeps watch over perception ...’ (*Writing and Difference*, p. 226). [...] ‘it is no accident that the metaphor of censorship should come from the area of politics concerned with the deletions, blanks, and disguises of writing ... the apparent exteriority of political censorship refers to an essential censorship that binds the writer to his own writing’ (p. 226). Thus the point at which psychoanalysis joins with a certain form of *Ideologiekritik* is also the point of its maximum investment in this whole metaphoric of writing and representation. It is here that an answer begins to take shape to those (mostly Marxist) opponents of deconstruction who deplore what they consider its ‘textualist’ obsession and indifference to political realities. As with Nietzsche, so with Freud as Derrida reads him: there is no question of affirming some delusive realm of ‘pure’ textuality beyond the claims of political or ethical life. To argue – as Derrida does – that such issues should be raised *in and through* the problematics of writing is not to deny that writing takes effect in far-reaching practical ways.” (Norris 1987 s. 207-208)

Paul de Man deler Nietzsches definisjon av sannhet som et motsigelsesfullt, aporetisk fenomen, med uunngåelige indre motsigelser (Bohrer 1993 s. 209). Nietzsche ville kritisere og undergrave alle fundamenter (Müller 1995 s. 94). Innen dekonstruktivismen er sannheten er så å si “hul” (Frank 1984 s. 461), slik at den forblir relativ til alle tolkninger som uavsluttbart fylles inn i den. Grunnen til denne uendelige prosessen er individualiteten, det at ethvert enkelt menneske tolker, forskyver og medskaper mening. Den franske filosofen Gilles Deleuze skrev i boka *Forskjell og gjentakelse* (1968): “Enhver individuell faktor derimot, er allerede forskjell, og forskjellenes forskjell” (sitert fra Frank 1984 s. 486). Mening skapes og forstås fra det subjektive i det individuelle (Frank 1984 s. 518). Men for Nietzsche fantes det ikke noe “in-divid”, men kun et “divid” (“dividum”) som består av et mangfold av drifter og krefter (Müller 1995 s. 96). Nietzsche opererer i sin filosofi ikke med noe absolutt eller definitivt senter, men med stadig nye perspektiver som forskyver hva som er i fokus (S. Kofman gjengitt fra Müller 1995 s. 219). Han oppfattet mennesket som et “pluraletantum” (noe som bare kan finnes i flertall), en samling av krefter og perspektiver (Müller 1995 s. 233).

Gilles Deleuze mente at all litteratur fungerer som “beskrivelsen av en kamp på grensen til det som ikke kan sanses, en kamp mot formen som uttrykk og påtrykk, en kamp som skaper en sone av tilblivelse, av ubestemthet” (Hesper 1994 s. 40).

Også Jacques Derrida fokuserer på det usikre, ikke-bestemte og ubestembare, og på hvordan “sannheter” danner motsigelser og oppveier hverandre. Derrida stiller seg i opposisjon til den vestlige “onto-teo-teleo-logikken” (sitert fra Frank 1984 s. 351) og framhever den uendelige kjeden av negasjoner som skaper en unnvikende mening, “the wide-open uncompleteness and unstabilizability of onto-theological discourse” (John D. Caputo i Silverman 1989 s. 32). Han påpeker i sine lesninger av litteratur og filosofiske tekster det uregjerlige og divergerende, inkonsekvenser, ambivalenser, paradokser, hull, brudd og aporier. Aporier er innebygde kollisjoner der språket vikler seg inn i inkonsekvenser, trekkes mot grenser der det ikke bærer sin intenderte mening. En apori er en struktur med indre motsigelse (Cebulla 1992 s. 153). Derridas tanke om “disseminasjon” i språket innebærer at det er noe ubetvingelig i hvordan mening blir til (Frank 1984 s. 573). Derrida er interessert i de minste enkeltheter som unnslipper den logosentriske tradisjonen, i det som framstår som spor og rest (Kofman 1987 s. 96). “Derrida traces traces which are traces only of traces and signs which are only signs of signs.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 43) Tekstlesningene til Derrida er basert på en slags “assosiativ tiltrekning” snarere enn rasjonell logikk (Kofman 1987 s. 35). Lesemåtene har et “ideal of an infinitely ‘plural’ text” (Norris 1988 s. 79).

“[L]yrisk læsning er det, de Man vedvarende kalder “vildfarelse” (*aberration*): nostalgiske og defensive forsøg på at tømme og kontrollere tekstualitetens (og livets?) aporier.” (Atle Kittang i Ørum 1994 s. 48)

“Derrida proposes the notion of *dissension* in order to ‘underline that in question is a self-dividing action, a cleavage and torment interior to meaning in general, interior to logos *in general*’ (WD, p. 38).” (Dalia Judovitz i Silverman 1989 s. 48)

“The properties that supposedly distinguish constatives from performatives – fidelity to preexisting facts, accountability to a criterion of truth – turn out to be as dependent on particular conditions of production and reception as performatives. “True” and “false,” [John L.] Austin concludes, are not names for the possible relationships between freestanding (constative) utterances and an equally freestanding state of affairs; rather they are situation-specific judgments on the relationship between contextually produced utterances and states of affairs that are themselves no less contextually produced. At the end of the book constatives are “discovered” to be a subset of performatives, and with this discovery the formal core of language disappears entirely and is replaced by a world of utterances vulnerable to the sea change of every circumstance – the world, in short, of rhetorical (situated) man.” (Stanley Fish i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 213)

“Austin continues to think of infelicity – of those cases in which the tethering origin of utterances is obscure and must be constructed by interpretive conjecture – as special, whereas, in Derrida’s view, infelicity is itself the originary state in that any determination of meaning must always proceed within an interpretive construction of a speaker’s intention. In short, there are no ordinary circumstances,

merely those myriad and varied circumstances in which actors embedded in stage settings hazard interpretations of utterances produced by actors embedded in other stage situations. All the world, as Shakespeare says, is a stage, and on that stage “the quality of risk” admitted by Austin is not something one can avoid by sticking close to ordinary language in ordinary circumstances, but is rather “the internal and positive condition” of any act of communication (Derrida 1977, 190). [...] Although it is true that we consider promises uttered in everyday contexts more direct – less etiolated – than promises made on a stage, this (Derrida would say) is only because the stage settings within which everyday life proceeds, are so powerfully – that is, rhetorically – in place that they are in effect invisible, and therefore the meanings they make possible are experienced as if they were direct and unmediated by any screens. [...] The “citationality” – the condition of being in quotes, of being indirect – of an utterance in a play is not the same as the citationality of a philosophical reference or a deposition before a court; it is just that no one of these performatives is more serious – more direct, less mediated, less rhetorical – than any other.” (Stanley Fish i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 214-215)

“One recognizes in these assertions the familiar world of Rhetorical Man, teeming with roles, situations, strategies, interventions, but containing no master role, no situation of situations, no strategy for outflanking all strategies, no intervention in the arena of dispute that does not expand the arena of dispute, no neutral point of rationality from the vantage point of which the “merely rhetorical” can be identified and held in check. Indeed deconstructive or poststructuralist thought is in its operation a rhetorical machine: it systematically asserts and demonstrates the mediated, constructed, partial, socially constituted nature of all realities, whether they be phenomenal, linguistic, or psychological. To deconstruct a text, says Derrida, is to “work through the structured genealogy of its concepts in the most scrupulous and immanent fashion, but at the same time to determine from a certain external perspective that it cannot name or describe what this history may have concealed or excluded, constituting itself as history through this repression in which it has a stake” (1981, 6). The “external perspective” is the perspective from which the analyst knows in advance (by virtue of his commitment to the rhetorical or deconstructive worldview) that the coherence presented by a text (and an institution or an economy can in this sense be a text) rests on a contradiction it cannot acknowledge, rests on the suppression of the challengeable rhetoricity of its own standpoint. A deconstructive reading will surface those contradictions and expose those suppressions and thus “trouble” a unity that is achieved only by covering over all the excluded emphases and interests that might threaten it. Nor is this act performed in the service of something beyond rhetoric. Derridean deconstruction does not uncover the operations of rhetoric in order to reach the Truth; rather it continually uncovers the truth of rhetorical operations, the truth that all operations, including the operation of deconstruction itself, are rhetorical.” (Stanley Fish i Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 215)

“Hvis det er umulig å nå dybden, må en innstille seg på inkoherenser, revner. Utgangspunktet er språkets tvetydigheter: alt kan tolkes annerledes, og også motsatt. Tekstens mening kan derfor aldri bli fastlagt én gang for alle. Teksten er “åpen”, og andre tekster kan vise seg i den.” (Masiello 2012 s. 88)

Derrida kan bruke en tilsynelatende perifer detalj i en tekst “as a springboard into regions of giddy uncertainty, where details merge and cross in a joyful breakdown of all proprietary limits. Any talk of meaning or structure is ineluctably ‘caught up in a process which it does not control’, which for Derrida signals the total dissolution of those boundaries that mark off one text from another, or that try to interpose between poem and commentary.” (Norris 1988 s. 114)

“[F]ör att citera Josué Harari ur inledningen till antologin *Textual strategies*, 1969, är målet för Derridas strategi snarare att spåra en väg “among textual strata in order to stir up and expose forgotten and dormant sediments of meaning which have accumulated and settled into the text’s fabric”. Derrida har ett högt utvecklat spårinne för allt som bara skenbart är perifert, marginalia, tillägg, metaforiska underströmmar, skikt som hittills ingen upptäckt men som väl uppmärksammade ger oss en ny text att förhålla oss till.” (Olsson 1987 s. 89-90)

“According to Derrida, all texts are born together with subcodes to deconstruct themselves. Deconstruction as a method for critical theorists involves two gestures. One is to gaze at the boundary of the discourse where binary oppositions arise, thereby deconstructing the text of the discourse and retrieving what is marginalized by logocentrism. The other is to recreate new meanings by reconstructing what was previously deconstructed.” (Kim 1996 s. 226)

“[D]econstruction is a rigorous attempt to *think the limits* of that principle of reason which has shaped the emergence of Western philosophy, science and technology at large. It is rigorous insofar as it acknowledges the need to engage with that principle in all its effects and discursive manifestations. [...] Deconstruction points to those blind-spots of argument where a text generates aberrant meanings or chains of disruptive implication that work to undermine its manifest ‘logical’ sense.” (Norris 1987 s. 162-163)

“[S]mall causes can lead to large effects. What is the preference for the marginal in deconstruction but a similar appreciation that seemingly trivial deviations can lead to large-scale effects?” (Hayles 1991 s. 11) “[D]er synes – bl.a. omkring begrebet ‘bifurcation’ – at være en vis konvergens mellem de Mans (og Derridas) tekststrategier og den såkaldte ‘kaosteori’ som den bl.a. er udviklet af Prigogine.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 118)

“It is difficult for us to speak or write about these “traces,” to provide a scholarly or philosophical analysis of this concept. In the first place, it is impossible to give a definition of it in our ordinary language. Derrida, following the lead of the German

philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), sees the entire tradition of Western philosophy dominated by our inability to imagine “being” in other terms than as “presence” (he calls this trait of occidental philosophy the “metaphysics of presence”). Hence, Derrida writes [...]: “*The trace itself does not exist.* To exist is to be, to be an entity, a being-present, *to on.*” How, then, can we speak about the trace? Even when I write “the trace is something absent, not something present,” I fall into the trap of the metaphysics of presence – since the trace is never present, it cannot be said to “be” in the ordinary sense of the word. Derrida sometimes tries to face this problem by writing “under erasure,” “crossing out,” again following Heidegger’s suggestions [...], such as “the trace is. [NB: “is” skrevet med et kryss over ordet]” It may be easier to describe the effect of the trace in language: by its absent presence (or its present absence), it prevents sense and meaning from ever being fully present. Since every word in a language carries within it the traces of all other, absent words, it always promises to give us its full meaning, but always defers delivering it by referring us from one absent trace to the next. Like in the German folk tale “The Hare and the Hedgehog,” users of language are forever pursuing the sense of language, but whenever we think we are catching up, we “meet” (another word which ought to be written “crossing out”) yet another trace, yet another absence.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 15.10.15)

“More generally, escape from logocentrism is impossible because the language we use to criticize or to formulate alternatives works according to the principles being contested. [...] The very notion of rhetorical effects – the possibility of metaphorical signification, for example – requires there to be a distinction between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning and hence the beginnings of a rhetorical code. [...] The alternative, then, is not a discipline, not another mode of analysis, but acts of writing, acts of displacement, play which violates language and rationality. Though these acts can themselves be analyzed and understood, discussed in terms of codes which make them meaningful, they are in their moment, as examples of the play of signifiers, challenges to a perspective whose limitations they expose.” (Culler 1983 s. 41-42)

Det er “always possible to read a philosophical text not as truth but as act – as act of persuasion, narrative, trope, rhetoric. Because language can always be read referentially or rhetorically, philosophy needs to constitute itself in opposition to the literary, but it can never avoid the possibility of being read as rhetoric. Indeed, one could argue that reading a philosophical text as rhetoric is *the authentic* philosophical move: to read a philosophical text as rhetoric is to put in question its concepts, to treat them as textual strategies or tropes. This is, for example, what logical positivists did in analyzing the discourse of metaphysics and attempting to show that it was ungrounded, fictional, metaphorical, a kind of literature. It is also the strategy Nietzsche employed in his analyses of cause and effect as a metonymy, of truth as metaphor whose metaphoricity has been forgotten, and of the identity principle as a rhetorical imposition, a synecdoche.” (Culler 1983 s. 222)

“[B]y shifting from one set of categories and distinctions to another he [den franske filosofen Jean-François Lyotard] is in fact pluralizing the concept of language behind each of them and refusing to accept one version of language over another as definitive or determining. Language consists of an unresolvable plurality and conflict of languages for Lyotard; the phrase is, above all, no matter its conceptual limitations, an indication of this heterogeneity. The most critical level of language is, thus, for him not “a deeper ground of language” (as it is, for example, for Heidegger), but the surface of language. In other words, Lyotard’s strategy consists in the infinite deferral of the question of the ultimate ground of language by assuming not what language is, but only, regardless how language is defined, that there are phrases.” (Carroll 1987 s. 165)

“In a close reading of some of Nietzsche’s works [...], de Man demonstrates that this German philosopher had already deconstructed the binary opposition between “literal” and “rhetorical” use. This opposition, then, is a typical example of a “violent hierarchy” in which one term (the literal use of language) is seen as superior and thus made the center of the structure while its opposing term can only play the role of a parasitical supplement. Yet according to Nietzsche [...], “truths are ... metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power.” Or, in de Man’s terms: language can only give the impression of being referential because it denies its own rhetorical character, because this is its blind spot. De Man goes on to apply this insight to Nietzsche’s text itself: if language is always rhetorical and metaphorical, if it cannot claim to tell the truth about its referents, but only refers to itself or to other texts, how can any sentence Nietzsche writes ever lay claim to expressing a philosophical truth? The reader arrives at a paradoxical situation or, as de Man likes to say, an aporia: on its “philosophical” or “referential” level, the text pretends it is speaking about some extratextual reality; on its “literary” or “rhetorical” level, on the other hand, it seems to say that this is fundamentally impossible [...]: “A more rhetorically aware reading of *The Birth of the Tragedy* shows that all the authoritative claims that it seems to make can be undermined by means of statements provided by the text itself.” This conclusion can be seen as typical of de Man’s manner of reading and interpreting. He believes that a number of literary texts display a similar discrepancy between their rhetorical and their referential content and thus make the possibility of understanding and interpreting them deeply problematic.” (Thomas A. Schmitz i www.researchgate.net/file.PostFileLoader.html; lesedato 15.10.15)

“Deconstruction enjoys announcing the impossibility of the semiotic activity it inhabits as it undertakes the task it has set itself: reading the major texts of Western literature and philosophy as sites on the boundaries of logocentrism and showing, in the most subtle interpretations that scholarship has yet produced, how these texts are already riven by the contradictions and indeterminacies that seem inherent in the exercise of language.” (Culler 1983 s. 43)

“Read against the grain, what these works prove to be about is not the truths and values that traditional interpretations have found in them, but rather the uncertain, indeterminate nature of their own status as representations. [...] Literary works “thematize” (or take as their theme) those conflicts that make them indeterminate – conflicts between the claims the works make to tell the truth, represent the world, and present an authoritative picture of things, and the way their status as language and fiction calls these claims into question. In other words, the theory is not only that literary works are indeterminate, but that they are at some level commentaries on their own indeterminacy.” (Lentricchia og McLaughlin 1990 s. 171-172)

“At least since Plato thinking has been thought of as a dialogue of the soul with itself.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 52) Slike ideer tilhører metafysikken (oppfatninger av det ikke-fysiske i tilværelsen). Derrida brukte dekonstruksjon som en systematisk undergraving av selvfølgeligheter i den europeiske metafysikken (Zima 1994 s. 1). Han gjennomførte nærlesninger av verk av filosofer som Platon, Hegel, Rousseau, Kant, Husserl, Lévi-Strauss og Austin, og påpekte hvordan filosofene ekskluderer visse ideer, verdier og argumenter som ikke passer inn i deres systemer. For Derrida fungerer den vestlige metafysikken på samme måte som en nedskrevet drøm, der én hånd skriver og den andre visker ut det skrevne. Han oppfatter metafysikken som fortregning av skriften (Kofman 1987 s. 104-105).

Derrida “insists that there is no opting out of that post-Kantian enlightenment tradition, and certainly no question of our now having emerged into a post-modern era where its concepts and categories lack all critical force. On the contrary: it is only by working persistently *within* that tradition, but *against* some of its ruling ideas, that thought can muster the resistance required for an effective critique of existing institutions.” (Norris 1987 s. 217) “Derrida’s stress on the need to keep faith with enlightened reason, to think through the problems of epistemological tradition, even while essaying that tradition’s limits. [...] Deconstruction can have no *critical* purchase on the texts of Western logocentric reason if it thinks to move decisively ‘beyond’ tradition by a leap on to different ground. [...] There is, Derrida writes, quite simply no escaping the ‘law and destiny’ of present-day enlightened thought. [...] For Derrida, as for Levinas, there is an ethical injunction to challenge philosophy on terms which offer the maximum resistance to its powers of recuperative grasp. But this challenge can only be sustained through a close and reasoned engagement with the texts where philosophy stakes its claims to truth.” (Norris 1987 s. 234 og 236)

Logosentrisk tankegang “absorb all differences into itself by viewing them as mere stages or signposts on the way to some grand conceptual synthesis. Philosophy has developed plentiful techniques for coping with whatever is perceived as external to its own sovereign domain. Emblematic of this process is the encounter with the so-called ‘Eleatic Stranger’ in Plato’s *Sophist*, an encounter in which (as Derrida reads it) there still persist ‘traces of an alterity that refuses to be totally mastered’. But the thrust of dialectical reason, from Socrates to Hegel, is the effort to comprehend

everything on terms which philosophy will always have laid down in advance. [...] For [Emmanuel] Levinas, the course of Western philosophical tradition is determined from the outset by its ancient Greek heritage. ‘Philosophy employs a series of terms and concepts – such as *morphe* (form), *ousia* (substance), *nous* (reason), *logos* (thought) or *telos* (goal), etc. – which constitute a specifically Greek lexicon of intelligibility.’ Like Derrida, he sees a systematic relationship or complicity between these terms, since they all point toward a moment of ultimate, self-present truth when reason would grasp the encompassing logic of its own nature and history. What is *intelligible* to thinkers in this Greek tradition is whatever lends itself to the various ‘totalizing’ methods and strategies which thought has devised to maintain its grasp upon an otherwise recalcitrant world. Philosophy is a series of elaborate detours which all lead back to this reassuring point of origin. Even where it thinks to reintroduce an historical dimension as the ground of all knowledge – as Hegel did in reacting against the timeless, *a priori* truth-claims of Kantian reason – philosophy can only conceptualize history on the model of an endlessly circular return to its own first principles. To equate truth with self-presence is always to have known *in advance* what the prospects were at any given stage on the road to enlightened understanding. There is nothing that could come as a salutary shock from outside this domain of speculative reason. For the only kind of knowledge that *counts* philosophically is that which finds its place in the grand dialectical scheme and thus has a claim to world-historical status. [...] the concepts and categories devised to keep thinking on a path of safe return to its own, self-identical logic.” (Norris 1987 s. 231-233)

“For Derrida, the realm of ethical discourse is that which exceeds all given conceptual structures, but exceeds them through a patient interrogation of their limits, and not by some leap into an unknown ‘beyond’ which would give no purchase to critical thought.” (Norris 1987 s. 224)

“There is no final home of meaning where the trail of indicative signs yields to the expressive core and the last sign is cashed as a meaning that does not point elsewhere. Presence is not a primordial given, existing prior to signs or to language. Language is not surpassed, extinguished in pure self-presence. On the contrary, self-presence is derived from or is an effect of language. Presence resides in the sign-mediated pursuit of itself; and it *is* that pursuit.” (Tallis 1988 s. 193-194) Derrida vil vise “the logocentric drift toward origins and self-present truth” (Norris 1987 s. 55) og at “something escapes, exceeds or perplexes the sovereignty of logocentric reason” (Norris 1987 s. 83).

Vestlig metafysikk er preget av “a hope for a *telos* hereafter of self-present presence to absolute truth.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 48) I en tekst kan en dekonstruktør finne “hele metafysikkens begrepterminologi [...]: skabelse, transcendental nødvendighed, totalitet, essens, varighed og umiddelbart nærvær.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 41) “In his texts on Greek philosophy Derrida traces some of the ruses and devices by which writing is systematically opposed to the themes of

truth, self-presence and origin.” (Norris 1988 s. 64) “The ‘meaning of history’ and the ‘history of meaning’ are bound up together in that quest for self-authenticating truth that is endemic to Western thought.” (Norris 1988 s. 77) “That consciousness can be present to itself in the pure light of reason, delivered from the snares of opaque textuality, is a recurrent dream of Western thought.” (Norris 1988 s. 82)

“Derrida would say that phonetic writing gives the illusion of transparency: it disappears before the voice that it transcribes in the same way that the voice is seen to be transparent in relation to the sense or intention it conveys.” (Johnson 1993 s. 88)

“In what sense, according to phonocentrics, is the speaker ‘present’ in his voice? The illusion of vocal presence encompasses many connected beliefs. Here are a few:

- (i) there is a self behind the voice that authenticates or endorses what is said;
- (ii) the self is the point of origin of the speech;
- (iii) the voice is animated by the consciousness of the speaker and expresses what he ‘has in mind’ at the moment of utterance;
- (iv) the meaning of the words used by the voice are what the speaker means by them – in other words, there is a more or less complete coincidence between signifying intention and verbal meaning;
- (v) expressed meaning matches a meaning inherent in the extra-linguistic world so that the voice refers outside of itself to an external state of affairs of which its utterance may be true.” (Tallis 1988 s. 177-178)

“In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida cites numerous instances of this logocentric will to devalue written language in contrast to the natural, the authentic or spontaneous nature of self-present speech.” (Norris 1987 s. 31)

“The relationship between the writer and what is written does not feed such illusions of origin, presence, reference, meaning and truth. When we come across a copy of *The Iliad*, we do not imagine that Homer is in the page authenticating what is written on it. He is not currently the origin of what we are reading: the words are not animated by his consciousness, nor do they express what ‘he has in mind’. The text, moreover, does not refer to a world currently surrounding Homer’s body in which the meaning of his words is to be found. Thus common sense. Derrida, however, disputes the validity of this sharp contrast between speaking and writing: “The thesis of the *arbitrariness* of the sign ... must forbid a radical distinction between the linguistic and the graphic sign.” (OG, p. 44)” (Tallis 1988 s. 177-178)

“To see speech as a natural, direct mode of communication and writing as artificial and oblique – ‘the representation of a representation’ – is therefore to see things upside down. It is in writing rather than in speech that we find language in its most artless state: writing is language wearing its essence on its sleeve. For linguistic

signs are *essentially*, rather than *accidentally*, devoid of the presence of a signifying agent.” (Tallis 1988 s. 179)

Derrida vil avsløre “the same logocentric myth – the craving for origins, truth and presence” og “release av multiplicity of meaning” (Norris 1988 s. 70). Tekstens metafysiske antakelser blir undergravd av teksten når den leses på bestemte måter (Zima 1994 s. 143). Derrida vil ryste, få etablerte systemer til å vakle, og sette tekstforståelse i gang på nye måter (Kofman 1987 s. 207).

Derrida ville løsrive kritisk tenkning fra den institusjonaliserte filosofien og stille spørsmål ved de etablerte begrepene brukt innen f.eks. Hegels totalitetstenkning og Saussures lingvistiske system (Zima 1994 s. 1). Derrida vil etablere eller undersøke begreper som atskiller seg fra filosofiens begreper; det dreier seg om provisoriske eller heuristiske betegnelser som innsirkler grensetilfeller av begrepslighet (Zima 1994 s. 61). Dekonstruktivistene gjør litteratur-vitenskapen til leverandør til andre vitenskaper.

Konsistens-, transparens- og konsekvens-postulater blir forlatt (Bohrer 1993 s. 113). Mening er ikke en stor, avsluttet finale, dvs. en lukket struktur, men en uavlatelig prosess (Barthes 1970b s. 18). Den amerikanske dekonstruktivisten Joseph Hillis Miller “insists on the endlessly *textual* nature of all understanding, the way in which meanings are deferred and multiplied as soon as one begins to interpret.” (Norris 1988 s. 95) Teksten har ikke noe sentrum, snarere et “missing center” (Hillis Miller) (Zima 1994 s. 142). All språkbruk “belong to *writing* in Derrida’s sense of the word: an economy of difference nowhere coinciding with the present intentions of individual speech.” (Norris 1988 s. 110)

Derrida oppfatter etablerte og grunnleggende tankemønstre som strukturer uten sentrum, dvs. uten fast forankring som kunne gitt det øvrige sin ordnede plass, en labyrint der vi aldri kommer fram til midten eller noe oversiktlig orienteringspunkt. Han vil ta vare på pluraliteten og meningsglidningene. Den ubestemmeligheten som Derrida påpeker, forstyrrer de etablerte skillene mellom fiksjon og virkelighet, fiksjon og sannhet, litteratur og filosofi, kunst og teknikk, offentlighet og privatliv (Bennington og Derrida 1991 s. 295). “[C]ritical texts must be read in a radically different way, not so much for their interpretative ‘insights’ as for the symptoms of ‘blindness’ which mark their conceptual limits.” (Norris 1988 s. 23) Litteraturen inngår i et ubestemmelig og endeløst spill (Kofman 1987 s. 93). Det uavsluttbare kan ikke temmes ved å foreta dialektiske synteser eller rasjonalistiske definisjoner (Zima 1994 s. 53). Motsetningene er ikke-dialektiske og ikke-hegelianske (Zima 1994 s. 101). I dekonstruksjon er avdekking av ambivalenser, motsetninger og flertydigheter viktig, i motsetning til begrepslig entydighet (Zima 1994 s. 46).

“Derrida is working, rather, to describe a general process through which texts undo the philosophical system to which they adhere by revealing its rhetorical nature. [...] This displacement has since been transformed into a central methodological

principle by J. Hillis Miller, who argues not just that a text already contains the operation of self-deconstruction, in which two contradictory principles or lines of argument confront one another, but that this undecidability ‘is always thematized in the text itself in the form of metalinguistic statements.’ In other words, the text does not just contain or perform a self-deconstruction but is *about* self-deconstruction, so that a deconstructive reading is an interpretation of the text, an analysis of what it says or means.” (Culler 1983 s. 15)

“The reading is not “our” reading, since it uses only the linguistic elements provided by the text itself; the distinction between author and reader is one of the false distinctions that the reading makes evident. The deconstruction is not something we have added to the text but it constituted the text in the first place. A literary text simultaneously asserts and denies the authority of its own rhetorical mode, and by reading the text as we did we were only trying to come closer to being as rigorous a reader as the author had to be in order to write the sentence in the first place. Poetic writing is the most advanced and refined mode of deconstruction; it may differ from critical or discursive writing in the economy of its articulation, but not in kind.” (Man 1979 s. 17)

“There is no final analysis, no metalinguistic method, which could possibly draw a rigorous line between its own operations and the language they work upon. Semiology has to recognize that the terms and concepts it employs are always bound up with the signifying process it sets out to analyse.” (Norris 1988 s. 9)

Ifølge de Man er både menneskets bevissthet og dets språk isolert fra “naturen” og “verden” (Bohrer 1993 s. 320). “[V]estlig filosofi har forestilt seg at språket og skriften kun er redskaper for bevisstheten; [...] erfaringen av stemmen som fenomen er opphav til en vedvarende form for kulturelt selvbedrag, nemlig av at alt lar seg erkjenne, forklare, finne ut og utredes, at alt lar seg fastholde i et overbevisende og varig nærvær bare det språkliggjøres, eksempelvis i vitenskapelige tekster og deres akademiske konvensjoner, inkludert dialog med sekundærlitteratur. Det er et selvbedrag på konkret nivå.” (*Morgenbladet* 25. juni–1. juli 2010 s. 36)

“[F]or all its sins, deconstruction has surely profited us by establishing the unreliable nature of texts” (Wendy Griswold i <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.so.19.080193.002323>; lesedato 28.06.19).

To strategier smelter sammen: “den litterære teksten blir filosofi, og den filosofiske teksten blir litteratur” (Bohrer 1993 s. 184). Dekonstruktivistene opphever langt på vei skillet mellom teori og diktning, historie og fiksjon, litteratur og filosofi. De griper tak i marginale fenomener, det perifere og uavklarte uavhengig av sjanger. Filosofi er alltid avhengig av retoriske figurer som ikke kan beherskes (Bohrer 1993 s. 207). De Man kalte dekonstruksjon for “samtidig teori og ikke teori, den universelle teorien om teoriens umulighet” (sitert fra Bohrer 1993 s. 343).

“Deconstruction is no more theory than practice, an opposition he [Derrida] deconstructs.” (Llewelyn 1989 s. 46) Avstanden mellom primær- og sekundærtekster forsvinner også, og i stedet inngår alle tekster i et intertekstuellet nettverk uten sentrum og periferi, og uten begynnelse eller slutt (Bohrer 1993 s. 345). Derrida vil “inaugurate a reading attentive to the various points of exchange, of intertextual crossing and confusion, between life and work.” (Norris 1987 s. 213)

“The aesthetic for him [Derrida] is always a little less and a little more than what both its staunchest defenders and most vocal critics claim; it is occulted in the very act of locating and defining it, never completely contained by the frame placed around it and thus never completely “itself.” ” (Carroll 1987 s. 139) “A certain practice of art, then, is still seen as an antidote to the limits of theory, a way of opening theories up to what they exclude or repress.” (Carroll 1987 s. 44)

For de Man tilhører bare de verkene kanon som motsetter seg kanon, og kanon er sterkeste når den møter sterkeste motstand – hva kanon er må dekonstrueres (Bohrer 1993 s. 23). Litteraturen finnes gjennom å mislykkes i kampen mot å bli kanonisert (s. 23).

Paul de Man sa til studentene i begynnelsen av en av sine forelesninger: “Dere kommer aldri til å forstå noe – vi kan slutte her og nå og gå hjem alle sammen.” (siteret og oversatt fra Perrig 2009 s. 79)

“Amerikas første møte med Derrida skete på en konferanse på Johns Hopkins universitetet i Maryland. Her holdt Derrida, i 1966, det foredrag, der skulle vise sig at blive et slags manifest for dekonstruksjon i Amerika. Foredraget hed “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”. Det var et oppgør med strukturalismen i almindelighed og med Claude Lévi-Strauss i særdeleshed.” (Andersen og Hauge 1988 s. 12)

“In 1966, one year before the spectacular appearance of Derrida’s first three books, Pierre Macherey published his *Theory of Literary Production* (English translation, 1978). This work was already, in Terry Eagleton’s words, a “fully-fledged piece of deconstructionist theory ... violently dismembering texts ... to discern within them certain symptomatic absences and aporia, those points at which texts begin to unravel themselves in ambiguous encounter[s] with their deceptively homogeneous power systems” (Eagleton 1981, 141). Macherey, Eagleton points out, refused the illusion of unified texts, sought to explore and explain the contradictions and aporia of literary discourse, and, most significantly, attempted to relate the production of literary discourse to its social context.” (Resch 1992 s. 260)

“The argument that feminists should approach the notion of a total discursive construction of the subject which erases any room for maneuver or radical change by the subject with some trepidation because it could lead to an ineffective, wholly negative feminism (which deconstructs and disrupts but does not construct

anything) is usefully developed in: Linda Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism"; and Susan J. Wolfe and Julia Penelope, "Sexual Identity/Textual Politics: Lesbian (De/Com)positions," *Sexual Practice, Textual Theory: Lesbian Cultural Criticism*, Susan J. Wolfe and Julia Penelope, ed., (Cambridge MA and Oxford UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.) (Connock 1999 s. 40)

Dekonstruksjon er "a dismantling of the text as a coherent signifying system [...] This deconstructive discourse is called 'radical bricolage' by Corrigan (1986)." (Anne Jerslev i Mathijs og Mendik 2008 s. 91-92) Den russiske forfatteren Vladimir Georgievitsj Sorokin dekonstruerer ifølge litteraturforskeren Christine Engel alle de tre store, europeiske metafortellingene: den kristelige, den rasjonalistiske og den marxistiske (i Neuhaus og Holzner 2007 s. 709).

"[T]he Parisian journal *Tel Quel*'s brand of 'libertarian' textual theory [...] equates radical politics with the free play of an infinitely pluralized meaning." (Norris 1988 s. 80)

"Etiken blir tveksamhetens ort. Men dette innebær inte att dekonstruktionen inte har fått eller kommer att få viktiga politiska konsekvenser. Dess vaksamhet mot inramningar, styrningar och idén om en enda meningsgivande instans, ger den en udd riktad mot alla auktoritært och hierarkiskt oppbyggda system." (Olsson 1987 s. 148)

Den amerikanske maleren Mark Tanseys oljemaleri *Derrida queries de Man* (1990) viser de to litteratur-filosofene i kamp med hverandre i Alpene, i rollene som Sherlock Holmes og professor Moriarty ved Reichenbach Falls.

"Michel Foucault once described Jacques Derrida's prose style as an effort at "obscurantist terrorism." " (Lehman 1992 s. 77)

"[H]ovedmålet på Utøya 22. juli var tidligere statsminister Gro Harlem Brundtland. Hun skulle tas til fange og halshugges for åpent kamera. Til dette formålet brakte han håndjern, kniv og bajonett med seg til Utøya. Det forberedte henrettelses-formularet lød: "Du GHB dømmes til døden for å ha dekonstruert norsk kultur." [...] I rettssalen begrunner Behring Breivik sine ugjerninger med ønsket om å slå tilbake mot "dekonstruksjonen" og "multikulturalismen". [...] Dekonstruksjonen observerer imidlertid hvordan jakten på helhet og mening, sammenheng og tilhørighet blir patologisk når man lever i en gjennomstrømmende globalisert verden. Den vil øve oss i å utsette kategoriseringene, respektere forskjellene og fornemme det flyktige ved tilværelsen. Dekonstruksjonen har fremfor alt vært vellykket som litteraturvitenskapelig program. Hvorfor skulle et kunstverk la seg redusere til en helhetlig fortolkning? Bør man ikke snarere undersøke hvordan tekster vender seg bort fra og motsetter seg slike fortolkninger?" (professor Kjetil Jacobsen i *Morgenbladet* 4.–10. mai 2012 s. 42)

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